The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims that today’s landscape is “rising in the east and falling in the west” and that “time and momentum are on our side,” but by reading CCP documents and Xi’s scripts, U.S. political experts find that behind this “pride Behind these “pride” lies a sense of caution and insecurity.
Writing in the Washington Post on April 13, Yuen Yuen Ang, author of “How China Can Jump Out of the Poverty Trap,” identified four important clues to Xi’s “institutional insecurity” through her reading of the CCP’s 14th Five-Year Plan “In January of this year, she wrote a letter to the U.S.-China delegation in the Washington Post. In her testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Council in January, she also cited these findings to reveal the opportunities and threats facing the Communist regime.
The Chinese Communist Party has recently been bossing around the international arena, pointing the finger at U.S. representatives in Alaska, and diplomatic war wolves barking around the international arena. Domestically, the regime claims to have controlled the epidemic, recovered the economy, and achieved what it calls a “comprehensive victory” in fighting poverty. Hong Yuan Yuan’s analysis shows that behind this confident “party talk” reveals a serious sense of insecurity that did not exist in the early years of Xi Jinping’s rule.
Politics in the CCP is a black box operation, and outsiders can only interpret the key political language to trace important clues. According to Hong Yuan Yuan’s research, CCP politics is very different from that of democratic countries, where politics is highly competitive and straightforward, with politicians competing to speak. But the Communist Party sends out “encrypted signals” that need to be deciphered in subtle ways that Westerners often do not understand.
Hong Yuan Yuan compares the CCP’s 14th Five-Year Plan in 2020 (the 14th Five-Year Plan, which covers the period 2021-2025) with the 13th Five-Year Plan (which covers the period 2016-2020), and finds subtle changes in the rhetoric. The comparison between the 14th Five-Year Plan and the 13th Five-Year Plan (planning for 2016-2020) reveals significant changes in the CCP’s ideology through subtle changes in rhetoric.
Here are four important clues she summarizes.
First, in the 14th Five-Year Plan, the Communist Party states that the challenges it faces have changed. “The 13th Five-Year Plan identified the economic slowdown as the biggest threat to the Communist Party, but the 14th Five-Year Plan for 2020 does not mention it. Instead, their top concerns become the epidemic (mentioned at least three times) and the “complex international situation” (mentioned at least three times), suggesting that the CCP considers the U.S.-China rivalry to be its challenge.
Second, the 14th Five-Year Plan mentions “new developments and changes in both opportunities and challenges,” and the party introduces a new term here – ” a major change unprecedented in a hundred years” and another new phrase – “profound adjustment in the international power contrast” – reflecting the Communist Party leadership’s self-perception that through epidemic control and epidemic diplomacy, the Communist Party’s position in the global order has risen , which seems to sound as if it is more confident than it was five years ago.
A third point worth noting is that while the CCP is confident, it is also cautious and “understated,” such as dedicating an entire paragraph of the 14th Five-Year Plan to listing China’s domestic limitations, which were not present in the 2015 communiqué. These weaknesses include “the problem of unbalanced and insufficient development is still prominent”, “the task of reforming key areas is still arduous, the capacity for innovation does not meet the requirements of high-quality development, the foundation of agriculture is still not solid, and the gap between urban and rural regional development and income distribution is wide”, etc. .
In addition, Xi Jinping, in his own “Note” on the 14th Five-Year Plan, mentioned that “China is still the largest developing country in the world, and development is still the first priority of our Party in governing the country. “. This is at odds with the arrogant tone of his entire speech.
Perhaps Western observers see the CCP’s self-identification as a “developing country” as an excuse to avoid global responsibility. Yes, perhaps this is their usual tactic when negotiating with the West, but note that this is a public admission of weakness by Xi Jinping to a domestic audience, unlike the man who usually likes to talk about big words like “great rejuvenation.
Lastly, the CCP has placed overwhelming emphasis on “security” in the 14th Five-Year Plan, mentioning the word “security” more than 40 times, compared to In contrast, the words “quality development”, “innovation” and “reform” are mentioned a dozen times. And in the 2015 plan, “safety” appeared only a dozen times.
Xi Jinping personally reiterated this message again in his own signed “note”: “We are increasingly aware that security is a prerequisite for development, and development is a guarantee for security.” This suggests that Xi’s deep-seated sense of personal insecurity is the party’s biggest priority.
Hong Yuan Yuan concludes that while Xi’s regime appears conceited and the CCP is trying to convince Chinese people to feel “confident” in the party’s leadership, if you read the words of its leaders carefully, you will find that – the CCP knows it is still far from the United States.
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