On April 28, Angela Merkel, who has been in charge of Germany for 16 years, and Li Keqiang co-chaired the sixth round of Sino-German government consultations (video). Since its establishment in 2011, the Sino-German government consultation mechanism has been called a “super engine” to promote Sino-German cooperation. However, in this last consultation she chaired, Merkel seemed to be trying to give a message to the Chinese Communist Party, or to make her political legacy more balanced, claiming that “discussing tough issues openly and honestly” is also part of the partnership.
Merkel cited Hong Kong as an example of a place where Beijing restricts political freedom with its so-called national security law. She told Li that she hoped the German-Chinese dialogue on human rights (established in 1999 and held annually but not in 2019 due to what the Chinese Communist Party called “a lack of atmosphere for dialogue”) could be resumed “as soon as possible” and that “the two of us It is clearly not enough for us to discuss this topic individually, and the ministers of justice of both sides should be involved in an in-depth discussion on this topic.”
Although Merkel contributed considerably to the CCP’s strengthening of relations with Germany and the EU, she was still slapped in the face. Using formulaic language, Li urged Berlin to respect Beijing’s core interests, treat them as equals and not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Chinese (Communist) Party.
This slap in the face reveals the complete failure of the Merkel government’s “trade for change” policy towards China over the years. The first failure is that Merkel has lived in East Germany for more than 30 years, but unfortunately, she still does not understand the nature of the communist regime. The depth of the Chinese Communist Party’s infiltration into Germany and Germany’s dependence on the Chinese Communist Party have profoundly affected Germany’s strategic choice.
Now, Germany’s strategy toward China is very seriously divided. After a late-night vote on April 20, Merkel’s coalition party announced that its candidate for chancellor in this year’s election would be Armin Laschet, a loyal Merkel supporter. Laschet had refused to exclude Huawei 5G in Germany, and Huawei’s European headquarters is built in North Rhine-Westphalia, where Laschet is governor.
Although, at present, the Alliance Party is the number one party in Germany, its main political rival, the Green Party, is only a few points behind the Alliance Party in the polls, and it is difficult to say who will die in the September election.
The Green Party candidate, Annalena Baerbock, is considered by foreign media to be more “hawkish” in her foreign policy towards China and Russia. A mainland media article said that if Raschett’s campaign team fails to approach or reach its previous glory, the first Green-led coalition government in German history may emerge, and then Sino-German relations may usher in a “winter”.
To take a step back, even if Raschett can become the German chancellor, the development of Germany’s domestic situation and the world situation, but also difficult to allow him to continue to maintain Merkel’s policy towards China. There are three main reasons for this.
First, there is a consensus in German politics that, as Nils Schmid, the foreign policy spokesman for the German Social Democratic Party, put it, “We need a real foreign policy toward China, not just a business-oriented policy.”
We know that Germany’s perception of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a “triad”, i.e., that the CCP is a partner, a competitor, and an institutional-level opponent of Germany and the EU in economic, technological, and global issues; however, this “triad” is both inherently contradictory and is under attack by the Chinese Communist Party’s war wolves. However, this “triad” is both inherently contradictory and hit hard by the diplomacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s war wolves, so it is only a matter of time before it changes.
As a matter of fact, the strategic differences between China and Germany are not unremarkable. Here are three examples. One, when the Czech Senate president visited Taiwan last year and the Chinese Communist Party went ballistic, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas asked the Chinese Communist Party to refrain from putting up a threatening front at every turn: “Intimidation for such behavior is totally unacceptable to us. In the field of diplomacy and security, we are united with our EU partner countries.”
Second, in September last year, it launched diplomatic and trade guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, seeking to increase its presence in Asia in the security field, with a focus on strengthening defense cooperation with Japan, such as the signing of the Intelligence Protection Agreement (the exchange of military and cyber security secrets and counter-terrorism intelligence between the two technological powers) on March 22 this year; and the first meeting of foreign and defense ministers on April 13. On April 13, the two countries held their first “2+2” talks (video), and Germany will send a frigate on a cruise to the Asia-Pacific region in August and hold joint maritime exercises with Japan.
Third, the economic, scientific and technological competition between China and Germany has intensified. In this regard, the Wall Street Journal published an article entitled “How did China and Germany change from former partners to current rivals?” on September 18 last year. The article pointed out that the informal partnership between Germany and China, which has been economically tied for decades, is disintegrating, and with the strong return of China, the Asian giant, this poses a threat to the recovery of Germany and Europe as a whole after the epidemic.
Second, the EU’s strategy toward China is undergoing a profound restructuring, and Germany must manage its policy differences with the rest of the EU soundly in order to exercise its leadership.
