The Ninth Congress was the turning point of Lin Biao’s decline from strength to strength
In April 1969, the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held. Mao rewarded Lin Biao’s successor status by writing it into the party constitution for the first time, and arranged for Lin’s subordinates Huang, Wu, Ye, Li and Qiu to join the Politburo at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee.
Why did Mao include Lin Biao’s successor status in the party constitution? In his speech at the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Lin Biao said he was “very upset and disturbed” by the inclusion of his successor status in the new draft party constitution. Mao agreed to it only after “considering it for one night” at the repeated insistence of Jiang Qing and others. Obviously, Mao would not make such a major decision because of Jiang Qing’s suggestion, Mao must have his own considerations, to be taken, must be given first? It is impossible to guess, but there are still traces: in the opening ceremony of the Ninth Congress, Mao deliberately nominated Lin Biao as the chairman of the presidium of the General Assembly to test, Lin Biao quickly responded, shouting “Mao as chairman”. “Lin Biao immediately interrupted Zhou’s speech and shed tears in praise of Mao. However, Mao still quoted the Soviets’ criticism of China as a “military bureaucracy” at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee to express his concern about the expansion of Lin Biao’s military power in a twisted way. Mao brought Xu Shiyou and Chen Xilian into the Politburo, and promoted Li Desheng to the Politburo as well, in an attempt to check and balance Lin Biao. Mao was very careful in appointing the first leaders of the military regions, and Lin had no right to use his power for this level of military leadership.
After the Ninth Congress, Mao began to suppress Lin Biao’s military influence, one of the ways was to cool down the cult of the individual, a move directed at Lin Biao, the drummer of the cult of the individual. in June 1969, he repeatedly criticized the formalistic touting of him in Wuhan, and said in front of his staff, “The four greats are too annoying! . Later, “Mao Zedong explained that Zhou Enlai had taken down all the quotation boards hung in the Great Hall of the People. When Zhou did so, Mao deliberately said in front of Lin Biao: “These bastards are no more.
Mao’s second tactic was to deliberately support Zhang Chunqiao in order to restrain, stimulate and combat Lin Biao. After the 9th National Congress (one says it was the end of April 1970), Mao took Zhang Chunqiao to Suzhou to visit Lin Biao. In the conversation, Mao first said that the Premier was getting old and asked him what he had in mind for Zhou Enlai’s successor, and then turned the tables and asked Lin Biao: I am getting old and you are not well, who are you going to give the class to in the future? When he saw that Lin Biao did not say anything, Mao asked again: What do you think about Zhang (Zhang Chunqiao)? At this point, Lin Biao began to worry that his “successor” status would not be preserved.
Lin Biao was aware of Mao’s intention to abolish the reserve, but he failed to avoid Mao’s sharpness. In October 1969, Lin Biao reported the report of his son Lin Liguo’s scientific and technological inventions in the military to Mao, which was commended by Mao and Mao received Lin Liguo, which made Lin Biao forgetful and took advantage of the situation to launch Lin Liguo in a grand manner, knowing full well that Mao’s death had dealt a huge blow to Mao and that his only son’s health had been affected by Mao’s death. On July 23, 1970, Lin Biao took Lin Liguo to inspect a military factory of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, with Lin Biao in the middle, Lin Liguo and Huang Yongsheng on his side, followed by Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and other generals, receiving a warm welcome from the army. On July 31, Lin Liguo gave another “lecture” in the Air Force, using Lin Biao’s original materials for the political report of the Ninth National Congress as “base material”, from “China must be strong” to “socialist politics and economy”. “The pamphlet was widely circulated in the military, and the Air Force was touting Lin Liguo as a “super genius”, which Lin Biao did not stop but encouraged. According to some sources, Mao was “very unhappy” when he found out about it and said to Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao in private that I was not dead yet and that Comrade Lin Biao was not well and could not wait to prepare his successor.
