As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become authoritarian and aggressive domestically and internationally in recent years, Western society has gradually focused its source on the CCP leader Xi Jinping. Late last year the Wall Street Journal published an article saying that the biggest strategic miscalculation of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era was the misjudgment of Xi Jinping.
On April 21, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a 30-page report, “After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era,” which focuses on whether Xi Jinping will remain in office as the 20th Communist Party Congress is less than two years away. Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era.
The report analyzes a variety of possibilities for Xi Jinping after 2022, including surrendering power, staying in office, being challenged by political opponents or in a coup, dying suddenly or becoming incapacitated.
The real trouble under Xi’s leadership, the report writes, is that a peaceful and predictable handover of power has been challenged. The report argues that Xi has consolidated his authority at the expense of the regular and peaceful transfer of power that has been the practice in the CCP for the past four decades. In doing so, he has pushed China (the CCP) into a potentially destabilizing succession crisis with far-reaching implications for the international order and global commerce.” While CCP officials are reluctant to publicly discuss the topic of succession, how this emerging issue is addressed has huge implications for the world.
CCP Succession Practices Broken by Xi Jinping
The report says that there has been constant power struggle within the CCP and that the succession of top leaders has been the central drama of politics almost since the CCP’s founding in 1949, with Gao Gang, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, all casualties.
Deng Xiaoping adopted a constitution in 1982 that introduced a term system for state leadership positions, followed by Jiang Zemin, who limited the age of the Politburo Standing Committee to no more than 70 and 68 in 1997 and 2002, respectively, in order to prevent Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan from staying in office. After that, the age limit system for the Central Committee (no older than 63) and the Politburo (no older than 68) became the so-called practice of the CCP. Anyone over the age of 63 could not become a provincial party secretary, governor or senior State Council official.
Until early 2018, this convention was widely accepted within the party, and CCP scholars and officials, alike, emphasized the 1982 Constitution’s limits on power, with one scholar claiming that “a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms has been further established and has become a key feature of China’s (CCP) leadership system.”
This consensus has been shattered since Xi Jinping took office. First, in 2017, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, two potential successors, were both eliminated from office. Then, at the National People’s Congress in March 2018, term limits for the president were lifted.
At the same time, Xi launched an ideological campaign to tightly control speech and squeeze the space for dissent. Xi also significantly weakened the powers of the State Council, and the previous days of the general secretary and premier as teammates are gone. The division of labor between the party and the government disappeared, with the former incorporating the latter. Li Keqiang has been essentially demoted in terms of policy making.
Xi Jinping also actively promotes himself to consolidate power. From his self-appointment as the “core” of the CPC Central Committee in 2016 to the promulgation of the related “two safeguards” in early 2019, all party members are required to “safeguard” Xi Jinping’s core position and leadership of the Party Central Committee.
With his power consolidated but without any designated successor, Xi is leading China (CCP) and its future into a vast uncharted territory.
The report analyzes multiple possibilities for whether Xi Jinping stays in office in 2022.
Scenarios 1 and 2: Xi hands over power in 2022 or stays in office
In this scenario, Xi would hand over power to one of the current Politburo Standing Committee members at the 20th Communist Party Congress next fall, with at least two of the three top titles likely to be handed over: general secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the military commission, in order to give credence to the idea that this is a true transfer of power. The reasons are as follows.
First, Xi has strengthened the CCP’s leadership by centralizing power during his two terms, and now that many of his changes are complete, he may feel that he can relinquish power without fear.
Second, there is a more intuitive reason why Xi may feel compelled to step down: personal security. An institutionalized succession rule that ensures the expectations of those within power prevents the possibility of a coup and ultimately reduces the risk of a leader facing a coup.
Xi Jinping may be aware that a full centralization of power could provoke a united revolt within the CCP, so he may choose to retire early.
One scholarly study found that 41 percent of dictators experienced exile, imprisonment or death within a year of leaving office, compared with 7 percent of leaders in democratic countries. Gorbachev, for example, as one Russian newspaper teased in March 2021 on the former Soviet leader’s 90th birthday, “is the first leader in Russia’s 1,000-year history to step down voluntarily, and he has been alive and well and free.”
If Xi Jinping feels he can retire, he needs a successor who can guarantee his safety. With the hundreds of powerful enemies left behind by Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign, Xi will have to be unwaveringly and publicly loyal to whoever he chooses as his successor.
Significantly, even if Xi names a successor and surrenders all three leadership positions, it is almost certain that he will continue to command behind the scenes.
Scenario two, on the other hand, would see Xi not hand over power in 2022, i.e., stay in office.