History since World War II has shown that although Germany has decisive influence on the EU, Germany can only be Germany in Europe, and Europe will not become Germany’s Europe.
The EU, with 27 member states, faced with the comprehensive infiltration and bullying of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the difficulties brought by the coordinated decision-making mechanism, actually imposed sanctions on the CCP for the first time after June 4 this year on March 22, which cannot be said to be a turning point in the EU’s policy toward China. This turning point reflects the mainstream public opinion in Europe and its compliance with the international strategic pattern toward the bipolar confrontation between the US and China.
Economic tying is the main tool of the Chinese Communist Party against the EU. But even on the economic level, the EU can hardly tolerate the CCP any longer. For example, in a report on China submitted to the European Council on April 25, the European Commission criticized the Communist Party’s turn toward dictatorship and its broken economic commitments, and became increasingly pessimistic about relations between Europe and China. Meanwhile, the European Commission is working on a bill that would stop foreign state-owned companies from taking advantage of the pandemic-induced recession to acquire European companies, and would allow fines or merger bans to be imposed on offending companies. This is a new wave of response to the economic threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.
Germany has a personality (e.g., ignoring EU opposition and continuing to build Nord Stream 2 to bring in Russian gas), but if the mainstream of the EU chooses to confront the CCP, it is difficult for Germany to implement appeasement policies alone. Germany, for example, led the conclusion of the China-EU Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA), and a strong argument (in a recent analysis by Philippe Le Corre of the Harvard Kennedy School and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published in the French weekly La Point) is that “we must hope that the CIA opens up a relevant debate (on China and democracy). debate [on China and democracy], not bring it to a close.”
Third, Germany is unlikely to jump out of the general framework of U.S.-European policy coordination with China.
While the U.S. and China begin a new Cold War in 2020, German relations with China are heating up and are even being described as “Sino-German cooperation on the fast track.” At the same time, German-US relations are deteriorating. For example, on June 28, 2020, German Foreign Minister Maas told Agence France-Presse that German-U.S. relations have undergone structural changes, and that although the alliance with the United States is important in terms of economy, defense and security, the deteriorated U.S.-German relationship can no longer return to its former state.
In this regard, there are articles in the mainland media saying that “Merkel is forcibly challenging the U.S.” and even mentioning the Sino-German-U.S. triangle. However, such views are exaggerated if not for ulterior motives. Just as Germany cannot be separated from the European Union, Germany cannot be separated from the United States. There are conflicts between Germany and the United States, and no matter how much they quarrel, they are still a family. The Atlantic Alliance cannot be broken up, especially when the Chinese Communist Party and Russia are still messing around.
In fact, the coordination of European and American policies toward China, including Germany, has long existed. In May 2005, the then EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana visited Washington and met with then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which is considered to be the official launch of the transatlantic dialogue mechanism on China. In November of the same year, the U.S. and Europe again held a strategic dialogue on China and Asia. Since then, due to the shift in U.S. diplomatic priorities, the transatlantic dialogue on China has gradually been relegated to an unofficial level and is not very active.
With the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States, China policy has made a historic turnaround, with the Chinese Communist Party becoming the most threatening adversary of the United States. At the same time, the European Union is also adjusting its policy toward China, marked by the release of the European Commission’s EU-China: A Strategic Vision in 2019, in which the U.S. and Europe accelerate their alignment, coincidentally classifying China as a strategic competitor, a systemic or institutional adversary, and a primary or important threat in a number of key security areas (e.g., information security, science and technology security, etc.), including values, the The issue of the “China threat” has been incorporated into the transatlantic security agenda.
In June 2020, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrelli proposed the launch of a transatlantic policy dialogue on China, which received a positive response from the United States; in October 2020, Borrelli and then-U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo met by telephone to discuss a range of issues of mutual interest in the transatlantic partnership, particularly the China issue. During the meeting, the EU External Action Service and the U.S. Department of State initiated a bilateral dialogue on China.
On March 24, Secretary of State Blinken visited Brussels, Belgium, to participate in a meeting of NATO foreign ministers and to meet successively with EC President Ursula von der Leyen and Borrelli. After the meeting with Borrelli, Blinken issued a joint statement announcing the resumption of the U.S.-Europe-China dialogue.
It is clear from the above facts that Germany, as an important country in the European Union and the Western world, cannot be independent of the United States and the Western world and act on its own. Germany and the United States have some specific contradictions and conflicts of interest, but they are still linked together at the root. The Chinese Communist Party is running a high fever if it wants to go about dismantling the German-American alliance.
To sum up, Germany’s appeasement policy toward the CCP has its limits, and the Merkel period is really coming to an end.
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