Petitioners with relatives missing or detained in Xinjiang hold up photos of their loved ones during a press event at the Attajut Rights Organization office in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Jan. 21, 2019.
Following the U.S. State Department’s finding that the Chinese Communist Party committed genocide in Xinjiang, on January 29, theintercept.com website exposed a database of millions of police officers, uncovering details of the Communist Party’s shocking and pervasive surveillance in Xinjiang.
The documents also make clear the extent to which authorities attempt to assess the psychology of those under suspicion, particularly with regard to loyalty and even enthusiasm. This is reflected in so-called flag-raising ceremonies: community events in which participants declare their loyalty to China and the ruling system. Documents show that these events were extensively monitored by the police and their agents. Authorities monitor not only former detainees but also their relatives to confirm that they are participating and to determine how enthusiastic they are about it.
At weekly flag-raising ceremonies, participants are asked to express a loyalty pledge to “make your voice heard and raise your sword” (or “show your voice, show your sword”). Bailer said employers and others would report them to police if their participation was not wholehearted and patriotic. The ceremony also examines the “surplus labor force,” which is in forced labor and combines community project work with re-Education. The surplus labor program has increased dramatically in the past four years.
Police and neighbors who monitor flag-raising ceremonies also advise on who should be sent to re-education camps, according to the document.
While the Communist Party has maintained that the purpose of policing in Xinjiang is to stop terrorism and extremism, not to persecute the practices of any religion, the database confirms and details how common expressions of Islamic faith, and even curiosity about religion, are monitored. The government believes this could be a sign of religious extremism, such as growing a beard, worship rugs, owning Uighur books, and abstaining from smoking or alcohol.
Authorities also monitor mosque attendance, tallying which worshippers are immigrants and which are residents, and overseeing that prayers are conducted in an orderly fashion.
Ayeep said there are also cameras inside the mosques, and the way prayers are said is monitored.
If people use a different prayer style…the camera will take pictures,” he said, adding that a friend was arrested for it.
According to a document from Quingcui, a resident of the Sixth Avenue neighborhood in the Shuimangu district, authorities even monitor the use of natural gas in the nearby mosque.
Citizens integrated into “super alarm” system
Urumqi’s “over-policing” means.
-Activities and behaviors among the Muslim minority are considered crimes even if they are legal at the Time of the incident.
Actively regulating mosques, including strict controls on who can enter mosques and observing the prayer practices of mixed-race people to reduce attendance.
-Watching people’s online activities, requiring that restaurant knives be kept in chains, and conducting regular Home visits to check for religious items such as prayer mats and books.
-Community informants were given extensive guidance on what kind of information to provide to police.
The relentless surveillance of Xinjiang has been a perfect component of the repressive environment in the region. What is more difficult to study and understand, especially for human rights organizations abroad, is how and to what extent law enforcement has been promoted. As it turns out, the intensity of policing in Xinjiang has been matched by the overwhelming offensive of surveillance: tightly integrated and ubiquitous.
Databases obtained by the U.S. media, The Intercept, reveal evidence of a deeply aggressive police state that involves people’s thoughts and passions, entering their homes, interfering with their daily activities, and even seeking out criminality in the conduct of activities that are perfectly legal at the time.
The authorities in the area used a method of direct investigation and other police work, described as “hyper-policing”, to combat any unusual behavior. The tactics used were all-encompassing, involving civilian travel, home visits and frequent checkpoints. While this work is extensive, it can also be targeted to the population depending on the level of danger. A wide variety of minorities (whether linguistic, religious, or ethnic) are monitored at high rates.
Many detainees and former detainees are referred to as “Category 3”. This label is used loosely to refer to extremists and terrorists of varying severity, classified according to the government’s perceived mindset and likelihood of causing harm. Relatives of detainees are also tagged, ranked and tracked by police. Another system categorizes people as trustworthy, normal or untrustworthy.
