Recently, the Ministry of Education of the Communist Party of China (CPC) changed the eight-year war of resistance in textbooks to a 14-year war of resistance, causing an outcry among the public, with educated people saying that this is not in line with historical facts and is obviously a way for the CPC to put gold on its own face.
The Chinese Communist Party also cannot explain the “25,000-mile Long March”, which it has been commemorating in high profile. The so-called “Long March” was not a “strategic transfer to the north to fight against Japan” as the CCP claimed, but a forced escape under the siege of the Kuomintang. Moreover, during the whole Long March, the CCP did not mention anti-Japanese in words and actions at all, and its main purpose was only to survive.
What’s worse, the Japanese army was in the northeast while the CCP Red Army fled south to the northwest, was this like going to fight Japan?
However, in any history textbook in mainland China after 1949, it is clearly written that “it was the Chinese Communist Party that led the nation’s military and people to persevere in the eight-year war of resistance and defeated the Japanese imperialist invasion”, and at the behest of the Chinese Communist Party, the “Long March” became a “heroic epic of revolutionary romanticism”, which is enough to “move the heart”.
It was with this idea that the large-scale vocal suite “Long March Suite” and the TV series “Long March” were concocted, allowing the public to relive the “sacrifices made by the Communist Party for the nation” one after another. But a lie is a lie after all. Let’s restore the lies in the Long March one by one.
The “Ten Red Soldiers” in 1961
In 2001, the Chinese Communist Party’s CCTV broadcasted the TV series “The Long March”. In the drama, the “Ten Red Soldiers” was played by suona several times, which made the atmosphere seem generous and sad. There is another episode in the drama: when the Red Army evacuated from the Central Soviet Union, the villagers sent the Red Army by torchlight, and Mao Zedong asked a girl to sing another song “Ten Sending the Red Army”, so the girl sang it with tears in her eyes ……
It is said that the old actors of the Communist Party’s Air Force Cultural Troupe were dumbfounded when they saw this: “Ten Sends to the Red Army” only came out in 1961, where did “Ten Sends to the Red Army” come from during the Long March (I think it was when they were in a panic to escape)?” And bearing in mind that the initial escape of the CCP was top secret and no one knew about it except the core members, how could it be sung with great fanfare and fanfare as “Ten Sends to the Red Army”?
In fact, “Ten Sending the Red Army” is based on the tune of the Hakka folk song “Sending the Lang Tune” from Jiangxi Ganan, which is called “Long Song” in the Cai Cha opera. The original lyric is: “A send to the cousin, only the side of the cabinet, the hands of the cousin to get, only the two dangling money …… cousin brother listen to sister wow, go out to the cousin, all must love money ……”, later It was later changed to “A send to the Red Army ……”. And such tampering folk ditties have appeared again and again since then, such as the well-known “The East is Red”.
Failed Escape
What was the real reason for the “Long March” of the Chinese Communist Party?
On September 18, 1931, Japan began to invade the three eastern provinces of China. Under the leadership of the Kuomintang, the Nationalist government army carried out a local resistance war, while the Nationalist government, limited to its own strength, also used diplomatic means to resolve disputes and win international sympathy and support.
And during this period, the Chinese Communist Party, under the orders of Soviet Russia, launched armed insurrection, agrarian revolution and established Russian-style Soviet power in order to subvert the ROC.
In response to the rebellion of the CCP, the ROC government formulated the national policy of “to rebel against the outside world, we must first secure the inside world” and started the siege of the CCP’s armed rebellion, especially the CCP’s Jiangxi Soviet Area and the EYU Soviet Area. This siege, which lasted for five times, took four years. As mentioned earlier, the second, third and fourth sieges, though had to be interrupted by the September 18 Incident, the Song-Shanghai War of Resistance and the Great Wall War of Resistance. However, in all the CPC documents and modern history textbooks, it is repeatedly recorded how the CPC “hailed” the “victory” of these three anti-encirclement campaigns, but never recorded that they had a single word to propose resistance to Japan, a single word to call for moving north to the Northeast, the Great Wall Instead, it is recorded how they took advantage of the national tragedy and shouted the call for rebellion and treason even higher, and intensified the act of armed rebellion and treason.
