In recent years, studies on Mao’s successor complex and the institutional and personal factors of the Lin Biao tragedy have tended to deepen. One noteworthy point is that this incident was not only a tragedy of the “successor,” but its cause and effect also involved the selection and designation of the “successor” of the “successor,” that is, the successor of the next generation. The problem of designation. The late Chinese historian Gao Hua pointed out in 2006 that Lin Biao’s “political naiveté” was to introduce his son Lin Liguo as his successor during the Cultural Revolution, thus breaking Mao’s taboo. [1] Recently, Tang Shaojie, a scholar of the Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, further pointed out that “Mao’s ‘successor’ complex and its practical manifestations are unique in that Mao’s ‘successor’ was ‘intergenerational designation’, that is, Mao Zedong had to choose both his own ‘successor’ and the ‘successor’ of his ‘successor ‘. …… Mao Zedong had suggested that his own ‘handpicked’ but ‘legal’ successor Lin Biao for the CCP party constitution accept Zhang Chunqiao as Lin Biao’s successor, which made the relationship between Mao and Lin Biao very This made the relationship between Mao and Lin Biao likely to go down the road of no return, and more likely to cause the top personnel changes of the Cultural Revolution to become some kind of destiny. Mao may never have seriously considered the relationship between his ‘successor’ and his ‘successor’s’ ‘successor’. The history of the Cultural Revolution proves that this relationship between the ‘successor’ and the ‘successor’ of the ‘successor’ is either incompatible with each other, like enemies, or between you and me, and not share the same fate.” [2]
Throughout the origin, development and intensification of the Mao-Lin crossfire, this “successor” of the “successor” dispute is always the substantive focus of this conflict, although on many occasions it is often floated by the “theory” and “line The “successor” dispute is the substantive focus of this conflict, although on many occasions it is often covered up by facile “theories” and “lines” of adornment.
The return to the civil service and the choice of Zhang Chunqiao as the second-generation successor
With the re-examination of the so-called “Lin Biao counter-revolutionary group” in recent years, there has been a simple black-and-white theory of either/or in the “reversal of the case”, i.e., describing Lin Biao and his military group as the “opposition” of the Cultural Revolution. The “Opposition”. In fact, when we oppose the official “line struggle” and the “counter-revolutionary group” case, it does not mean that what Lin Biao and others did in the Cultural Revolution is correct. It is even more important not to inappropriately create or exalt the examples of Lin Biao as the representative of the correct line. For example, in the memoirs of Qiu Huizuo and Wu Fa Xian, both members of Lin Biao’s military group, it is said that Lin Biao supported the report of the Ninth National Congress drafted by Chen Boda before the Ninth Congress, advocating the end of the Cultural Revolution and “the development of production and economic construction”,[3] for which he and Mao Zedong had an “extremely far-reaching “The “struggle” with Mao – because Mao supported the report of the Ninth Congress drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, which aimed to continue the revolution. This statement does not actually correspond to historical facts. The factual situation is that Chen Boda improperly set aside Zhang and Yao because of the contempt of the literati for each other, and personally penned the Ninth Congress report that should have been drafted collectively and could not be completed in time, and was blamed by Mao. And Mao actually agreed to include Chen Boda’s comments in Zhang Yao’s report. [4] The most important thing is: Lin Biao may have agreed with some of Chen Boda’s views in private, but in public he never expressed any opposition or even a small modification to Zhang Yao’s report as a reporter. Generally speaking, the political line or advocacy of any political figure must be measured first and foremost on the basis of what he says and does in public and how it affects the political activities of the country. Even if Lin might have expressed his agreement with some of Chen’s ideas on a private occasion with Chen, it was definitely not a “conflict” or a “struggle” with Mao, but a normal consultation during the drafting process. And when Lin Biao finally made the revised report of the Ninth Congress by Mao without changing a single word, it only shows that Lin was actually a supporter rather than an opponent of Mao’s Ninth Congress line. A basic historical fact that cannot be ignored is that Mao’s inclusion of Lin Biao’s successorship in the Party Constitution at the Ninth Congress, his approval of Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu to the Politburo, and his holding of such key departments as the Military Commission’s Office Group, was never because they opposed the Cultural Revolution, but because they most actively supported his Cultural Revolution. As for how exactly the Cultural Revolution was to be carried out, especially when it came to going deeper in the army, there were indeed no small conflicts between Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and others. But these were mostly private disparagement and slander between the civil and military groups under absolute imperial power in the feudal dynasty.
However, there are two other things that happened between Mao and Lin during or after the Ninth Congress that should never be ignored. The first was because more than half of the members of the Central Committee, especially the Politburo, were military personnel, and Mao euphemistically pointed out through a foreign telegram: “What does monolithic mean? They say it is the military, bureaucratic system. According to the Japanese, it is called a system; according to the Soviet Union, it is called ‘military bureaucratic dictatorship’. When they look at our list, there are a lot of soldiers, and this is called ‘military’; there are also ‘bureaucrats’, probably me, Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Bodha, and these ‘bureaucrats’. The ‘bureaucrats’ are me, Enlai, Kang Sheng and Chen Bodha. ……”[5] The second is that Mao recommended Zhang Chunqiao to Lin Biao as Lin’s “successor” before the ink was dry on Lin’s name in the party constitution. According to various documents, during the 9th Congress Mao nominated Zhang Chunqiao to be the Secretary General of the Congress, and also talked to Lin Biao about the second generation successor. When talking about “who will take over when you are older”, Mao mentioned Zhang Chunqiao’s name. [6] Because Lin Biao’s successor position was still in hot hands at that time, their conversation did not deepen. But at least it revealed Mao’s strategy to return to “civilian politics” in the future state system, i.e., to choose a civilian as the first person in charge of the state.
