Nationalist government representative Zhang Qun, mediator Marshall, Chinese Communist Party representative Zhou Enlai
(2) Marshall’s mission to China
(1) Background and fallacies
Although Marshall’s mission to China was only one year apart from Hurley’s previous mission to China, the international situation and the war situation in China had fundamentally changed.
During Hurley’s Time, the cooperation between the Communist Party and China was still in line with the U.S. strategic goal of a quick victory over Japan. But when Japan surrendered, the time had changed and the basis for Communist-Chinese cooperation was gone. As soon as the war was won, the Chinese Communist Party, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, openly rebelled against the government and reignited the war to divide the country. No sooner had the external problems been eliminated than the internal worries arose again. The Red rebels of that year, after eight years of rejuvenation, were revived and reborn. They were no longer satisfied with the communist border areas in the country within a country; they wanted to overthrow the national government and to redress the whole of China. The National Government was facing an enemy more vicious than The Japanese, and the Republic of China was in danger of dying.
But at this time, the pro-communist faction in the United States wanted to use the democratic coalition government as a condition for helping China. The sober man like Hurley was worried. When he returned to China to report on his duties, he complained to Truman that the State Department’s “China Tong” sympathized with the Communists and misled American foreign policy, pointing out that the Communist Party was trying to overthrow the legitimate national government and that the road to a coalition government would not work. But Truman was unmoved, and Ambassador Hurley resigned in anger and was replaced by Marshall. This appointment meant that the Anti-Communist hardliners in the U.S. government’s decision-making circle were basically extinct, and heralded the introduction of a new round of U.S. appeasement policy toward the CCP.
In December 1945, President Truman issued a statement on China Policy, the gist of which was that the Chinese government forces and the Communist forces should cease hostilities through peaceful negotiations. The United States recognized the Nationalist government as the sole legitimate government of China, but strongly desired that the government expand inclusiveness and implement democratic reforms so that all parties would be fairly and effectively represented in the government. The Communist military was incompatible with Chinese political unity and should be effectively subsumed within the national army. This was the benchmark for Marshall’s mission to China.
But what the Truman statement expressed was a policy of compromise with the treasonous terrorist forces of the Communist Party. The prescriptions that the United States thought it was prescribing were also based on a misplaced position of the CCP. Truman and U.S. foreign policy makers have always been accustomed to viewing the relationship between the two parties in terms of the U.S. donkey and donkey debate, when in fact there is no commonality between the two. The Kuomintang is completely opposed in nature and program. The Kuomintang believes in the Three Principles of the People and aims for a democratic and constitutional government, in line with American values, and is a normal political party with a humane spirit.
The CCP, on the other hand, promotes class struggle against humanity and violent revolution, is a terrorist organization against humanity, and does not belong to a regular party. The Kuomintang is essentially the difference between righteousness and evil, civilization and barbarism, freedom and totalitarianism, and gentleman and rogue. Even from the point of view of the Nationalist government’s resolute anti-communist resistance to Russia, the United States should have fully supported the Nationalist government. But the new U.S. policy of treating the Communists as partners, allowing the anti-communist National Government and the rebellious Chinese Communist Party to cease hostilities and establish a coalition government, is a typical case of not distinguishing between the enemy and itself, and not distinguishing between right and wrong.
Truman’s policy toward China, like the Yalta agreement, was not preceded by consultation and consultation with the ROC allies, but by unilaterally and forcibly setting a political red line for the National Government, making a political solution the only option, contradicting Chiang’s two-handed strategy and actually interfering in China’s internal affairs, and its damage to the national interests of the ROC was again far greater than the Yalta agreement in terms of magnitude and duration.
After the failure of the Chongqing negotiations, the overall strategy of the National Government was to eliminate the communists and rebuild the country. However, the U.S. appeasement policy was the opposite, making it difficult for the government to respond. During the War of Resistance, China and the United States had mutual demands. Therefore, Jiang Zhongzheng repeatedly resisted those in the U.S. government who were advocating for the Communists, even going so far as to break away from the U.S. alliance to fight Japan alone, and even Roosevelt had to give him a few points.
