Forty-five years ago today, the deputy commander of the Cultural Revolution was about to flee when his plane crashed in Wendur Khan, Mongolia, the next day. Since the Lushan meeting in 1970, the next line struggle has been directed at him, and he is making a last-ditch effort to win MAO’s understanding.
Throughout his life, Lin biao wrote (including asking for instructions) countless times to MAO Zedong. Their correspondence will be an important material for future studies of the History of the Communist Party, and this book would also be a bestseller. They have gone from being close to each other at first, even as father and son, to giving legal succession and to being at loggiest. They have changed so much, dramatically, and ended so violently in ways rarely seen in modern and ancient politics.
Lin Biao’s last letter to MAO Zedong was on May 23, 1971. The letter was never sent, and Lin Biao’s decision to flee from MAO’s home was never handed over to MAO zedong. And there is plenty of evidence that Lin Biao was determined to break with MAO zedong at the Tiananmen Rostrum on May 1st, as he still wrote to MAO more than 20 days later to explain that he had been trying to save his life from imminent danger. On July 1 of that year, he agreed to be photographed by Jiang Qing, confirming that he did not want to fall out with MAO Zedong.
Lin Biao’s last letter to MAO was this:
On May 20, I had a talk with Premier Zhou About party unity and the safety of those equivalent to or above the Political Bureau. For the consideration of the Premier and for the instruction of the Chairman, I would like to report to the Chairman the summary of my remarks. I would like to ask the Chairman to consider and hope that the Chairman can have a talk with the Premier. My comments are as follows:
After five years of the cultural revolution, a revolution is very necessary and correct, we won a great victory, now is to consolidate the victory, is to carry out the unity of nine route, ensure especially after nine big batch rectification after Chen (Chen rectification is necessary and correct, because Chen po-ta is counterrevolutionary, is the big bad Wolf, he took advantage of the lushan meeting opportunity to insurrection, so you must eliminate the influence of his), the party central committee and politburo, in a fairly long time maintain consolidate solidarity, prevention of confused thoughts and adventurers take unexpected adventures, and undermine the party’s unity, lead to the order of chaos, Cause domestic and foreign adverse reaction, want to think of specific method for this. I think the following ways, I do not know whether, looking forward to deliberate chairman: first, the four a to practice, one is in the interim, within a decade of current members and alternate members of the political bureau of the central committee of the major military commands head honcho, the second in command, to arrest, detention, not kill, do not removed four, if they have a member of error, is solved through the party’s ideological criticism, they were sick, can replace work, if the illness only ascend others to succeed, as to require a long illness retirees to handle retired cadres, a want is unavoidable circumstances, executive chairman of face-to-face made clear instructions. Second, to convey the above rules to Beijing and other cities as necessary the garrison, each soldier to them according to the rules, don’t carry out any other than the President at any time in the relevant head of the political bureau of the central committee of the central or the equivalent of the above personnel to catch people, people, homicide, chaos to order, if they excuse is executed command and disorderly, it I should accept the legal sanctions, no matter where to escape, all should bring that, and must never excuse is execute commands and shirk their responsibilities; Third, in order to ensure the safety of the capital, the three artificial hills near the capital are proposed to be defended by an independent battalion from east China, Northeast China and Shandong each. Fourth, it was suggested that the thirty-eighth should be moved out of North China. This was a good unit, but it was not well placed near the capital, and it would be advisable to move elsewhere, and replace it with an army of two, three, or one.
I have read the documents of this rectification meeting. Some comrades are worried about security. They are worried, so they deserve to be taken seriously and given deep thought.
I think, in order to prevent the accident, so I thought of the above methods, but these methods are necessarily incomplete or even incorrect, I hereby report to the Chairman, asking him to consider the prime Minister to follow. With regard to articles 1 and 2, it would even be possible to call a meeting of all the officers of the security forces in the capital to announce it, orally or verbally uploaded to every soldier, and to repeat the message to the soldiers every two or three months for ten years. In ten years’ time we shall see how things stand, and we shall basically act in this spirit. Troops outside the capital may be communicated to cadres above the division level. These contents should be kept strictly confidential to avoid side effects as much as possible.