The first time, he said, “I’m not going to be able to do that. The next day, Ye Qun reported it to Mao and Zhou as a “telephone circulation”. Lin Biao and his wife had always been cautious about Mao, but this time they made a big mistake. Lin Biao was not concerned about the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, but after the Sino-Soviet vice foreign minister’s negotiations in Beijing, Lin Biao was worried that the Soviet Union might make a surprise attack, so he became nervous and gave several instructions at his residence in Suzhou, which were later issued to the whole army by Yan Zhongchuan of the Military Commission with the headline “Vice Chairman Lin’s first instruction”. Mao’s favorite thing is that Lin Biao does not care about things, and once Lin Biao wanted to give orders, he was uncomfortable. Mao ordered Wang Dongxing to burn the “first order” that Lin Biao reported to him. In fact, this time, it was all because of Mao’s suspicion. According to some sources, on that day, when the news came back to Suzhou, Lin Biao regretted very much, because before that, he did not even dare to make the decision to mobilize a company of troops, but had to consult Mao, and this time, he took the initiative in the most sensitive aspect of Mao, which was a big mistake. On this very day, Lin Biao wrote two more paintings, one for himself and the other for Ye Qun, saying, “This is the only thing that matters.
In December 1958, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee announced that Mao would not serve as the next president of the country. According to some sources, the news was like a “bolt from the blue”, and many workers and peasants cried out in pain, thinking that the country was about to collapse. Many people said excitedly, “This is not right, Chairman Mao can not leave us behind”, “Who will we listen to in the future!” “Aren’t we now children without a mother?” “If Chairman Mao is the chairman of the Republic, the people of the country will feel like they have a person in charge and something to fall back on. The people of the country demanded that he still be what?” Nankai University professor Long Yin said, “Chairman Mao as the country’s chairman is the desire of everyone, (he) is not only China’s chairman, but also the chairman of all mankind.” Many people even said that no one is qualified to replace Chairman Mao in the post of State President, “No one can be the President except him (referring to Chairman Mao)”, “The President of the Republic has a lot of power, if Chairman Mao is not, will there be problems if someone else is?” Although Mao stepped down from the post of State President, but fully enjoyed the love of the masses, which is why in 1970 he questioned Lin Biao, who advised him to advance, etc.: “I did not do it more than ten years ago, would not it be more than ten years since the people are not represented?” And from 1958 to 1959, only a very few people could see Mao’s heart. A kindergarten teacher in Xiamen said that Chairman Mao proposed not to be the chairman of the state in order to test the people’s trust in him. Liu Guojun, vice chairman of Jiangsu Province’s Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, “whispered to someone” that “in the future, we will make a person as a tablet, to cope with, to interact with, in reality, Chairman Mao is still in charge.” Guo Chengquan, deputy director of Shenyang Education Bureau, said, “Because the party power is above everything, the power is still in his hands, he alone has the say, even Premier Zhou still has to be very careful.” Wang Minsheng, vice chairman of the Beijing Federation of Industry and Commerce, even suggested, “Is the chairman of the government needed in the future, and if not, the constitution can be amended.” It is for this reason that when Mao proposed not to have a state chairman in 1970, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and others made statements and pleaded with Mao to be the state chairman.
However, Mao’s reluctance to become the president was still sincere, and because he was so stimulated by the “one country, two governments” after 1959, as early as at the end of the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, the central government issued an order to the whole country to change the post of “chairman” of all people’s organizations to “director. All of them were changed to “director”. In 1970, what Wang Minsheng had said eleven years earlier really came true, and now Mao advocated the abolition of the “state chairmanship”.
