A series of recent events makes it hard not to conclude that the risk of an early crisis in the Taiwan Strait is growing rapidly. For me, the biggest surprise was Biden’s revelation in his first major speech to Congress that in his phone call with Xi Jinping, Xi offered to bet him that Chinese dictatorship, or Xi’s dictatorship, would prevail over American democracy. It is not surprising that Xi Jinping does not believe in democracy, but it is extraordinary that he would provoke the U.S. president and American core values in such an exaggerated manner. Combined with his recent series of statements and actions, including the commemoration of the bloody battle of Xiangjiang River and the escalation of war-wolf diplomacy to rogue diplomacy, it clearly shows that Xi is no longer hiding, or even controlling, his agitated emotions. In other words, Xi Jinping’s desperation under internal and external pressure, or even complete loss of rationality, is highly likely to bring about a serious situation in the Taiwan Strait that many people did not expect.
There is more than one factor that could drive Xi to desperate measures, the most opaque of which is his mental and physical health. It is easy to understand that if something were to go terribly wrong with Xi’s mental and physical health, it is entirely possible that he could be pushed to make an early decision to fight to the death. Another major opaque factor is the crisis of local social governance facing Xi. The recent “Shenzhen Housing Management” case in Shenzhen and the “birthday celebration” case of Zhou Zhengyi in Shanghai have given insight to outsiders on how serious this crisis is. The two cases are very different, but the common denominator is that senior government officials and financial institutions have colluded with the gray and black forces of local society, posing a serious threat not only to the economic and local order, but also to Xi Jinping’s personal authority.
If the purge of Ant Financial Services and Jack Ma reflects Xi Jinping’s fear of the collaboration of technology elites with international backgrounds and high-level political enemies, then the purge of Shenzhen’s “Shen Fangli” and Zhou Zhengyi’s “Qing Shou” case in Shanghai reflects Xi Jinping’s fear of the collaboration of technology elites with international backgrounds and high-level political enemies. The purge of the Shenzhen “Shen Fangli” and Zhou Zhengyi’s Shanghai “birthday celebration” cases reflects Xi’s concern about the growth of gray and black forces that have no political agenda. It is unlikely that Xi could not have imagined that a full-blown domestic crisis would make his dream of “reunification” impossible, and that his use of the banner of “reunification” would help crack down more severely on possible opposition on the mainland.
Since the global outbreak of the epidemic, the rapid rise of Taiwan’s international status has been a major headache for Xi Jinping. On the Taiwan issue, it has become clear that the “time and momentum” are not on Xi’s side. Xi has two important preconceptions about solving the so-called “Taiwan problem”: first, that the United States and the West will not fight a war with China over Taiwan; second, that the Taiwanese will not fight for their freedom. It cannot be denied that these two presuppositions of Xi’s are not wishful thinking. What is happening is that the United States and the West recognize that they have to be prepared to fight a war for Taiwan to preserve their own freedom, even if they do not want to fight a war for the freedom of the Taiwanese. But the United States and the democracies have run into two troubles to preserve Taiwan. One is that it will take more time because it has not been prepared for years; the other trouble is even greater, and that is that the will of the Taiwanese to fight for their freedom is insufficient and the preparation is even less.
No one knows better than Xi how serious this second problem is, and it is actually the most important source of Xi’s confidence in solving the Taiwan problem. The current situation has emerged in which the greater the determination of the United States and democratic countries to defend Taiwan is, on the contrary, somehow detrimental to stimulating the Taiwanese to increase their self-defense capabilities, especially in terms of national mobilization. It is of course also a matter of time, because under the urging and pressure of the U.S. and democratic countries, Taiwan will always move in the direction of increasing its national war mobilization capacity, and there is already a positive response from the new generation. By this logic, it is not difficult for Xi to conclude that there is no chance of further delay. The question is, does Xi really have a chance of success, whether he does it early or late? My view is that Xi may still make the choice to commit suicide, even if he knows he has no chance.
Recent Comments