It’s been less than a week since the start of the new year, and except for New Year’s Day, Taiwan‘s Ministry of Defense data shows that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has not stopped intruding into Taiwan’s southwestern airspace, a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly worrisome to U.S. academics and experts concerned about the situation in the Taiwan Strait. A newly released report says the competition between the U.S. and China will reach a fever pitch in the next five to 10 years, and the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait will become more real, and Washington must develop a “danger zone” proximity strategy to deal with this proximity crisis.
The Eurasia Group, a risk consulting firm, on Monday released its assessment of the top 10 global risks for 2021, with “expanding tensions between the U.S. and China” ranked No. 4. All of these issues have significant opportunities for miscalculation and escalation of tensions.
Two U.S. academics, Michael Beckley, professor of political science at Tufts University, and Hal Brands, professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University, worried about the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait over the next five to 10 years, called on the U.S. government in a report released Monday (Jan. 4) by the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, to The report, released Monday (January 4) by the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, called on the U.S. government to develop a “danger zone” (danger zone) strategy to respond in a timely manner. The main points of the report were also previously published in a shorter article in the journal Foreign Affairs.
The report, titled “Entering the Danger Zone: The Coming Crisis in U.S.-China Relations,” points out that the great power competition between the United States and China may not be a 100-year marathon, but a 10-year “sprint” (sprint), with China likely to reach its peak of power in the next 10 years before it begins to decline. China is likely to act aggressively in the next decade under the strong incentive that it will begin to decline at the peak of its power, and “the United States will need a ‘danger zone’ strategy to prevent China from making important advances in two major areas sufficient to alter the long-term balance of power, namely science and technology and Taiwan. “
The report says that the U.S.-China rivalry over geopolitical interests and ideological differences will be a long-term one, but that over the next five to 10 years, the competition between the U.S. and China will reach sizzling levels, including hot spots like the Taiwan Strait, and the possibility of war will be extremely real because Beijing will have incentives to achieve its geopolitical goals in the face of multiple internal and external challenges at the same time, so while the U.S. still needs a sustainable strategy to manage and win this enduring global rivalry, it must first have a proximity strategy to get through this danger zone.
Both scholars argue that Taiwan should be a top U.S. priority in practical terms because of the strategic balance at stake for the United States in the Western Pacific. China has made the absorption of Taiwan its most important diplomatic target, and preparations for its conquest account for one-third of China’s defense spending. China could use Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to project military power in the Western Pacific, blockade Japan and the Philippines, and create divisions in the U.S. East Asian alliance.
Moreover, if it succeeds in violating Taiwan, the report says, China “would eliminate the world’s only Chinese democracy, remove a persistent threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and Taiwan would thus be tantamount to the center of gravity in East Asia: lose Taiwan and you lose the region.”
The report notes that China has been trying to achieve reunification for decades through a combination of hard and soft approaches, but the people of Taiwan seem more determined to preserve their independent way of life, so China is increasingly emphasizing its military options and has made a show of force in the Taiwan Strait over the past two months that has not been seen in more than 20 years, and while “an act of aggression or intimidation may not be imminent, its likelihood is increasing,” and while some U.S. policymakers and commentators have argued that the United States should provide formal security assurances to Taiwan, “such assurances, if not backed by strong defenses, would be cheap and even extremely provocative rhetoric.
To this end, the report makes several policy recommendations, the first of which is to strengthen the U.S. base infrastructure in East Asia and reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. military presence and China’s use of regional warfare to deter U.S. military operations.
Second, the United States must assist Taiwan to fight in an asymmetric manner. Taiwan should devote its limited defense resources to acquiring a large number of mobile missile launchers, armed drones, and mines to form a force capable of deploying to any beachhead within an hour, backed by millions of reserve troops capable of guerrilla warfare; the Pentagon could also take actions such as donating some weapons and ammunition to Taiwan and expanding joint training with Taiwan to accelerate this transition.
Third, the report suggests that the United States should strengthen its military presence near or even in Taiwan, and that the Pentagon should maintain a near-constant naval presence in the region as a signal of U.S. resolve, even if that may rely mostly on small surface warships. The U.S. should also consider deploying surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles in Taiwan, if Taiwan itself plus U.S. missile facilities in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait are insufficient to generate the firepower that would make Taiwan a no-go zone, “These forces would not only provide additional launch manpower in wartime, but also serve as a U.S. pull-alert device to deter Chinese aggression.”
Finally, the report argues that the United States must engage potential partners, such as increased coordination with Japan, India and other European democratic allies, in order to increase the likelihood of assistance in the event of conflict, and that while doing so would have limited effect, it could still increase the complexity of China’s estimation as it would have to pay a higher price for this aggressive action.
Mike Hunzeker, deputy director of the Center for Security Policy Studies at George Mason University, said the challenges facing the United States in the Taiwan Strait are also symbolic of the challenges facing the United States in the entire Indo-Pacific region, which is the competition between the United States and China, only the situation in the Taiwan Strait is more severe, and it is particularly damaging (pernicious), if the United States is to intervene in the Taiwan Strait in the event of a crisis and the long-range delivery of military power, but also must deal with the challenge of China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities.
In the Center for Global Taiwan Studies’ “Taiwan Strait Security Update” podcast on Tuesday, Henzeker, who has studied deterrence theory, noted that the two most important dimensions of deterrence theory are “capability” and “determination,” which encompasses not only “you can do what you say you will do” but also letting the other side know “you will do what you say you will do.” Therefore, both the United States and Taiwan must signal their capability and determination to pay the price for deterrence if they are to prevent Chinese aggression and achieve the goal of deterring China.
Hunsaker, who published a book on Taiwan’s traditional deterrence posture in 2018, said there is also a risk that deterrence against China may have doubts among Chinese policymakers about the willingness of U.S. audiences, elites and soldiers, and even Taiwan itself, to pay the price for this deterrence, and that “as long as Chinese policymakers have some degree of doubt about Taiwan’s or the United States’ willingness to pay those prices, deterrence will is placed on shaky ground.”
As China’s military activities around Taiwan increase in frequency, the United States continues to send warships through the Taiwan Strait. on December 31, two U.S. guided missile destroyers, the USS McCain and USS Wilbur, sailed through the Taiwan Strait again, marking the 13th time in 2020 that U.S. warships have done so. the U.S. Navy says the ships’ passage through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
The Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Wu Qian said this is a “show of force” and a “provocation to stir up trouble”, and that this action “sends a wrong signal to the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces”, and that the PLA is always on high alert and ready to respond to all threats and provocations.
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