Police categories and ranks implicitly draw the attention of minority groups, but in some cases the attention is explicit. For example, minutes of community stabilization meetings show that they focused specifically on “ethnic language speakers,” who were more closely monitored than Chinese-speaking Hui Muslims. The meetings also focused on the relatives of detained Uighurs.
Uighurs are also subject to Shariah surveillance. Documents show that police sometimes conduct security checks on everyone who attends mosques.
Religious Persecution
In practice, the government strictly controls who is allowed to enter the mosque. A police document shows that three students tried to attend the funeral of a friend’s father at the mosque. Byler (Byler) described how “the three were just hanging out at the entrance trying to find their way in because they had to scan their ID cards to get in, but they were worried that [the front gate checkpoint] would contact the police and they didn’t know what to do.” Police questioned the students, detained them for several hours and put them on the school’s watch list, “even though they explained everything they wanted to do,” he said.
Recent reports indicate that authorities set a goal of reducing mosque attendance and achieved it. a Nov. 12, 2018 report from West River Dam noted that the number of visits to a mosque fell by 80,000 in four months, a 96 percent drop from the same period last year. There has been a “sharp decline in religious practitioners” over the past two years as mosques have been implemented with real names, the population has declined and people have been sent to re-education camps or are afraid to practice Islam.
Ayupu said the Communist Party considers mosque activity a sign of extremism, which can include praying without Uighur dobas, wearing perfume in the mosque or even relaxing during prayers. Anyone who does not praise the CCP after prayer is also considered suspicious, he said.
Bailer said in police records, “It’s interesting that they portray citizens as the enemy when in reality they are just trying to find out who is practicing Islam.”
Notes from the Weihu Liang police station describe a “massive investigation … focused on areas where migrant populations congregate,” concentrating on the main Uighur population of Xinjiang. During the week, police registered 605 people from southern Xinjiang and investigated 383 of them and those living with them, the memo said. In the same sweep, authorities checked 367 telephones and nine computers.
Xinjiang authorities’ policy toward Islam is particularly focused on finding “wild imams” or “illegal preachers. These terms refer to Islamic preachers whose work is not sanctioned by the CCP; human rights groups said authorities arbitrarily drew this legal line to meet the political need to prosecute preachers who preach online or in mosques.
Notes from the Weihu Liang police station list 60 people involved in alleged illegal preaching, with 50 detained. The same document says a 41-year-old Hui woman was arrested and a 62-year-old Hui man was placed in administrative detention for “illegal preaching” in the “WeChat” group Quran.
The latest documents from 2017 to 2019 reflect the increasing difficulty police have in continuing to detect violations and place people in detention or re-education camps. This comes as the first wave of detentions swept through Xinjiang in 2017, expelling much of the population from Urumqi, where Xi Jinping has shown a tough stance on crackdowns following the 2014 train station stabbings and open-air market bombings.
Since his arrival in August 2016, Chen has taken a strong stance on mass surveillance and control, establishing “re-education camps” to suppress Islam, and has been accused of human rights violations by European and American countries and sanctioned by the U.S. government.
Police documents from the period following the first wave of repression reflect an interest in pursuing any suspicious behavior.
Bailer says, “The way the system is set up creates overregulation, and if you are a minority, you are vulnerable to such incidents and are subject to police regulation at a micro level, whether by hand or by applying smart technology to your Life.”
In some cases, people are persecuted for breaking the law even before the law is enacted.
One police document describes how Hui women were arrested because there was evidence that they had studied the Quran in an online group when it was legal for them to do so, but it had become illegal before they were detained. They were active in the group for at least a year prior to their detention.
This uncertainty about Xinjiang’s laws and when they might run afoul of the police echoes Ayupu’s experience. “When people are arrested, they find out ‘Oh, [the activity] is dangerous,'” he explained.
Wang, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, said that super-policing has become more common as time passes. “They just want to make sure they have overall control of the area.”
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