How big are Xi Jinping’s Taiwan ambitions?

In last week’s column, I wrote that Beijing has its own agenda for “liberating Taiwan” and that Xi Jinping is more ambitious than his predecessors in “liberating Taiwan”. So how big are his ambitions? Why isn’t it big enough to take advantage of the U.S. election chaos to attack Taiwan?

Since Xi Jinping took office, the crisis in the Taiwan Strait has worsened, which manifests itself in the following ways – First, in recent years, the CCP has become increasingly aware that the best way to alleviate the pressure on democracy and human rights in the international community is to take the initiative. Therefore, it has intensified its big outreach and coveted the leadership of the international stage. The seizure of democratic Taiwan not only has the significance of unifying the motherland, but also adds the value of the triumph of autocracy over democracy.

Second, as China leaps into the world’s second largest economy, it has more financial resources to significantly increase its military spending. Third, Xi Jinping has reshuffled the military and cracked down on corruption. More than 70 tigers of military rank and above have fallen from their horses, including four at the Central Military Commission level.

Fourth, the two-child policy was liberalized. This policy is not just for the purpose of recruiting cannon fodder, but has objectively eased Chinese parents’ resistance to sending their children to war. Due to the heavy burden on families, the current two-child policy has not been very effective. However, there has been a trend toward forced childbirth in some places.

Fifth, education on patriotism and nationalism has been further strengthened. People willing to die for the country have grown up, although not as spectacularly as the “Five Mao” and “Little Pinky” that people see.

Suppressing the Opposition Within the Party Is Easier Than Attacking Taiwan

So how compelling is Xi Jinping’s desire to attack Taiwan? Has the crisis in the Taiwan Strait reached a feverish pitch? Critics often see Xi as a hard-line, authoritarian leader who is more willing and willing to use force against Taiwan than his predecessors. At the same time, he uses the “Chinese Dream” as his governing slogan and has a greater sense of mission to “reunify the motherland.

On the other hand, under Xi’s rule, the CCP has tightened its control and manipulation of the media, using nationalist agitation to compensate for the regime’s lack of legitimacy. With the euphoric propaganda of China’s “rise and rejuvenation” and the drifting away of Taiwan’s younger generation from China, public opinion for “liberation of Taiwan” has risen, and calls for an invasion of Taiwan by force are prevalent among the populace, the authorities in Beijing will be under pressure. A “forced” attack on Taiwan.

I think these two characteristics are obvious, but neither is to be feared. First, almost all autocrats have two distinctive characteristics at the same time: on the one hand, they are rattling and domineering; on the other hand, they are bullying and fearful of the weak. In recent years, the CCP has not deviated too much from this equilibrium by examining the U.S.-China trade conflict, the Sino-Indian border friction, the South China Sea sovereignty dispute, and the Taiwan crisis. Second, with the development of the Internet, the CCP’s control over public opinion and propaganda has become more precise, and nationalist sentiment is completely under control. The sound of “I’d rather not have grass grow in Taiwan than liberate the island” sounds radical and folkloric, but in fact it is officially allowed or even authorized to be released to threaten the Taiwanese. Otherwise, why would these “patriots” not dare to ask about the historical issues and solutions to the territorial disputes along the Russian-Chinese border?

The real need for power is more important than individuality and nationalistic feelings. Xi Jinping has amended the constitution to pave the way for a lifetime of power. But analysts believe that he needs more reasons to convince the opposition within his party. The best reason would be to capture Taiwan and win the great achievement of reunifying the motherland.

Judging from the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, which ended last month, Xi seems to be smarter than analysts: it is apparently much easier to suppress the opposition within the party than to take Taiwan. Although opposition and struggle within the party has not subsided, the CCP has long built a power machine that allows those in power to effortlessly destroy dissenters.

The Fifth Plenum not only failed to launch a successor to the current leader, as is customary, and was not subjected to the intra-Party struggle that public opinion had expected, but also allowed Xi Jinping to achieve an overwhelming personal victory. …… we will definitely be able to overcome all kinds of difficulties and dangers that arise on the road ahead”. On national defense and the military, “implement Xi Jinping’s idea of strengthening the military” and “adhere to the absolute leadership of the Party over the people’s army.

Compared to Xi’s previous remarks on Taiwan, the communiqué of the Fifth Plenum only talked about “promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the reunification of the motherland” as a matter of course, and did not address more of the private comments and phrases from the Taiwan naval drills. It can be assumed that Xi Jinping is not eager to “liberate Taiwan” as a public opinion issue, nor will he take advantage of the U.S. election chaos to attack Taiwan, as experts fear.

This does not mean that Taiwan can rest easy.