Second, Lin Biao did something and did not do anything from 1966 to 1969
Lin Biao was handpicked by Mao as his successor and met no resistance in the central core.
Zhou Enlai: In the early 1960s, when Liu and Deng unanimously resisted Lin Biao’s excessive propaganda against Mao, Zhou sided with Liu and Deng. on March 24, 1960, at an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee in Tianjin, Liu Shaoqi first proposed: Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought must not be made into two things. Deng Xiaoping spoke second: We must make sure that our newspaper propaganda does not lose the words “Marxism-Leninism”, and the recent bias is to speak only of Mao Zedong Thought. Zhou Enlai’s third speech, echoing Liu and Deng, criticized the propaganda of Mao Thought in the press at that time: one (is to put Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought) against each other, and another (is to put Mao Thought) vulgarity up, (to say) everything is Mao Thought. But by 1965, the situation in the Central Committee had changed significantly, and Zhou had seen the political prospects that Lin Biao was on the rise, and in the second half of that year greeted Wang Jiaxiang on behalf of Mao that his successor might be Marshal Lin and General Secretary Deng. At the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in May 1966, Zhou spoke in praise of Lin Biao’s “earliest mention of Mao Zedong Thought, the highest, the most playful, the most active, and the most forceful”. He also praised: “Lin Biao’s speech was the most weighty speech at the 7,000-strong conference in 1962.” At the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Zhou actively embraced Lin’s position as his successor.
Deng Xiaoping: always held an opinion of Lin Biao, he saw very clearly that a truly aloof person would never be as calculating (fervently hailed Mao) and ruthless (to Peng Dehuai, to Luo Ruiqing) as Lin Biao, so he did not have a good feeling about Lin. Deng also disapproved of the excessive publicity of Lin Biao’s war achievements, but by the first half of 1966, Deng also paid attention to adjusting his relationship with Lin. After the fall of Peng Zhen, Deng recommended Tao Cast to the Central Committee as the executive secretary of the Secretariat, one of the considerations is that Tao Cast was a former subordinate of Lin Biao in the northeast four fields.
Liu Shaoqi, who had long known the weight of Lin Biao in Mao’s mind, seldom offended Lin Biao after he was promoted to vice chairman, and at the enlarged meeting of the military commission on September 9, 1959, Liu said he “wanted to engage in Lin Biao’s personal cult. by 1963 to early 1966, Liu Shaoqi had no choice but to do something about Lin. At the enlarged meeting of the Politburo in May 1966, Liu Shaoqi made self-criticism and praised Lin on one side, and later criticized Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing for opposing Lin Biao, thus showing goodwill to Mao and Lin, not knowing that all this could not undo his own fate of imminent downfall. At the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi was demoted from the second to the eighth in the party, and in his speech, he expressed his support for Lin Biao as Mao’s successor.
Zhu De: Long humiliated by Lin Biao, he was again criticized at the enlarged Politburo meeting on May 23, 1966, and no longer had the right to speak at all.
Tao Chuang: After the enlarged Politburo meeting in May, he replaced Peng Zhen as the executive secretary of the Central Secretariat, cited his historical affinity with Lin Biao, held up Lin, and came to Beijing and was received by Lin Biao, which was extremely rare for Lin Biao.
Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing: they took orders directly from Mao and cupped Lin with all their might.
Lin Biao, once out of the mountain, struck a blow: Liu Shaoqi had fallen and his biggest rival was Deng Xiaoping. At the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Deng was elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo with a unanimous vote and ranked fourth, still in charge of liaison with the Communist Party of various countries. In the enlarged meeting of the Politburo after the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Lin also made a speech in the capacity of “successor” to undermine Deng’s prestige, and Deng Xiaoping could only step down after handing over his work to Kang Sheng during the meeting.
