South Korea refuses to join Asia’s version of NATO: U.S. won’t necessarily protect us if targeted by Dongfeng missiles

According to a report published by Yonhap News Agency on the 28th of this month, South Korea’s Special Assistant to the President Moon Jung-in, who attended a U.S.-Korea think tank seminar and was asked how to handle relations between China, the U.S. and South Korea, made a point of emphasizing South Korea’s position against deploying the Saud system or U.S. medium-range missiles into South Korean territory again.

The special assistant to the president also unveiled a rather embarrassing status quo for the U.S. The U.S. would not necessarily protect South Korea if they were to be targeted by Chinese Dongfeng missiles as a result of these moves, and it would then be difficult to end the situation. It is reported that this is in the recent South Korean clear position, to ban Huawei said “no”, and refused to join the “Asian version of NATO” after another expressed position.

It is clear that South Korea does not want to put itself in the front line of the confrontation between the major powers, especially when it is being pushed by the United States in both the economic and military fields. The reason why South Korea has chosen this time and place to make these remarks, which the US sees as somewhat “treasonable”, is essentially related to the US’s current Indo-Pacific strategy.

In order to further contain China’s rise, the United States has adopted Abe’s suggestion to construct a diamond-shaped envelope across the United States, Japan, India and Australia, with the intention of once again sealing us off in the Indo-Pacific and cutting off any possibility of our rise. In the process, the United States, which is trying to unseal itself from medium-range missiles, is actively encouraging numerous Asia-Pacific countries to agree to deploy them, including South Korea.

In fact, under Trump’s leadership and direction, South Korea has many grievances about the current U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. On the one hand, Trump is more inclined to Japan, and in many sensitive issues between Japan and South Korea, Trump has to make decisions more in line with Japan’s interests, which undoubtedly touches South Korea’s sensitive nerves.

In particular, Moon’s obsession with getting back the Korean military’s wartime command has inevitably led to a drift in position with the US. On the other hand, it is South Korea that has realized that they are putting themselves in a very dangerous position as an East Asian military ally of the United States.

Ever since Pompeo’s infamous “New Cold War” speech at the Nixon Library, Korea has been in a risk zone that is even further ahead than Japan. Not to mention the fact that the U.S. is still urging South Korea to decouple economically from China and South Korea, but in turn is demanding that South Korea significantly increase its share of U.S.-South Korea military spending. As a result, South Korea is now well aware of its position, and the so-called U.S.-South Korea military alliance is becoming the biggest source of damage to South Korea’s core interests.

They hope that the United States can protect their security, but never want it to manifest itself in this way, otherwise if the situation in East Asia falls into violent turmoil, it will be South Korea that will bear the brunt of it. If the United States does fail to deliver on its promises, South Korea will then suffer all the consequences alone. And while South Korea’s choice will be under tremendous pressure from the US, it is also seeking a way out for itself, and complete obedience is not going to gain them any say in the matter.