After the victory of the war, the United States thought that China was no longer of strategic value. China, on the other hand, had been badly wounded by the long war and was in dire need of assistance from the U.S., in addition to the communist rebellion. Therefore, although Chiang did not agree with the U.S. policy toward China, he had to passively cooperate in order to maintain the relationship between the two countries. However, to obey the U.S., he had to make concessions to the communists, and he was constrained by the U.S. to insist on fighting the communists. After Marshall’s arrival in China, the Nationalist government has been torn between the dilemma and the established strategy of fighting the Communists could not be successfully implemented. It was like a war between good and evil, where the righteous side had to look at the U.S., and was blamed and blamed by the U.S. when they could not easily make a move, or were even simply held back, so how could they win? If the Japanese invasion of China allowed the Chinese Communist Party to take advantage of the opportunity to grow, the post-war appeasement policy of the United States became a stumbling block for the Nationalist government to eliminate the Communist Party and calm the chaos, indirectly helping the Chinese Communist Party to grow against the odds and eventually seize mainland China.
However, Marshall himself was confident at first and thought he could live up to his mission, but in fact his fate of failure in China was already sealed for three reasons.
First, Marshall was weak in anti-communist consciousness, an enlightened faction in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, and easily confused by the Communists. He was stationed in Tianjin for three years in the 1920s, but, like his “China-comers,” he had no good feelings toward Chiang and the Nationalist government, and little understanding of the evils of the Communists. He came to China for more than a year and did not recognize the nature and true face of the Communists until he returned Home after the failed mediation.
Second, Marshall actually had a double identity. Not only was he a mediator between the Communists and the Chinese, but he was also a special envoy of the U.S. president, charged with the important task of defending American values and national interests. These two roles were contradictory in themselves. The United States recognized the Nationalist government as the only legitimate government in China, yet Marshall, as a mediator, considered himself to be impartial and tried to strike a balance between the legitimate government and the rebel groups. Marshall’s so-called “impartial” position enabled the communists to take advantage of the U.S. power, repeatedly resolving difficulties, turning crises into peace, and finally turning defeats into victories.
Thirdly, Marshall was bent on mediation, but his influence and binding power over the two sides was not equal. The Nationalist government had to ask for help from the United States, and was unwilling and unable to turn against the United States. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, was originally a rogue and rogue, and had no scruples in the negotiations, asking for prices, and rejecting all that were unfavorable to it. In order to accomplish his mission, Marshall was bent on accommodating the Chinese Communist Party and forcing the government to compromise. The American envoy became another Chamberlain, leading to the devastating consequences of damage to both the interests of the Republic of China and the United States.
It is generally believed that a key point at which the Nationalist government lost the mainland was when Marshall forced Chiang to issue a second armistice in June 1946, allowing the communists in the northeast to come back from the dead.
However, if we review that whole period of history from a larger perspective, it is easy to see that not only was the war in the Northeast reversed because of Marshall’s obstruction, but Marshall’s mission to China itself, from beginning to end, was ignorantly aiding and abetting the Nationalist government. The actual role he played was to help the Communists step by step to politically, militarily, economically and in terms of public opinion to weaken, combat and eventually subvert the anti-communist allies.
(2) A coalition government that recognizes enemies as friends
One of Marshall’s main tasks in coming to China on Truman’s orders was to establish a so-called “democratic coalition government” including the CCP and to realize the peaceful reunification of China. But the Nationalist government had already made an attempt during the Chongqing negotiations, which proved to be a wishful fantasy.
After the victory of the war, the Chinese Communist rebellion became the main obstacle to the peaceful establishment of the national government. Jiang Zhongzheng was prepared for this on two fronts. Internationally, the United States had always been dissatisfied with the one-party government of the Kuomintang, the Soviet Union had promised to support the Kuomintang in the recently signed Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Communist Party had indeed grown in size, so Chiang invited Mao Zedong to Chongqing to negotiate a political solution, that is, to accept the Communist Party into the coalition government under the premise of unified political and military orders. He had revealed in his diary that he was prepared to appoint a number of provincial chairmen if the Communists did repent. However, Chiang, who was well aware of the nature of the Communists, at the same time reissued the “Handbook for the Suppression of Bandits” to the National Army and prepared for a military solution once the road to peace failed.
If Chiang had a glimmer of hope that the Communists would repent, Mao had no interest in reconciliation between the Communists and the Chinese, and his trip to Chongqing was a last resort. Chiang repeatedly met with Mao to try to persuade the Communists to change their course, give up their armies and cut off territories, and instead compete politically and economically. This was indeed the only reasonable way to build a country peacefully. But what Mao was thinking was: If the Communist army and regime were abolished, what power would the Party have even if it could legally exist? That is why the army and the regime must never be given up. Mao’s ambition was always to seize power with arms, to terraform all of China, and to become a communist emperor by itself.