Why did Lin Biao advocate the establishment of a State Chairman? First of all, Lin Biao answered Mao’s test with “persuasion”; secondly, Lin Biao’s health would never allow him to take up the post, but this did not stop him from asking Mao for a name, as the Chinese people’s deep-rooted notion that “if the name is not right, the words will not be right” was not a problem for Lin Biao. The deep-rooted Chinese concept that “if the name is not right, the words are not right” had a great influence on Lin Biao. Before the Cultural Revolution and up to 1969, Lin Biao’s congratulatory messages to his “brother countries” on the occasion of Military Day were signed “Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of National Defense”, but from 1970 onwards, they were signed “Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China”. This detail shows the importance he attached to his title: Lin Biao was the Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and “close comrade”, “successor”, and “deputy commander-in-chief”, in addition to the post of Minister of National Defense. The terms “close comrade”, “successor” and “deputy commander-in-chief” are all descriptive language, not even a false title. This time, Lin Biao wanted a position that would represent the state’s prestigious weapon. Although the position of state president was only a symbol of honor and etiquette, holding this position would at least consolidate his position as “successor”. Lin Biao’s insistence, of course, had its own purpose, which Mao saw through at once.
The debate over the “genius theory” and the “three adverbs” was also a contest between Lin Biao’s group and Jiang Qing’s group under the name of Mao. The Lin soldiers have been tolerating the arrogance of Jiang Qing’s literati group for a long time, and Lin Biao and others know that Jiang Qing has great influence on Mao, so they have been perfunctory to Jiang Qing for many years, sometimes praising a few words, but in a very measured way, while Ye Qun has been warming up and praising Jiang Qing. The Lin soldiers also felt sad about the death of the old cadres, which made them dissatisfied with Jiang Qing’s group. The Lin soldiers challenged Zhang Chunqiao on Lushan to force Mao to take a stand between the military and Jiang Qing’s group, and Mao, after weighing the situation in two days, decided that Lin wanted to “seize power” and took measures one after another to crack down on Lin’s power: (a) throwing out Chen Boda.
(1) Throw out Chen Bodha. Chen Boda followed Mao for decades and was the main builder of Mao’s thought and Mao’s ideology. In 1966, when Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, Chen Boda did not leave a way out and supported Mao without reservation, and gave Jiang Qing a shield, but after 1969, Mao’s dissatisfaction with Chen was already very deep, and Chen Boda began to lean on Lin Biao because of repeated humiliation by Jiang Qing, and the report of the Ninth National Congress drafted by Chen Boda was not in line with Mao’s ideas. Chen Boda jumped out on Lushan and played the vanguard for the Lin system, and Mao warned Lin Biao by beating Chen Boda.
(2) Carrying out the “criticism of Chen’s rectification”. After Mao failed to wait for Lin Biao’s “statement”, in December 1970, Mao instructed to convene the “North China Symposium”, explicitly criticizing Chen Boda and actually beating Lin Biao, delaying to let Huang, Wu, Ye, Li and Qiu “pass”. “Mao also criticized Ye Qun in particular: “He has become a member of the Central Committee and is going to the sky”. Mao also launched a campaign against the army, “anti-pride and full-blown”, and proposed that “the army should be cautious”, criticizing Lin Biao’s advocacy of “talking about use” and “highlighting politics” as “engaging in fancy”, pointing the finger directly at Lin Biao.
(3) “Flinging stones, mixing sand and digging corners”, reorganizing the Military Commission Office Group and the Beijing Military Region, forcing Lin Biao to review.
(4) On May 31, 1971, the “Notes on Chairman Mao’s Meeting with the American Friend Snow”, which had been reviewed by Mao, was verbally conveyed to all Party members in the form of a central document to let the people know that the “four greats” proposed by Mao to Lin Biao (“great teacher, great leader, great commander-in-chief, and great helmsman”) had been accepted. (5) The army is not averse to deception.
(5) On June 9, 1971, Jiang Qing took a photo of Lin Biao, “Tireless”, which was published in the combined issues of People’s Pictorial and PLA Pictorial 7 and 8 in 1971, and played an important role in paralyzing Lin Biao.
(6) On August 15, 1971, Mao began his southern tour to “greet” Lin Biao, the purpose of which was to further weaken his position and prepare for the upcoming Third Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, but at this time, Mao had not yet made up his mind to completely overthrow Lin.
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