Lin Biao’s first speeches after he came to power, the speech he made on August 9 when he received the members of the Central Committee’s Cultural Revolution Group, and the speeches on August 10 and 13 on the issue of “dismissal of officials”, were all in the nature of mobilization orders in support of the Cultural Revolution. After the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee, Mao directly took charge of the work of the Central Committee, and the original intention was that “Lin Biao would preside over the work of the Central Committee”. In addition to his poor health, more importantly, he saw that Mao had already done the restraint: Ye Jianying became the Secretary General of the Military Commission at the beginning of the year, and Mao promoted Ye Jianying, Xu Qianqian and Nie Rongzhen to the Politburo at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee; Lin Biao’s residence in Mao’s Bay was originally guarded by the General Office of the Military Commission, but after the 11th Plenary Session, the 8341 unit under Wang Dongxing’s direct command was added, and a deputy chief of staff of the Central Guard Corps was personally in charge. The two units jointly guarded Lin Biao’s residence. Thus, Lin Biao had no opinion of his own on everything, took the initiative to hand over power and listened to Mao on everything.
When Mao returned to the front line completely, how did he steer the big ship of the Cultural Revolution and lead the country?
(1) The great power was monopolized and he was the supreme or sole decision-maker, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing and others were the executors.
(2) Gradually freezing the daily leading bodies of the central government and setting up two classes: In May 1966, the Central Cultural Revolution Group was set up with Jiang Qing as the core, Chen Boda as the head of the group was only a cover for Jiang Qing, and the major powers were in Jiang Qing’s hands, which was a prep for replacing the Central Secretariat later. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, the Secretariat existed in name only, and Tao Chuang, as the permanent secretary, was only nominal, and the Secretariat no longer met. The Central Cultural Revolution Group, with Jiang Qing as its core, received orders from Mao to guide the National Cultural Revolution; Zhou Enlai led the daily work team of the Central Committee, including the members of the Politburo and the Vice Premier who had not been defeated yet, and Zhou followed the orders and managed the economic operation of the country. Later Mao ordered Zhou to preside over the “head-to-head meetings” of the State Council and the Central Cultural Revolution, with Ye Qun attending on behalf of Lin Biao to deal with important military and national issues.
(3) The military under Lin Biao’s leadership was the escort, but all major operations were arranged by Mao, or Mao entrusted Zhou Enlai to coordinate between them.
(4) Mao himself, and through Jiang Qing who was in sole charge of the ideological propaganda system, carried out the ideological agitation of the whole country and regulated the national situation.
In this stage of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao’s fame was so great that propaganda against him was pervasive, especially in the military system, and on August 12, before the reorganization of the central personnel organization at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee was made public, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published an editorial declaring that it was the greatest happiness of the whole Party, the whole army, and the whole nation that Comrade Lin Biao was identified as Chairman Mao’s successor. In early September, the whole army launched a study and propaganda campaign on the first anniversary of Lin Biao’s publication “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War”, and so on.
Lin Biao supported all of Mao’s decisions, “no interference in big matters, no trouble in small matters”, “Chairman Mao draws a circle, I draw a circle”, and showed goodwill to Jiang Qing from time to time. When Lin Biao returned to Beijing from abroad, he even went to Diaoyutai to visit Jiang Qing instead of returning to his own residence, Mao Jiawan. Lin Biao did not stop Ye Qun from promoting Jiang Qing, and in the summer of 1967, Lin Biao even gave a letter to Mao to Jiang Qing’s close friend Qi Benyu to seek his opinion. However, Lin Biao still used the opportunity of the Cultural Revolution to take revenge on his enemies and purge dissidents, and he did so by taking advantage of Mao’s suspicion and purging dissidents by the hands of Mao and Jiang Qing.
What Lin Biao hated most was Lu Dingyi and his wife. He was an important cadre promoted by Mao during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign and trusted by Mao after the founding of the country, and since the late 1950s, he shared Mao’s views on intellectuals and was admired by Mao, but Lu Dingyi’s wife, Yan Huibing, wrote anonymous letters to the Lin family for a long time and offended Lin Biao. The weight of Lu Dingyi and Lin Biao cannot be compared, and it is trivial for Mao to sacrifice Lu to get Lin Biao’s loyalty.
In March 1953, Dr. Fu Lianzhang was ordered by Mao to examine Lin Biao’s body, which aroused Lin’s suspicion, and he was persecuted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Mao knew that Fu was a good man, and in 1934 in Jiangxi calyx had saved Mao’s life, in September 3, 1966 issued a decree to save Fu: this person is not in power, and no major crime, should be protected. As Mao’s will to save Fu is not firm, in reply to Fu’s letter of help, more accusations against Fu: “to their own life, to have analysis, do not only see the advantages, not the shortcomings”, February 29, 1969, Fu Liancheng or by Ye Qun, Qiu will make the whole death.