Therefore, during the negotiations in Chongqing, the Communists demanded the formation of 48 divisions, four times the maximum of 12 divisions allowed by the state government. At the same time, the government was forced to recognize the “democratically elected” government of the Communist areas and appoint them as the chairmen of the five provinces in North China, and as the mayors and vice mayors of Pingjin. Chiang said frankly in his diary that his brain was deeply stimulated, lamenting that the Communists were faithless and insincere, and that the animals were not as good. At one point he considered detaining Mao and trying him for traitorous treason. Although Chiang eventually sent Mao out of the country as a gift, he also discouraged the idea of a political solution to the Chinese Communist problem.
The Chongqing negotiations failed to achieve the goal of unifying political and military orders, and the loss was completely outweighed by the gain. The Communists, on the other hand, had a great deal to gain. The peace talks provided a good opportunity for unification propaganda and deception. A red terrorist organization, formerly wanted by the government and still in rebellion, earned a paper that concealed its true demonic appearance, the Double Ten Pact, and a political status equal to that of the legitimate government, with only a cheap set of democratic masquerades.
Marshall’s arrival in China and the re-firing of the coalition government’s cold rice was totally unappetizing to Chiang. With the failure of the Chongqing negotiations in the first place, Chiang was extremely reluctant to continue to seek an illusory political rapprochement. In his view, the Republic of China had fallen into an unprecedented post-war security crisis due to the full-scale rebellion of the communists. Insightful people in the Nationalist government, such as Bai Chongxi, also believed that the time for political democratization had not yet come, and that there was no alternative to a military solution to the Chinese Communist problem. The Nationalist government had an urgent need to suppress the Communist Party and put down the rebellion. But under the international pressure of strong American intervention, Chiang could only hope that Marshall could do justice and work together with his anti-communist allies to force the communists to give in.
However, Chiang soon found out that Marshall was extremely ignorant of the CCP, just like the U.S. Army Observation Team, and had fallen prey to Zhou Enlai’s bent and fanciful United Front lies, believing that the Communists genuinely aspired to democratic politics. Ignoring the fact that the CCP had an illegal armed and secessionist regime, he submitted the Organic Law of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China to Chiang, granting the Communists powers they did not dare to hope for, and Chiang marveled that it was “enough to call for the downfall of the country”.
The Chinese Communists had already broken with the government militarily, and Marshall’s arrival in China showed them the advantages of playing the political card again. The first was to paralyze the U.S. with democratic demands, so that Marshall would feel that there was “something reasonable to say and something to do” politically, thus blocking the Nationalist government from attacking the Communists by force. The second was to launch a public opinion offensive at the political consultation to discredit the National Government and gain political and public opinion advantages. Therefore, on the same day that Truman issued his statement on China, the CPC restarted the negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists on the Political Consultative Conference. Mao Zedong had explicitly instructed Zhou Enlai that the resolution of the Political Consultative Conference could be signed and ostensibly it could still be said to be good. This Chinese Communist plot to unify the war was quite successful.
Although the Political Consultative Conference did not come from Marshall, the U.S. actively supported and was happy to see the Communist Party participate in the constitution-making and democratic coalition government along with regular parties such as the Democratic League, the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, and even saw the Communist Party as a democratic counterweight to the Kuomintang. The Communists, who were also skilled in unification and deception, took advantage of the CPPCC meeting like a fish to water, and once again fooled the nation and public opinion by falsely claiming that the liberated areas had been democratically elected, with a positive image of being the first to realize democracy and freedom, and in turn attacking the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. The CPPCC meeting was like a stage for the communists, and Chiang knew that the communists were only acting, but he had to cooperate against his will to show the Americans. Therefore, he confessed in his diary that the three weeks of the CPPCC meeting were the most painful period in his Life, and he was begging for what he could get.
However, even though Chiang was “dictatorial”, he still made many concessions at the CPPCC, such as the draft constitution, which basically adopted the CCP’s version, including limiting the power of the president, actively protecting human rights, and directly electing legislators. But to the Communists, the Chongqing negotiations and the CPPCC meetings were nothing but a united-war strategy to weaken their opponents and protect themselves. Therefore, no matter how much goodwill the government released, the communists insisted on maintaining the status quo in their illegal regime in the “liberated areas”, and the CPPCC meeting repeated the same mistake as the Chongqing negotiations.