I should like very much to talk with the Chairman, and if he is free, please give me an appointment.
We might as well look at the final part of the letter, Lin biao “suggest 38 army transferred from north China, the forces is very good, but not very suitable in near the capital”, as is known to all, the Chinese people’s liberation army (PLA) the 38th army’s predecessor is the northeast field army column 1, Lin biao made MAO zedong rest assured, no any wild desires, their commanding troops out of the capital, “in a former two wild, mino or a field army to replace”, and near the capital, but not my own. “In order to ensure the safety of the capital, it is suggested that the three man-made mountains near the capital should be fortified by an independent battalion from east China, Northeast China and Shandong each faction”, which also gave advice to MAO Zedong and no one could “rule alone” in the capital. It was a well-intentioned statement.
Another important part of the letter was clearly a fear of the future. He proposed “no arrest, no detention, no killing, no dismissal of the top and second commanders of the military commands who are currently members and alternate members of the Politburo”. Everyone knew that Chen Boda had been found out nominally after the lushan meeting more than half a year before, but Lin Biao had already been pointed out with a sword. Lin Biao and his beloved general were guilty during the Cultural Revolution, but it was never at the Lushan meeting that MAO Zedong was proposed as president, nor was it much mentioned in the later approval of Huang Wu and Li Qiu. And the vast majority of central committee members at the meeting, either out of admiration or fear, approved of MAO zedong as chairman. But only Lin Biao group out of the question, that this is just an excuse.
Lin Biao from the time of nearly a year to the crash, has been trying to get MAO Zedong’s understanding, he also urged Wu Faxian and other initiative to find MAO Zedong admitted mistakes, but MAO Zedong firmly not, until Lin Biao personally wrote a letter almost begging for mercy, in the letter asked MAO Zedong “about me to talk” also ignored. From the contents of the letter, he was in a state of emergency under some martialdisorder, Lin Biao asked zhou Enlai for advice on the letter, Zhou Enlai answered meaningfully: “Is this necessary?” Zhou enlai, who had more political experience, knew that writing letters was useless.
As for Lin biao proposal to the politburo “practice the arrest, detention, not kill, do not removed four” is clearly to protect Huang Wu Ye Li qiu, regardless of when MAO zedong was determined to put a few menace in limbo, is in a casual can put a leader (not to mention ordinary people) in the s the legalization of prison and how is it possible to Lin biao [here? If MAO had wanted to overthrow Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao and all the politburo members had disagreed, at least the Cultural Revolution would not have gone so smoothly. If Liu Shaoqi had not firmly supported the overthrow of Peng Dehuai and said a few years later, “It is Peng Dehuai who cannot be restored to justice,” he would not have responded so enthusiastically to luo Zhi’s accusation. If the perpetrators of the miscarriages of justice are cleared up from the Yenan rectification period, the ten years of the Cultural Revolution will not go without law.
Since it has become a national policy to make unjust, false and wrong cases at will, and Lin Biao himself helped to make them happen many times (of course, there were some resistance in the late Cultural Revolution), how could he be spared in his own turn?
For Lin Biao, it was all too late, only to sit tight and die. On September 12, 45 years ago today, Lin Biao prepared to flee completely.
Lin Biao’s final outcome is very sad, if there is a “four no” system may not be so hastily, this thing has a sequel: since there is no “four no” system, so sorry, Jiang Qing can not be “four no” treatment, in MAO Zedong’s bones before the cold was caught, a farewell to the era of terror began. Ye Jianying, an important participant in the campaign, said significantly: “Catching the Gang of four will be the last time in party history that special means will be used to solve problems within the Party.”