Lin Biao was a contradiction of “individual heroism” and “deep secrecy”, which eventually led to the September 13 Incident.

Mao and Lin’s conflict intensified, leading to the “September 13 Incident”

Mao’s “leadership science” has always been successful. In the past, Mao had a good command, and all his party rivals fell to the ground and waited for death.

In Mao’s “leadership science”, asking people to do a review is a big part of the content, and oral review does not work, must be a written review only, Mao like to let people do a written review, probably because of the benefits of the move is also very big: (a) this is a record, the first time to keep a record, the first time to do a review.

(a) the establishment of this record, from the hands of the pigtail, you can always “new accounts together with the old”.

(2) Depending on the circumstances, the review will be sent down to the party to combat the prestige of the comrade or purge its influence.

(3) Let the reviewers themselves admit their mistakes, using their mouths, sitting on Mao’s accusations, more persuasive, the so-called “convincing”.

(4) The standard review, apart from “confessing” and “admitting” mistakes, is to glorify Mao, and if such a review is issued, it will greatly strengthen the worship of Mao by the whole Party and the whole country.

During the Mao era, especially during the Cultural Revolution, no matter whether it was sincere or not, people who wrote reviews were all over the place, from Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, to the party, political and military officials who were beaten and prayed to be reinstated, to the staff around Mao, with the exception of one person, Lin Biao, who just didn’t do a written review no matter how much pressure Mao put on him.

Among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin Biao was a very individualistic person, who lived a simple life, was a loner, and had lived in isolation for many years. As for Lin Biao’s personality, Liu Shaotang, who had close contact with Lin Biao and served as a cadre of the Xinhua General Branch of the Fourth Field from 1949 to 1950 and later fled to Taiwan to found Biographical Literature, had the following comment in a book published in 1951: “Lin Biao is an individual heroist with a strong desire for leadership”. In an internal book on Lin Biao published in 1968, the KMT military in Taiwan, Lin Biao’s old opponent on the battlefield, besides quoting Liu Shaotang’s above opinion, also considered Lin Biao as “modest, simple and regular in life, meticulous and thorough in his thinking” and “extremely ambitious but deep in secrecy. He was “very ambitious but not hidden”. It should be said that Liu Shaotang’s and the Kuomintang military’s observation of Lin Biao’s personality was basically accurate.

“Individual heroist” and “deeply hidden” are originally contradictory, but both are indeed the most important characteristics of Lin Biao’s personality. In the past, Lin Biao was able to unite the two, even in the period after the Lushan Conference. Some sources say that at one point after the Lushan Conference, Lin Biao wanted to write a letter to Mao, and had his secretary draft it on his behalf, reportedly asking the newly transferred secretary Wang Huanli to write it. It is also said that Lin’s letter is not a review, but a negotiation of conditions with Mao, its main content is that he and Mao have common interests, which is to consolidate the achievements of the Cultural Revolution, “he persuaded Mao not to remove his people in ten years, not to kill his head, can guarantee ten years without chaos”, Ye Qun think Mao is unlikely to accept this condition, stop not let issued. Lin Biao wanted to write a letter to Mao and was prevented by Ye Qun from doing so, which Mao actually knew. At the end of March 1971, Zhou Enlai and others went to Beidaihe on Mao’s order, hoping that Lin would attend the report meeting held by the central government to criticize Chen’s rectification and make a statement. However, in his conversation with Zhou and others, he politely admitted that he also had “mistakes” and was a “cannon” and had been “used” by Chen Boda. Lin Biao wanted to cope with Mao’s pressure with this verbal check, but was unwilling to do any further check on a larger scale. Mao was extremely annoyed with Lin’s unwillingness to cooperate, so he took it out on the “Big Four”, and Lin gave up the idea of inspection. On the night of May 1, 1971, in front of Mao, Lin played the temper of an “individual heroist” on the Tiananmen Tower. He did not even say hello to Mao, nor did he look at Mao’s eyes, but sat in his seat for a few minutes before brushing off.

