Four great dislikes
To be fair, Mao’s demands were not entirely unreasonable. For example, one of the main incriminating evidence that Lin Biao and the rest of the crowd attacked Zhang Chunqiao at the Lushan Conference was Zhang’s disagreement that “(Mao Zedong Thought) has developed Marxism-Leninism in a genius, comprehensive and creative way” during the discussion of the Constitution. In fact, these three adverbs were objected to and circled by Mao himself, as happened in previous Central Committee documents and the Party Constitution of the Ninth Congress. Lin Biao never read these important documents himself, but only listened to his secretary “talk about the documents” every day. Later, even Lin’s secretary admitted that this was an oversight on Lin Biao’s part.
In addition, according to the materials available today, Lin Biao was indeed the driving force behind the attempt to bring down Zhang Chunqiao and other Cultural Revolutionists at the Lushan Conference in the name of setting up the State Chairman and defending the “genius theory”. The company’s main goal is to provide a high profile to its customers. He did not name Lin Biao, which was already very protective of him. However, Lin Biao did not appreciate it and was determined not to do the review, starting a year-long “cold war” with Mao. He began a year-long “cold war” with Mao, and on different public occasions he made a fuss over Mao. From the point of view of court politics, these were very unwise moves. In the politics of the imperial prince, any extremely personal and accidental factor could lead to the deposition of the crown prince, not to mention the use of emotions to demonstrate to the supreme imperial power. On this point, Chen Yinan, a scholar of the Cultural Revolution, argues: “If Lin Biao had confessed his mistakes and made a review to Mao Zedong before the September 13 incident, he would have ended up far less tragically than what happened later ……” This is, of course, a family statement of historical assumptions. But one thing is for sure: Lin Biao’s cold war against the “holy power” greatly accelerated the process of Mao’s general “complaint” to “anger” against him. You know, the “never soft” character of those who obey me will prosper and those who disobey me will die is also the personality of Mao’s lord, and he is the “monarch” who can decide the rise and fall of the “Crown Prince” Lin Biao at a thought. He was the “monarch” who could decide the rise and fall of the “Crown Prince” Lin Biao at a thought. In this conflict of personalities, the loser is inevitably Lin Biao. The former staff member of the Lin Office, Guan Weixun, cited this “example”.
An example is Snow’s visit in 1970. According to Secretary Y, after Snow’s arrival in Beijing, Chairman Mao instructed Lin Biao to receive him first, but Lin Biao just did not see him. …… was delayed for several months. How can Chairman Mao be happy? You said my words “a sentence is worth 10,000 sentences”? I asked you to meet with Snow you do not see! Later, Chairman Mao himself received, “the four great dislike” this deadly words came out.
There was another personal reason for Lin Biao’s mishandling of his relationship with Mao after the Lushan Conference, and that was the aggravation of his mental illness that led to his pathological stubbornness and made him respond more pessimistically and negatively. Because of the widespread knowledge of mental illness and the breaking of political taboos today, both Lin’s former family doctors and secretaries and researchers who advocate his “reversal” are openly convinced that Lin suffered from some degree of mental illness. After interviewing Lin’s daughter, Lin Doudou, Shu Yun, a mainland researcher on Lin Biao, learned that Soviet experts diagnosed Lin Biao’s mental illness as severe depression. In everyday life
After his defeat at the Lushan Conference in September 1970, Lin Biao was apparently very mentally stimulated and extremely depressed, showing various symptoms of mental illness, such as “fear and dread, sensitivity and suspicion, aggression and crying, pessimism and disappointment, reluctance to meet people, and unwillingness to talk”. The anxiety disorder, hypochondria, and phobias belonging to the mental depression have appeared from time to time. In this regard, the memoirs of the former Lin Office secretaries have a lot of records, such as “After the Lushan Conference in 1970, Lin Biao, who was already living in seclusion, was even more lonely and emotionally depressed to the bottom. …… spent more time curled up alone in the sofa. It seems he was even more depressed.” In early 1971, Lin and Ye Qun cried together with a headache while in Suzhou. Another example is when Lin said to his guard Li Wenpu, who was extremely pessimistic, “Don’t build the house in Beidaihe, I won’t live for a few days anyway!” Another example is that he suddenly hugged a visitor and cried. Although these symptoms did not reach the point of dominating Lin Biao’s normal thinking, they still had a significant impact on the mutation of his personality.