Lin Biao is most uneasy in the army is He Long, must want to get rid of it and then quickly. In the old marshal, Zhu De has been dying, there is no threat; Liu Bo Cheng is nearly blind; Chen Yi, there is no one in the army, and there is history of anti-Mao, Mao to clean him up; Xu Qianqiang, decades of caution; Nie Rongzhen, only the management of national defense technology, far from the center of power; Ye Jianying, more “mountain” and The old marshal only He Long strong, in the military has a deeper network of resources, has a greater influence at home and abroad, and in the early and mid-1960s, on behalf of Lin Biao, once presided over the day-to-day work of the Military Commission, and Luo Ruiqing also close relationship. So Lin Biao and his wife plotted to frame He Long in July and August 1966, when he first came out of the mountain. Mao trusted He Long, but later became suspicious: in November 1964, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovsky, turned against He Long in Moscow, and although He Long showed his loyalty to Mao at the time, Mao still had difficulty dispelling his doubts: Why would the Soviets turn against He Long? Mao changed his attitude towards He and agreed to defeat He Long. Lin Biao took this opportunity to cleanse all of He Long’s men and horses, but Mao let him do as he pleased.
In the early 1960s, Lin Biao admired Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen’s approach to the party, and wrote in his own handwriting that he wanted to “learn from Liu and Peng’s approach” in the management of cadres. On January 23, 1962, when preparing the report of the “Seven Thousand People Conference”, Lin Biao reminded himself that “when speaking, he should take care of the interests of the audience and the interests of the big heads (No.1, cadres, brains and weeks) and pull them separately”. When he gave his report on January 29, his first words were: Comrade Shaoqi’s report was very good, very correct, I agree completely. On August 14, 1966, Lin Biao forwarded a letter falsely accusing Liu Shaoqi to Jiang Qing, “and asked that it be forwarded to the President for his perusal.” On September 29, 1968, Lin Biao gave his personal instructions on the “review report” of Liu Shaoqi’s task force. Report” on the handwritten instructions: “Liu Shaoqi, the thief, all five poisons, ironclad evidence, the crime is extremely vicious, outrageous, is a very bad egg, the biggest hidden danger. Dig him out, to pay tribute to Comrade Jiang Qing who brilliantly guided the special case work and achieved great success!” But according to Guan Weixun, who gave Ye Qun a lecture, Lin Biao privately told his daughter Lin Liheng, “Liu Shaoqi speaks more thoroughly than Chairman Mao on matters, Liu Deng are good comrades, and it makes no sense to take them out.” Lin Biao’s secretary Zhang Yunsheng also recalled that in July 1967, the Red Guards surrounded Zhongnanhai to take out Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao blurted out while listening to his secretary’s paper: Liu Shaoqi was the vice chairman, and Kuai Dafu was anti-Liu, which was anti-Party.
Lin Biao could not do anything about the defeat of Tao Chuang. After Tao Chuang was defeated, he gave a letter to Lin, who was “silent” when he saw the letter, and Ye Qun ordered his secretary to burn the letter quickly.
The first thing you need to do is to make sure that you have a good idea of what you are doing.
Liu Bo Cheng did not persecute.
The first thing you need to do is to take a look at the website.
To Zhu De, although Lin Biao humiliated him many times at meetings of the Central Committee, in private, according to Zhu De’s daughter, he “often visited” Zhu De after the 1959 Lushan meeting until the week before his defection.
In March 1967, Zhou was accused by Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Ye Qun for reporting directly to Mao and not to Lin Biao about the convening of a military-level cadre meeting. “Lin was quite touched after receiving the letter and immediately asked his secretary to write a letter to Zhou to thank him, which was later stopped by Ye Qun and greeted by telephone instead.
To Kang Sheng: Knowing how powerful Kang Sheng is, he respects and stays away from him.
Lin Biao was sympathetic to the downfall of some of his subordinates and quarreled with Jiang Qing, but Lin Biao distinguished between different situations, except for a very small number of his cronies (only Qiu Huizuo was saved), he did not care about the others.
Lin lived in seclusion, except for appearances with Mao, and seldom met with military personnel, and “seldom asked questions” about the work of the “Military Commission Office Group”.