In the early 70s, Lin Biao was hesitating between learning from Fan Li and Cao Cao, but his physical and mental state was getting worse and worse. Although he was motivated by Cao Cao’s “great ambition and wisdom”, Lin Biao was still an “individual heroist” at heart and could not change his nature despite his long years of obscurity. On the one hand, he begged to see Mao and even went through Jiang Qing’s doorway, but Mao put him off; on the other hand, when the opportunity came, he committed “personal heroism” again. On June 3, 1971, Mao instructed Lin Biao to accompany him to meet with Ceausescu of Romania, but Lin first refused to go, and then agreed to go only after Ye Qun’s begging on his knees. He could have used this opportunity to talk to Mao after receiving the foreign guests, but this opportunity was given up by Lin Biao himself.

Mao’s step-by-step approach and Lin Biao’s soft and hard resistance finally led to the “September 13” incident. Mao did not expect Lin Liguo to dare to “stab the King of Qin”, which was the first time after Mao took power. Although Lin Liguo has the intention to assassinate Mao, but the whole program as a child’s play, they dare not do it, and in his father’s single-handedly directed by the Chong Mao environment, Mao has become “God”, more than a few dare to sell their lives for the Lin family dead soldiers, plus Mao’s vigilance is extremely high, so he was lucky to avoid the assassination.

The first thing you need to do is to take a look at the website. The reason is that for many years, Ye Qun controlled the information of Lin, but in this important matter of the family’s life, if there is no consent of Lin Biao, Lin Liguo how dare to take his father’s life’s reputation and family life to risk this? Although Mao was pressing forward, his life was not yet at stake. Lin Biao had always been encouraged by his “calmness in the face of great events” and had studied the “coup scriptures” of China and abroad. Among the top leaders of socialist countries, such as Stalin, Tito, Hoxha, Kim Il Sung, there is no precedent of any of them being assassinated, so can a few young boys have any chance to win? If Lin Biao did so, it would only mean that he was mentally deranged and had the name of “Commander of the Generation” in vain!

Lin Liheng played a key role in keeping the central government informed of the situation, and on September 1-2, 1971, Jiangxi leader Cheng Shiqing denounced Mao in Nanchang, and Lin Liheng came to Jiangxi several times to convey the message to Cheng through his wife that Cheng Shiqing should have less contact with the Lin family in the future. This important revelation by Cheng Shiqing caused Mao to be highly alarmed. On September 12, Lin Liheng reported five times to the head of 8341 troops in Beidaihe that Ye Qun and Lin Liguo were going to hijack Lin Biao and escape.

Why would Lin Ligheng be so righteous? Although Lin Liheng knew that her father’s position was slipping after the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, she was more dissatisfied with Ye Qun’s power and long-term blockade of Lin Biao; she was kind and simple by nature, unaware of the dangers of politics and ignorant of history, but princess temper and self-righteousness. Despite the influence of Lin Biao, Lin Liheng had deep superstition about Mao and thought that his father was at most like Zhu De, who was treated coldly by Mao. All these prompted Lin Liheng to denounce the Central Committee.

From all indications, Lin Biao was not prepared to flee to the Soviet Union, and his plan to flee south to Guangzhou was not well thought out, and there was no plan to meet him in Guangzhou. After his departure from Beijing to Beidaihe in July 1971, Lin Biao’s mood became more lonely and gray, and from the available information, he was ready to listen to God and let Mao fall. It was only when Lin Liguo’s attempted assassination of Mao was known that Lin Biao knew the disaster was imminent and his relationship with Mao was irrevocable, while Ye Qun and Lin Liguo were not willing to sit still and wait for death. What is puzzling is that Beijing did not give a clear answer to the report of Lin Lixiang’s prosecution, but later asked Lin Lixiang to get on the plane as well. It is now certain that the crash of Special Flight 256 in Wendur Khan had nothing to do with the Chinese side, but further information is unknown, because the “black box” of the plane is in the hands of the Soviets and has not been released so far.