Super genius makes Mao tolerant
Finally, the idea of “expecting a son to become a dragon” caused Lin Biao’s biggest blunder in handling the relationship between the crown prince and the supreme imperial power – he wrongly regarded his son Lin Liguo as the “successor He mistakenly treated his son Lin Liguo as the “successor” of the “successor” to be trained. Not to mention that this approach could have greatly offended the deepest taboos of Mao, who did not have a son to succeed him, and sang against Mao’s preferred second-generation successor (Zhang Chunqiao). More importantly: it directly challenged the authority of the supreme imperial power to decide the second-generation successor in the mutated CCP’s princely politics. In addition, Lin Biao inappropriately condoned and helped Lin Liguo to build his own team of civil and military officials. Both the “research group” around Lin Liguo and the later expanded “joint fleet” were of the nature of the traditional Eastern Palace princely government, which was the most impermissible potential second power center in Mao’s imperial princely politics. And Lin Liguo in various places to establish the “Shanghai Group”, the Air Force’s “teaching team” and Guangzhou’s “combat squad” and so on, and all are not closely around this Lin The “Major”‘s private armies. Here Lin Liguo violated another of Mao’s bigger taboos – the secret organization of getting involved in the army and establishing an “army of armies”.
What’s more, Lin Biao also tacitly approved and participated in the campaign to create a god that Lin Liguo was a “super genius”. Throughout history, in order to justify and legitimize usurpation, conspirators have often resorted to the “Mandate of Heaven” theory. For example, the famous Wang Mang, who usurped the Han Dynasty in the name of “Zen transfer”, had created the public opinion that he was “ordained by Heaven” beforehand. Mao Zedong was suspicious and credulous, and he was familiar with history books like “The Twenty-four Histories” and “Zizhi Tongjian”, so of course he knew very well the ultimate purpose of Lin Liguo being touted as a “super genius” by Lin Biao’s group. This also made Mao’s appetite for Lin Biao’s cult of genius completely reversed, and the “super genius” argument made Mao intolerable. So much so that Mao made a rare criticism soon after Lin Liguo’s report. In addition, Lin Biao’s practice of grooming Lin Liguo as the second-generation successor also, by mistake, enabled Mao to occupy the moral high ground of the so-called “meritocracy” instead of “cronyism”, and allowed Mao to carry out the abolition of the reserves on the basis of the righteousness of the Party’s policy and line. The abolition of the Reserve. In short, Lin Liguo’s dream of being a “super genius” marshal was undoubtedly an extremely important factor that triggered Mao’s determination to depose Lin Biao as his “successor”.
On September 13, 1971, the final chapter of the Mao-Lin controversy was written, but it still did not break out of the strange circle of princely politics. It entered the most common ending and the most tragic step in this vicious circle on the eve of the “September 13 incident”: the Crown Prince was forced to revolt and was soon defeated and killed. Throughout the decades of “closest comrades” between Mao and Lin to become the “successor” after the rapid turn against each other, it is not difficult to tell the world the system between them is destined to turn against each other. The transmission of supreme power in the Mao era was in fact a process in which the appearance of a Zen transfer and the essence of a unique feudal hereditary crown was the essence. In this process, the supreme leader also had the absolute power to create or dismiss a crown prince based on his personal preference, which was limited even to the emperor in the hereditary system. Compared to the traditional dauphinship, this “successor” system also mutated a number of new rules in the name of revolution, such as the absolute exclusion of potential “second centers of power” for the “successor “The supreme imperial power had the power to designate the “successor” of the crown prince from generation to generation, and so on. Because of the arbitrariness of this new Crown Prince politics, not only did it create a crisis of disorderly transition of the highest power in the country, but also intensified the conflicts between the imperial power and the Crown Prince caused by some personalities and other factors into irreconcilable conflicts, thus greatly increasing the variables of the Crown Prince being abolished or forced to rebel. In short, compared to the traditional politics of the crown prince, which was already full of swords and bloodshed, its revolutionary variation made it more difficult for the “successor” to cross the distance to the highest power.
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