In 1934, the Kuomintang conducted the fifth siege. Due to proper tactics, the CCP was dealt a fatal blow and had to decide to break out in groups while looking for a place to survive everywhere. The so-called northward movement and the establishment of the anti-Japanese base in northern Shaanxi were merely “forced” and a big lie told after the failure to go southward. In order to cover up this history of defeat and escape, the CCP later used the beautiful words “Long March” and “March” in its propaganda to deceive the world.
The Red Army fled through Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Xikang, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shanxi, mostly through areas with very bad weather and environment, and finally arrived in Shaanxi on October 20, 1935. From the original 80,000 to 90,000 men, only 3,000 were left when they arrived, and the attrition due to natural causes was as much as half.
Confusion before the escape
Speaking at a meeting of the Central Political Bureau in Yan’an on November 13, 1943, Bogu admitted: “The military plan for the Long March, which was not discussed at the Politburo, was a serious political mistake. …… The ‘three-person group’ at that time handled everything.”
Zhang Wentian also mentioned in his “Notes on the Yan’an Rectification”, “At that time, all preparations for the Long March were decided by the highest ‘three-person group’ chaired by Li De, Bogu and Zhou Enlai, and I only acted in accordance with the ‘three-person group’ I only acted in accordance with the notice of the ‘three-man group’.”
Li Weihan, then Director of the Organization Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (soon to be renamed Minister of the Organization Department), recalled that all preparations for the Long March, whether central, local, military, or non-military, were carried out in secret, and only a few leaders knew about them, and I only knew individual aspects of them, which were generally unknown to the masses. Although I was the director of the Central Organization Bureau at that time, I did not know anything about the specific plans for the Red Army’s transfer. They also did not tell me about the military situation of the Fifth Anti-“Encirclement”. As far as I know, the Politburo of the Central Committee did not discuss this major strategic issue, which was related to the success or failure of the revolution, before the Long March.
In fact, even the top decision-makers of the strategic transfer, Bo Gu and Li De, were not clear about the purpose of the operation, and were looking at it as they went along.
The Massacre Before the Escape
Before the Communist Party’s escape, Zhou Enlai ordered the Political Security Bureau of the Communist Party to carry out a severe purge and a bloody massacre of the Red Army officers and soldiers, the old and the sick, whom he did not trust. Gong Chu, the former acting chief of staff of the Red Army who remained in the Central Soviet, witnessed Lin Ye and his wife, the chief of staff of the Twelfth Red Army, being hacked to death with machetes behind their own backs without warning. These chilling and cruel purges caused Gong Chu to lose all confidence in the Chinese Communist Party, so he left his unit and defected to the Kuomintang, becoming the “first rebel of the Red Army”.
According to Gong Chu’s memoirs, when the Red Army retreated or marched long distances in the White Zone, it would send a holding team composed of political security bureau personnel to accompany the rear-guard security forces, and if the deserted officers and soldiers could not be carried, “they would be killed without mercy” to avoid being captured and leaked.
Gong Chu said: “Not only were middle and lower ranking cadres worried all day long, not knowing where they would die, but senior cadres were also in danger. How can people live under such a horrible atmosphere? At that time, I secretly decided to go.”
No anti-Japanese acts during the four stages of escape
According to the research of an overseas scholar, Mr. Xin Hao-nian, from October 1934 to the end of 1936, the defeat and escape of the CCP was divided into four stages.
In the first stage, the Central Red Army of the CCP first fled south to western Hunan. Modern history textbooks of the CPC admit that “the Central Red Army began the Long March with the goal of rendezvousing with the Second and Sixth Army Corps. The Second and Sixth Corps launched a strong offensive at the border of Sichuan, Hunan and Qianxi to meet the Central Red Army”. The reason why the Central Red Army fled south to the border of Chuanxiangqian, as the CCP admitted, was because the border of Chuanxiangqian “was located at the frontier all a thousand miles away from the capitals of the four provinces. Counter-revolutionary military forces are weak …… it is overlapping mountains, rivers, into the Yangtze River traffic can be cut off, retreat by virtue of the high mountains, is a mixed Tujia, Miao, Bai, Han and other ethnic groups live in the place …… local warlords factions, extremely disunified, conducive to the revolutionary armed The partition …… is conducive to the main force of the base area to maneuver …… conducive to the survival and development of our troops in the enemy contradictions, and conducive to the opening of the base area.”