On June 16, 1967, when Lin and Mao watched the revolutionary modern Peking opera “Wisdom and Power” performed by the Shanghai Opera House, Mao joked to Lin Biao when he saw the actors on stage praying “Longevity and Longevity” in unison. Lin Biao joked that it was your turn to be next (referring to the Cultural Revolution-era routine of wishing Mao “longevity” followed by “to the eternal health of Vice Marshal Lin”), and that was all it took to alert Lin Biao, who went home that night and wrote He went home that night and wrote: “This is the only thing that matters, only this is the greatest, restrain yourself and return the rites”, ordered the staff of the “Lin Office” to go to the street at night and paint away all the slogans wishing Lin Biao “eternal health”, and wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai and the Central Committee overnight. He wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai and the Central Cultural Revolution Group overnight, requesting that the propaganda for “eternal health” be stopped nationwide.
On March 20, 1967, Lin Biao wanted to arrest the “capitalists in the army” and “Liu Deng’s line with guns”, but Mao weighed the situation and stopped him. On July 20, 1967, when the Wuhan Incident broke out, Lin Biao jumped to the foreground with the wind and was “excited”, first chairing a meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution. On July 22, Lin Liguo published an article in People’s Daily under the pseudonym of “Red Pointer”, putting forward the slogan of “seizing a handful of people in the army”. In late July, Lin Biao took the initiative to meet with several members of the Cultural Revolution Group, saying that he was “hoping for a small group of people”. On August 1, the twelfth issue of “Red Flag”, commemorating “August 1”, really put forward the slogan of “seizing a handful of people in the army”.
The Wuhan incident and Lin Biao’s behavior after July 20 triggered a nationwide “anti-military” climax, which put the political status of non-Lin military officials, such as Xu Shiyou, who were in charge of military and political power in various places in jeopardy, and caused Mao to be highly alarmed by Lin Biao’s “activism”. In Shanghai, in the presence of Yang Chengwu and other staff members, Mao expressed his discontent with the wish for Lin Biao’s “eternal health” and the “Four Greats”, and talked to Yang Chengwu about the old incident of Lin Biao asking Mao to step down during the Long March. Mao asked Yang to return to Beijing quickly, leaving Lin Biao behind, and conveyed his instructions to Zhou Enlai: the old marshal to attend the August 1st Army Day reception, and Yang Chengwu to deliver a speech at the reception. Mao’s actions immediately put Lin Biao back. On August 25, in order to stabilize the situation, Mao ordered to throw out Wang Li and Guan Feng, and once again asked Yang Chengwu to leave Lin Biao behind and convey his instructions to Zhou Enlai, who thought it was inappropriate. He asked Yang to go to Beidaihe to report to Lin Biao. At this time, the big picture of the fall of Liu has not yet been finalized, Mao only to knock Lin Biao a little, and did not “change the horse” intention, September 24, he said when talking about the issue of holding the Ninth Congress, of course, the successor is Lin Biao. After that, Mao had a series of actions to appease Lin Biao. On November 25, 1967, Mao gave instructions to reject Lin Biao’s proposal to delete words that were too high for him, saying that “it is not good to delete them, and there is no need to rewrite them”.
In March 1968, the opportunity came again, Jiang Qing wanted to bring down Yang Chengwu and Fu Chongbi, Lin Biao also wanted to crack down on “Yang, Yu and Fu”, because Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin had blocked Mao’s speech in Shanghai to him, and Mao had also considered that Yang Chengwu was “ingratiating himself on all sides”, Fu Chongbi In April 1969, during the Ninth Congress, Wen Yucheng, who belonged to Lin Biao’s department, was suddenly deposed by Lin, and Mao accepted it. This was the last time Mao gave to Lin Biao.
From 1966 to 1968, almost all decisions of the army had to be reported to Diaoyutai beforehand and could be implemented only after Mao and Jiang Qing agreed. Lin Biao’s speeches also had to be reviewed by Diaoyutai beforehand, and the composition of the staff of the military commission’s office group was also decided by Mao himself. All major decisions came from Mao, but when Mao needed Lin Biao, he would also appropriately meet Lin Biao’s demands, which was roughly the case in the past few years. Mao relied on the army, stabilized the general situation, and rebuilt the Party with the army as the center, and restored order.
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