The Philippines seems to be an exception to the string of Chinese diplomatic failures in recent years. However, on May 3, Philippine Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin tweeted a request for Chinese ships stranded in the disputed waters of the South China Sea to leave Ngau Yoke Reef, going so far as to say, “Let’s see, oh, get the fxxx out! (GET THE FXXX OUT)”, he said: “That kind of gentle diplomatic rhetoric does not work at all.” He also called China “an ugly fool trying to impose his will on a handsome man who wanted to be friends.”
Although Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte inoculated himself against the Chinese vaccine and said “thank you China” in an evening television interview, and Lurchin apologized to China the next day, the “dramatic” episode that preceded it slapped the Chinese Communist Party in the face. But the previous “dramatic” episode was a slap in the face to the Chinese Communist Party.
In fact, Philippine-China relations have been quite “dramatic” in the last two decades. The background of the above incident is that Duterte shifted his policy toward China dramatically after he was elected president in 2016. Originally, relations between the Philippines and China fell fast after the Huangyan Island standoff in 2012, and hit rock bottom in the 2016 South China Sea arbitration case (which ruled almost entirely in favor of the Philippines’ claims), when the Chinese Communist Party was very passive. However, President Duterte changed his strategy after taking office, meeting with Xi Jinping eight times and transforming the relationship between the two sides.
Why did Duterte change his strategy? There are two main reasons. The first reason is fear of the Chinese Communist Party. The second reason, economic disillusionment with the CCP. on October 18, 2016, Duterte visited China and the two sides signed a total of 13 bilateral cooperation agreements covering economic and trade, agriculture, tourism, anti-drug and other areas, worth $13.5 billion. in November 2018, Xi Jinping visited the Philippines and the two sides signed 29 cooperation documents, with the intention of combining the “Belt and Road The two sides signed 29 cooperation documents with the intention of dovetailing the “Belt and Road” with Duterte’s “build, build, build” policy, which is expected to cost $180 billion over the next six years.
So, five years into his presidency, has Duterte’s policy toward China achieved its intended goals? As it turns out, Duterte has fallen into the CCP’s trap. To name a few.
For one thing, the Philippines has complained that the Chinese government has not delivered on its promises, and that its aid and investments in the Philippines have fallen short of its promises. Meanwhile, China has become the Philippines’ top trading partner and top source of imports, and the trade structure between China and the Philippines as a whole is in a state of imbalance, with China enjoying a huge trade surplus with the Philippines. For example, in 2018, the Philippines imported $20.11 billion from China and the Philippines exported $9.983 billion to China, leaving the Philippines with a trade deficit of $10.127 billion with China, accounting for 39.97% of the total foreign trade deficit of the Philippines. And by 2020, bilateral trade between China and the Philippines will be $61.15 billion, with the Philippine trade deficit with China rising to $22.53 billion. In addition, Chinese enterprises have relatively small direct investment in the whole industry of the Philippines (only $140 million in 2020), but vigorously seize the engineering market ($6.24 billion in new engineering contracts in the Philippines in 2019, an increase of 102%; $9.6 billion in 2020).
Secondly, incidents of disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines continue to occur. For example, the “Nakye Island Crisis” (Nakye Island is the second largest natural island in the Spratly Islands, which is a disputed island between China and the Philippines and is now under the actual control of the Philippines) in the second half of 2018 to 2019. Another example is the “Whitsun Reef incident” from March this year, when the Philippine side rarely summoned the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines.
Third, the Chinese Communist Party’s military expansion and “war wolf diplomacy” in recent years have posed a serious threat to the Philippines, forcing the Duterte administration to constantly adjust its policy toward the United States. At one point, Duterte said “I want to part ways with the U.S.” and refused to hold joint military exercises with the U.S. military in the future, and in February 2020 even announced the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (which allows the U.S. military to be stationed in the country and conduct extensive joint exercises between the U.S. and the Philippines), but his position soon changed again. changed. For example, the Philippines announced the suspension of the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States twice, in June and November 2020, respectively. In late January 2021, for example, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said the United States was a “stabilizing force” in the contentious South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region and was optimistic about a “new era” in Manila’s relations with Washington. optimistic about a “new era” of relations with Washington.
In fact, the Philippines’ relations with the Chinese Communist Party are far from harmonious. According to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, the Philippines has lodged 78 diplomatic protests with the CCP since Duterte took office in 2016.
To sum up, the Philippines’ policy of pandering to the CCP out of fear and illusions about it has turned out to be bitter. This is a living lesson to the rest of the world: one must deal with the CCP head-on and abandon any fears and illusions.
Filipinos, of course, feel this most acutely. More and more Filipinos are realizing that the CCP may make concessions or concessions to the Philippines for a while or in certain areas for strategic reasons, but the expansion of the CCP’s ambition and the difficulty of hiding its wolf nature (or deliberately showing it in order to intimidate the Philippines) may eventually intensify the conflict between the Philippines and China and make the “Duterte’s China policy” unsustainable.
For the Chinese Communist Party, Duterte is a key factor in the breakthrough improvement of Sino-Philippine relations; however, when Duterte leaves office next year at the end of his presidential term, who will take office and what will be the Philippines’ policy toward China? Everything is still up in the air.
One should not be surprised if a more sober Philippine policy toward China undergoes another dramatic change.
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