It is clear from this that the Central Red Army of the Communist Party of China fled south to western Hunan, intending to rendezvous with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps, seeking to continue to implement armed secession in Sichuan, Hunan and Qianjiang. Where is the shadow of “going north to resist the Japanese” at this time?
In the second stage, the Central Red Army was forced to flee to the southwest in an attempt to re-establish its base under the siege of the national government forces. According to a modern history textbook, “After crossing the Xiangjiang River, if they continued to rendezvous with the Second and Sixth Corps, they would have to fight an enemy five or six times larger than themselves, which obviously threatened to destroy the Central Red Army, which had only 30,000 men left. At this time, Mao Zedong advocated abandoning the plan to rendezvous with the Second and Sixth Army Corps and advancing to Guizhou, where the enemy was weak, to avoid entering the enemy’s pockets, so as to establish a new base in Sichuan-Qianbian, where the enemy was weak. …… On December 18, 1934, the CPC Central Committee held a Politburo meeting in Liping and resolved to abandon the plan to go to Xiangxi. It was decided to establish a new Soviet area on the Sichuan-Qianqian side, and first to establish a base area in northeastern Qianjiang, with Zunyi as the center.” Thus, “the Red Army of the CPC Central Committee forcibly crossed the Wu River in January 1935 and defeated the city of Zunyi”.
From this, it can be seen that the purpose of the Red Army of the CPC Central Committee’s flight to the southwest was to establish a new base in northeast Qianjiang centered on Zunyi, neither northward, nor the Long March, let alone anti-Japanese.
In the third stage, the Central Red Army was forced to flee from the southwest to the northwest because the National Government forces did not give the CCP time to breathe. In order not to be annihilated and to be able to rendezvous with Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army, which had long since fled to northern Sichuan and established a Soviet area, the Central Red Army fled in late January to early May 1935, tossing and turning. The first crossing of Chishui, the Yangtze River failed; the second crossing of Chishui, forced to return to Zunyi City; the third crossing of Chishui to the south of Sichuan failed, and then returned to Guizhou; until the fourth crossing of Chishui, through Huize, crossing the Jinsha River, from Huili in southeastern Xikang north to Dechang, Yuejun, crossing the Dadu River, and then through Tianquan, Jinxing, only on June 16, fled to Mao Gong in northwestern Sichuan and Zhang’s rendezvous.
The above historical facts show that the remnants of the three main forces of the Red Army were not a long march, but a flight, not northward, but westward. It had nothing to do with going north to resist Japan, and never shouted a slogan of going north to resist Japan.
In the fourth stage, the first and fourth front armies of the Chinese Communist Party split up from one another, fleeing north and south, and Mao’s troops fled to northern Shaanxi.
In June 1935, the First Front Army of the CPC Central Committee and Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army met in Mao Gong on their way to escape and held the Mao Gong Military Conference. At the Mao Conference, Mao Zedong “put forward a military plan to advance north to the north of Gansu and Ningxia”. Mao said “the Communist International had called to instruct us to get closer to Outer Mongolia, and this is the only thing we can do now according to our own situation”.
Zhang Guotao in his “Memoirs” also recounted: “Mao Zedong talked and laughed and talked on. He said he opened the map and saw that only Ningxia, an affluent region in the northwest, was defended by Ma Hongkui’s troops, who were also relatively weak. Moscow has such instructions, although it has been a long time, I believe it will still respond to us from the side of Outer Mongolia. Then we will not be afraid of the barrier of the desert between Outer Mongolia and Ningxia. He said in an aggravated tone, open the window to speak brightly, we are in danger of being wiped out …… if Ningxia can no longer get a foothold, at least a part of the CPC Central Committee cadres, can still take the car through the desert to Outer Mongolia, leaving behind these revolutionary seeds, and can rise again in the future.”
Zhang Guotao also recounted that “the plan he (Mao Zedong) put forward did not focus on Shaanxi, did not talk about going north to resist Japan, because at that time we were in a state of isolation, the matter of resisting Japan is really very confused; he also did not say that in Shaanxi can join with Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang and Xu Haidong two, because Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang’s name at that time we do not know “. “Zhang Wentian and others said that the CPC Central Committee had no knowledge of Xu Haidong’s division traveling westward from EYUAN to the northern Shaanxi region, whether it still existed, or whether there were other guerrilla groups around northern Shaanxi, etc.”