Scenario 3: Xi suffers a challenge or coup
The plot to overthrow Xi is not a fantasy out of thin air. In an internal speech in 2016, Xi spoke of a “political conspiracy” aimed at “undermining and splitting the party. That same year, Liu Shiyu, then chairman of the Communist Party’s Securities Regulatory Commission, accused derelict officials, including Sun Zhengcai and Zhou Yongkang, of “plotting to usurp the leadership of the Party and seize state power.”
The fear of political conspiracies and coups is, of course, the norm for most authoritarian leaders. Studies show that the vast majority of dictators have had their power taken away from within the top, not from the general public.
Even Xi Jinping, the most powerful leader, relies on the support of various groups. While the deals struck between Xi Jinping and the Communist Party elite are unclear, a sharp economic slowdown or repeated mishandling of international crises could make Xi’s team even more vulnerable.
Nonetheless, successfully organizing a coup against the incumbent leader, especially in a Leninist one-party state, is a formidable challenge. One of the first obstacles would be to secure the support of key members of the military and security services without alerting the incumbent leader and his security apparatus.
In the absence of a systemic crisis, a coup against Xi Jinping is currently very unlikely. Yale University political scientist Dan Mattingly, examining data on more than 10,000 CCP military appointments, found that Xi has overseen the personnel rotation of the CCP’s military, keeping tabs on their ethnic, class and ideological backgrounds.
Xi Jinping’s increasing control over the domestic security services has left senior members of the Chinese Communist Party and military lacking the basic operational capacity to act and communicate with Xi’s omniscient security apparatus, despite their immense power.
Challenging Xi Jinping at a formal meeting of the Politburo or the entire Central Committee can occur seemingly spontaneously, but it requires the collaboration of numerous officials, and it is impossible to know how many are willing to join the effort to overthrow Xi, even if some express dissent.
Scenario 4: Xi’s Unexpected Death or Incapacitation
Any serious illness or terminal illness of the top leader would be considered a state secret. Xi, who is 67 years old, has been a smoker, overweight and under pressure at work, and, according to official media reports, “finds pleasure in the exertion of his work.
Details about Xi’s health are scarce, and the Communist Party strictly controls reporting on Xi’s health in China and has threatened to cancel visas for foreign journalists.
For the sake of simplicity, this report assumes Xi’s sudden and unexpected death.
Once Xi’s death occurs, at least the literal procedure is fairly clear. According to the CCP constitution, the general secretary can only be elected from among the current members of the Politburo Standing Committee and “elected” at a plenary session of the Central Committee. The Constitution provides that the members of the Party’s Central Military Commission shall be decided by the Central Committee, and the State Chairman and Vice Chairman “shall be elected by the National People’s Congress.
Thus, assuming the procedure works, in the event of Xi’s death, the CPC Central Committee would be convened to decide who among the remaining Politburo Standing Committee members would become general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is unclear whether the National People’s Congress, as required by China’s constitution, would need to convene to formally determine the presidency.
In practice, however, the choice of a new leader will be decided through informal consultations and dealings, followed by approval by the Central Committee.
But in a power vacuum, there is a risk of infighting within the Politburo, and Xi’s allies could split into different factions to support different successors. Those who had been punished or marginalized by Xi could see this as a rare opportunity to return to power, and so they too could vie for control.
It is impossible to predict how this process will unfold, and it is more practical to ask: What are the signs that the succession process is going well or that there is a split in the leadership? These signs include.
- Failure of the prime minister or national vice president to attend regularly scheduled meetings.
- A change in the broadcast or publication schedule of national television and radio, as well as the major national and metropolitan newspapers.
Sudden disruption of the Internet and disruption of social media; it may encounter “technical difficulties” due to the popularity of WeChat or, conversely, become an important channel for the opposition if a power struggle breaks out.
- There are inexplicable disruptions to flight and rail schedules at China’s major airports and train stations.
- Competing or contrary discourses appearing in central government agencies, official media or on the Internet without being removed.
There is another important scenario to consider: Xi Jinping’s incapacity due to health problems (e.g., stroke, heart attack). Unlike the death of a leader, incapacity forces the system into a period of political uncertainty of indeterminate duration, in which Xi’s supporters and opponents, alike, try to maintain a balance between Xi’s recovery and death at the same time.
After Stalin’s stroke on March 1, 1953, senior Soviet officials, were conspiring for a possible post-Stalin era. Beria, the head of the secret police, cursed at Stalin as his condition worsened, but when signs of recovery appeared, “Beria fell to his knees, grabbed Stalin’s hand and began kissing it.”
Recent Comments