After the CPPCC, the “autocratic” Nationalist government continued the process of returning the political power to the people, without losing its gentlemanly spirit. In accordance with the resolution of the National Congress, it proceeded to convene a constitutional National Convention to end the government of training and to start a constitutional democracy. But the communists began to worry that the “democratic coalition government” would turn out to be a sham and hinder their stated goal of armed seizure of power, but they could not openly oppose it. So they resorted to another tactic of political hooligans, stirring up nonsense.
The communists refused to submit the names of delegates to the National Convention on the grounds that the list could only be given to the reorganized coalition government. But there was no such provision in the resolution of the National Convention, and the date of the meeting was already specified as May 5 of the same year (1946). The government wanted to agree on the number of seats in the committee of the coalition government, but the CPC did not sincerely cooperate and dragged the NLD to demand 14 seats. At first the government agreed to 12 seats, but later gave in to 13 seats, arguing that you could exercise the veto as long as you got a vote from non-Communists, but the CCP refused to do so, and threatened to boycott the Constitutional National Convention, even though the issue of seats had nothing to do with constitutionalism. It is clear that the communists are deliberately creating a deadlock. [14]
Things had come to a head, and Chiang C.C. felt that a political solution had to be abandoned. He stated at the KMT Central Committee’s Memorial Week in June 1946, “I depend on completing the military (suppression of the Communists) within one year and restoring the economy within two years.”
However, Chiang could not let go of his independent decisions without the United States, which was still seeking the peaceful reunification of the Communist Party. The mediation envoy Marshall, who was mindful of the democratic coalition government, was firmly opposed to a military solution and pressured the government to continue unnecessary negotiations with the Communists, arguing that a coalition government without the participation of the CCP would encourage the Communists to expand their rebellion. Chiang clearly told the Communists that they wanted to seize power by armed force, and that the Communists were fighting with the National Army in Soviet China at that time. But Ma, like a man possessed by a fire, turned a deaf ear to it completely.
In response to Marshall’s forced intervention, Chiang C.C.C. confronted him with the question: Can a democratic government be established without the participation of the Communists? In his diary, he lambasted Marshall for his “insanity”, “obstinacy” and “lack of political common sense”. But after all, the Nationalist government could not build a country against the Communists without the support of its American allies, so knowing that political reconciliation was hopeless, it had to cooperate with the United States and the communist hooligans to continue negotiations and tug of war. But Chiang also instructed himself “must not change my basic national policy for the sake of Marshall’s personal favor or dislike.”
Marshall, in an effort to promote peaceful reunification, also asked the Nationalists and Communists to stop hateful and suspicious propaganda in order to create an atmosphere of reconciliation. But only the National Government, as the gentleman’s side, responded, while the communist hooligans disdained it. At that time, a large number of refugees from northern Jiangsu fled the communist area to Nanjing and complained to the press about the communist bandits’ atrocities of land reform. This would have been excellent material for the national government to expose the communists’ fake democracy and true terror to the people. However, the Central Daily News and other anti-Communist media were ordered not to report the story. Wu Guozhen, the Kuomintang propaganda minister, recalled, “Nothing could have pleased the Communists more than this policy. While we foolishly kept silent, they made a great deal of propaganda, and the world could only hear what they had to say and not what we had to say.” [15] When a Nationalist general was killed in action and his body was shipped back to Nanjing, the central government banned the publication of news and the participation of the military in the mourning so as not to irritate the Chinese Communists. [16] In contrast, the Xinhua Daily, which was allowed to be distributed in the National Unification Area, openly promoted the Communist philosophy, flaunted the Communist war record, published the list of captured generals of the National Army, brainwashed the public, and broke the morale of the National Army, causing confusion and panic in the National Unification Area. Marshall’s fear of the Communists forced even the National Government to be Mr. Dong Guo.
The Communists also took advantage of the goodwill and tolerance of the Nationalist government to encourage school petitions, strikes, rallies and protests in the major cities, which led to a wave of public opinion wars against the government and directed public discontent toward the government. The Communists’ alternative attacks on the government on their so-called “Second Front” were another important reason why the Nationalist government lost the hearts and minds of the people and eventually withdrew from the mainland. All this had much to do with the untimely and forced democratization of politics with the Communists.