In the words of Zhang Guotao, “our main problem at that time was survival and death”, and the reason why “our group was particularly strong and not afraid of all difficulties” was because “the ambition was to find a way to survive “. In this regard, experts in CPC history also said, “On June 26, 1935, the Two Hekou Conference decided to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gan base area and did not propose to go to northern Shaanxi.”
When we restore the historical reality, we will find once again that after the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies of the CPC at Mao Gong, neither side proposed going north to Shaanxi, much less north to resist Japan. Mao Zedong’s plan to move north to northern Gansu and Ningxia was to open the way to flee north to the Soviet Union, not to resist Japan. At this time, it was already eight months after the Red Army of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had fled Jiangxi.
In August 1935, two months after the Mao Gong military conference, the CPC held a meeting of the Politburo in Tsavo, near Mao Er Gai. The meeting adopted a resolution on the political situation and tasks after the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies, and that the entire party and army should unite around the Central Committee and continue to struggle for Soviet China. Secondly, “had talked about the anti-Japanese issue, but no one said that the current policy of the Soviets should be changed to a national united front policy of anti-Japanese”. Zhang Guotao confessed that “we did not think we could find our lifeline on the anti-Japanese issue”. Thirdly, in view of the fact that “if we stay any longer, the enemy will mobilize more troops to blockade us and prevent us from getting out of the area”. The Maoist meeting neither decided to go north nor to resist Japan.
Soon after, the Red Army of the Communist Party of China failed to engage the government troops in the area of Brazil, northwest of Maoergui. Coupled with the suspicion between the First and Fourth Front Armies and the infighting between Mao and Zhang, Mao Zedong led the 6,000 remnants of the First Army, including Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao and Ye Jianying, and fled quietly to the vicinity of Xigu, southwest of Gansu, under the name of the Shaanxi-Gansu guerrilla brigade. “It was only on September 28, 1935, at a meeting of the Party Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Panglao Town, Tongwei County, that the decision was made to place the landing point of the Red Army’s Long March in northern Shaanxi.” The decision to settle in northern Shaanxi was due to the geographical situation. Because of its inaccessibility, it was easy to defend and difficult to attack.
On October 19, 1935, the remnants of Mao’s First Army arrived in the town of Wuqi, fifty kilometers from Yan’an in northern Shaanxi, and rendezvoused with the Red Army in northern Shaanxi. After the rendezvous with the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, Mao’s forces still insisted on the “national name” of the Soviet Union, and Mao himself became the chairman of the Soviet Central Executive Committee. Mao said, “The Soviet area in northern Shaanxi should be used to lead the national revolution.” Note that at this time there was no explicit mention of anti-Japanese.
Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army, after Mao’s split with Mao’s Central Red Army, decided to go “south” instead of north, and naturally not to resist Japan. His men were “busy with the mobilization work for the southward movement”, as Zhang Guotao said in his recollection, “to fight to Tianquan Lushan and eat rice was the slogan we used to motivate our soldiers at that time”. Later, unable to defeat the Nationalist Army, Zhang Guotao led the Fourth Front Army to the north, and arrived at the end of 1936 to rendezvous with Mao’s troops in northern Shaanxi.
Summing up the above historical facts, a full year after the defeat of the Fifth Communist Party Anti-Encirclement and escape, the remnant Red Army of the Communist Party did not only fail to put forward anti-Japanese resistance in words, but also failed to do so in actions. At that time, if someone put out a banner such as “northward anti-Japanese advance team”, it was just an escape under the banner of anti-Japanese. The former was “forced” after the failure to go south, while the latter was naturally a big lie.
The real history is enough to prove that the CCP’s “going north to resist the Japanese is a lie, but the failure to flee is real”.
Conclusion
This historical lie about the Chinese Communist Party’s “Long March” has been repeatedly fed to generations of Chinese people through the press, novels, plays, movies, dramas and other propaganda means after 1949, especially through repeated forceful indoctrination of university, high school and elementary school students, while those in the know have been silenced under the clutches of the Chinese Communist Party.
But a lie is a lie after all, and one day it will be exposed. Today, with such advanced information, the Chinese Communist Party has no power to cover up the truth.
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