On April 25, 1970, Mao and Lin Biao met in Suzhou. This time Mao had more formally proposed to Lin Biao that Zhang Chunqiao should be Lin’s successor. Ye Qun’s notes, as recalled by his secretary, were as follows.
Chairman Mao asked Lin Biao: “Premier Zhou is getting old, what are the considerations for the Premier’s successor?”
Lin Biao did not speak.
Chairman Mao asked again, “I am getting old and you are not well, who are you going to hand over the class to?”
Lin Biao still did not say anything.
Chairman Mao asked again, “What do you think about Xiao Zhang (Zhang Chunqiao)?”
Lin Biao said, “I still want to use the red kid who went to Jinggang Mountain with you.”
I was impressed by the words about using “red kids”. Ye Qun also told us that Lin Biao said to Chairman Mao, “We still have to rely on the red kids. Ye Qun also said, “It’s time to prepare for the Fourth National People’s Congress, and the chairman is in a good mood.”
It was this time that Chairman Mao invited Lin Biao to attend the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, and Lin Biao agreed. [7]
The above conversation between Mao and Lin revealed at least the following important information: 1) Mao was well aware that Lin Biao’s health was extremely poor and he would probably not survive to take over his class. His inclusion of Lin Biao in the Party constitution was actually a transitional expedient; 2) the target of this transition was Zhang Chunqiao; and 3) Mao hoped that Lin would agree to his designation of an inter-generational successor and begin transferring power immediately. Clearly, a serious disagreement arose between Mao and Lin on this issue. This disagreement led to their eventual parting of ways at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee.
It is not for nothing that Mao Zedong designated Zhang Chunqiao as the “successor” of the “successor”. In the recently published “Zhang Chunqiao Family Letter,” Zhang’s eldest daughter, Zhang Weiwei, discusses the Mao-Zhang relationship in the following way.
My feeling is that Chairman Mao should have regarded my father as a confidant, and Mao felt relieved to have him around. When I was in Jiangyin, my father talked to me about how Chairman Mao had talked to him individually many times to understand his personal and family situation. He also talked to him about the history of the struggle between the two party lines before the Seventh Congress. The Red Army period, how Mao was seized power and expelled from the Party, how the three anti-encirclement battles were fought, and how the four and five anti-encirclement battles were sidelined. These are all played out in TV dramas now. At that time, cadres like my father did not know. …… He also told me that Chairman Mao had told him several times, “Help Jiang Qing, helping him is helping me.” [8]
Indeed, Zhang Chunqiao was one of Mao’s “confidants” in launching and guiding the Cultural Revolution, especially in the formation and development of Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution. Although Zhang Chunqiao always positioned himself as Mao’s “secretary,” he was in fact one of the founders of Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution. Mao did not have his theory of continuing the revolution before he discovered Liu Shaoqi’s problems in the cross-examination and launched the Cultural Revolution to bring down Liu Shaoqi. Rather, he was determined to bring down Liu Shaoqi before he created a theoretical system of the Cultural Revolution to occupy the moral high ground. A small group of elite theorists of the extreme left, including Chen Boda, Zhang Chunqiao, Qi Benyu, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Yao Wenyuan and others of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, were the actual constructors of this theoretical system. Zhang Chunqiao, on the other hand, was also the deputy head of the Central Cultural Revolution. For example, Mao Zedong’s famous “theoretical points” about the need to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat were summarized by Mao Zedong in the second year of the Cultural Revolution (1967), and later derived and systematized by Wang Li and others from Mao’s fragmentary words. [9] From the criticism of Hai Rui’s dismissal of officials, which launched the Cultural Revolution, to the Notice of May 16 and the Sixteen Articles, which guided the Cultural Revolution; from the proposal of “criticizing the reactionary line of the bourgeoisie” to the launch of the “January Revolution” to seize power nationwide, Zhang Chunqiao was the author of the most important guiding ideas of the Cultural Revolution. Zhang was one of the authors of the main guiding ideas and programmatic documents of the Cultural Revolution. Especially after the fall of Wang Guanqi and Chen Boda due to the political storm, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan became the only remaining Maoist theorists of the Cultural Revolution at the central level. Zhang Chunqiao was always able to put a nice ideological wrapping on all the mistakes and deliriums of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, making them look like noble “doctrines”, profound “strategic plans” and developed Marxist-Leninist “theories” on the surface. theories”. For example, the outbreak of the Lin Biao affair was clearly a major bankruptcy of Mao’s theory of the Cultural Revolution, but Zhang Chunqiao’s “On the Comprehensive Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie” (April 1, 1975) and Yao Wenyuan’s “On the Social Basis of the Lin Biao Anti-Party Group” (March 1, 1975) used the term “the problem of bourgeois legal power” and “the principle of capitalist commodity exchange” to describe it. The article was wrapped up with seemingly profound theoretical issues such as “the principle of capitalist commodity exchange”, which in the midst of speciousness relieved Mao of his dilemma, and bent to flatter him as “proving that the theory, line and policy put forward by Chairman Mao are completely correct”. [10] In response, “when Mao reviewed their articles, he drew several circles on the titles of two articles in a row to show his appreciation, like an old schoolteacher correcting and evaluating essays for his students”.
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