In November 1946, after waiting once for an extension, the government took the first step toward constitutional democracy by reserving seats for the CCP to convene the National Convention and adopt a constitution that the CCP had previously participated in formulating and endorsing. The CCP, however, accused the government of unilaterally convening the NCP with the intention of secession and vilified it as a pseudo-NCP and a pseudo-constitution. Even Marshall had to say, “It is unfortunate that the National Convention has indeed adopted a democratic constitution which is in all major respects consistent with the principles laid down by the Political Consultative Conference, that the constitution adopted already includes all the points demanded by the Communist Party, and that the Chinese Communist Party should consider it inappropriate to participate in the Convention.” Ma also thought that the CCP really cared about political democratization.
After the formal constitution of the Republic of China in 1948, the Communist rebellion had gotten out of hand. In response to the wartime state of fighting the Communists, the Temporary Provisions for Mobilization in the Counterinsurgency Period had to be added to expand the President’s emergency powers so that they would not be subject to the Constitution of the Republic of China, which had only been in force for a few months. Marshall’s efforts to democratize politics have not only made the government time-consuming and troublesome, but also brought the wolves into the house, back to square one.
In fact, the Communist Party is most unlikely to practice democracy, either by nature or by objective. The so-called “democratically elected” government is actually a totalitarian tyranny, and there is no democracy or freedom for the people in the Communist Party. The U.S. had the intention to promote the democratization of Chinese politics, but unfortunately, it both misread the target and chose the wrong time, and as a result, the U.S. fell for a big trick and did the Communist Party a big favor, making the state government suffer a big loss.
Besides, democratic politics is supposed to be a game between gentlemen. And the disagreement between the Communist Party and the state is a dichotomy between gentlemen and rogues. The rogue will not agree with the rules of a gentleman, and naturally should not enjoy the treatment of a gentleman. If you treat a rogue as a gentleman, it is the gentleman who will suffer. The United States mistakenly treated the Communists as normal human beings and expected the rogue scoundrels to accept the rules of civilization, to the detriment of others and themselves, and its profound lessons are still relevant today.
(3) Appeasement of the agreement on military integration
Another mission of Marshall’s visit to China was to assist the government in integrating the army, abolishing the Communist armies, and nationalizing the army.
However, the negotiations on the integration of the army, like the earlier political consultation meetings, the government was forced into the drama by the United States, as the subject was shelved during the Chongqing negotiations due to the lack of sincerity of the communists. At that time, the hard-line anti-communist Ambassador Hurley strongly supported the National Government, and the Communists still refused to budge. Now that the pro-Communist Marshall is conducting the negotiations, the government has no chance of winning. Although the Communists did pretend to sign the CPPCC resolution on the nationalization of the army, they were merely putting on a show.
Marshall also did not understand that for the United States, the end of World War II meant the coming of peace. China, on the other hand, was not. Immediately after the war, there was an overwhelming danger that the Communists would overthrow the government and rehabilitate China. With a strong enemy at hand, the national army should have actively repaired and improved its combat strength to attack and suppress the bandit scourge. However, the agreement adopted by the CPPCC called for the army to be drastically downsized, which was obviously not in line with the Nationalist government’s strategy of fighting the Communists. In order to cooperate with the U.S., the government knew that it could not do it but did it. However, the military restructuring plan formulated under Marshall’s auspices resulted in a large number of officers and soldiers of the government army being reduced and demobilized, while the illegal armed forces of the communists were retained, thus nullifying the goal of eliminating the communist army.
The Nationalist government proposed a mixed integration program, in which the Communist army would be abolished after both sides had downsized and demobilized their respective armies proportionally, and the officers and men would be dismantled and broken up and incorporated into the Nationalist army, so that the Communists would not be allowed to have their own army.
However, the communists steadfastly rejected the state government’s mixed integration proposal because Mao Zedong had long said that not a single gun or bullet could be surrendered from the communist army. But on the surface they came up with a set of grand reasons: the army belonged to the people, it had to be democratized politically first, then nationalized, and could not be handed over to the KMT one-party government. Marshall was speechless when he heard that, after all, the CCP’s rhetoric also fit his thinking about making China.
Anyone with a little knowledge of the nature and history of the Communist Party would know that the Communists believed in violent revolution, not nationalization of the army. Without disarming the Communist Party, there was no way to democratize China’s politics. But instead of siding with the anti-communist allies, Marshall supported the Communist Party’s so-called unification in order to accomplish his mission as soon as possible.
Marshall proposed that the Nationalists and Communists be unified into an army in divisions, with two Nationalist divisions plus one Communist division, with the Nationalists as the commander, and two Communist divisions plus one Nationalist division, with the Communists as the commander. The bizarre thing about this program was that allowing the communist rebels to retain their divisional formations was tantamount to legitimizing the communist army and departing from the goal of nationalizing the army. Furthermore, the communists were already extremely good at possession infiltration, which is why they were expelled by Chiang C.C. to clear the party. Marshall was tantamount to reintroducing the ghosts into the army, and the commie army commander could still command the national army in name only. In the words of Zhou Enlai: with a military commander and two division commanders, still afraid that they can not influence the rest of a division? The Communist divisions under the State Government’s army, on the other hand, could never take orders from the commander of the National Army.
In the view of the State Government, such an integration of the army was like a child’s play, and instead of being abolished, the Communist Army had a reason to exist. The essence of this integration program was the approval and protection of the communist rebels, which was totally against the will of the national government. The historical evils of the post-Xian Incident alliance with the Communists against Japan were still in sight. The Communists pretended to accept the National Government’s jurisdiction, but in reality they only received their pay and refused to listen to military orders, and regarded all those who obstructed their expansion as intransigents, which led to the heart of the National Government’s problem today.
However, although the agreement on army restructuring allowed the communists to retain divisional formations, it also stipulated that they had to be reduced to 18 divisions first, followed by 10 divisions. Mao Zedong wanted to weaken the national army and preserve himself through the integration of the army, so as to completely destroy the national army and subvert the national government. Therefore, it ordered Zhou Enlai and Marshall to make a false deal and delay. Zhou excused that the Chinese Communist army lacked formal training and needed time to train before it could reach the standard of regularization. Unaware of the scheme, Marshall said he could open a military school in the communist zone where American officers would train the communist army and also promised to provide equipment for ten divisions of the communist army. He had also proposed that the Communist Army, which had only an army, should have one-third of each in the navy and air force. Marshall was really anxious about the needs of the Communist army and thought about what the Communist army had not thought about.
In keeping with civilized custom, Marshall attached particular importance to the role of formal agreements. He thought that if the Communists agreed to sign the integration agreement, he had really accomplished Truman’s mission of nationalizing the army. At the signing ceremony for the integration agreement in February 1946, a complacent Marshall went so far as to accuse the righteous people in the national government who had given him advice: “This agreement is the hope of China. I trust that it will not be tarnished by a few stubborn elements. But this stubborn minority, selfish and self-serving, is destroying the peace and prosperity and the right to live to which the majority of the Chinese people aspire.” But the ink was not yet dry on the agreement, and it soon became clear who was a gentleman, who was a rogue, and who was empty of joy.
According to the agreement on army integration, the demobilization of the army should be implemented immediately. The national government began to downsize the national army from March 46, the army to divisions, divisions to brigades (cut a group), a large number of officers and soldiers demobilized, including the so-called miscellaneous troops, but also the Whampoa Department, and later there was a sensation “crying tomb incident”. The Communist army in North China to reduce the old, weak and residual soldiers to cope with the verification of the three-member team of the United States and China, the troops should be abolished in the name of the local armed forces of the liberation areas to retain. The Communist forces in the northeast were expanding unchecked, as if they were outside the law.
The agreement on military restructuring required the submission of troop and disarmament rosters within one month. The national government submitted to the three-member panel on time a list of the 90 divisions of the national army and a list of the order of demobilization of troops for the previous two months, while the Communist army refused to comply. The result of Marshall’s nationalization of the army was that the Nationalist Army was undermining itself by unilateral disarmament, while the Communist Army treated the agreement like scrap paper and expanded its forces without fear. Marshall finally learned that the Chinese Communist Party had gone back on its word, but he could only swallow the bitter consequences he had created, because he had no binding power over the Communist Party. Ma’s efforts to nationalize the army were like a flower in a mirror, a moon in water, a laughing stock. The next issue of the armistice made him even more anxious.
Recent Comments