During the Ninth Congress, when Mao decided to write Lin Biao’s successor status into the party constitution, he also had the concern that Lin Biao was weak in the theory of the Cultural Revolution. For this reason, he proposed to Lin Biao Zhang Chunqiao, who knew the essence of his thinking, as the “successor” of the “successor”, probably with this in mind. It is worth mentioning that Zhang Chunqiao was probably one of the leaders of the Central Committee in the Cultural Revolution who was not directly criticized by Mao Zedong. The only time he criticized Zhang Chunqiao’s article on empiricism (actually written by Yao Wenyuan), he took the responsibility for Zhang, saying that he had not seen it and was “sorry for Chunqiao”. So much so that scholars who later wrote biographies of Zhang marveled that “this was a rare attitude that even allowed Zhang Chunqiao to look smug when receiving criticism.”
When Mao designated Zhang Chunqiao as his “successor” in a different generation, he also mentioned very specifically that Zhang was first to be the “successor to the Premier. This in turn has to do with Zhang Chunqiao’s relatively strong administrative leadership skills as demonstrated during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang Chunqiao was not a new cadre who arrived at the central government by helicopter in the style of Wang Hongwen, he was a member of the Communist Party in 1938. Before the Cultural Revolution he had been secretary-general of Shijiazhuang Municipal Government and president of Shijiazhuang Daily, president and editor-in-chief of Shanghai Liberation Daily, secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, member of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the propaganda department of the East China Bureau, etc. He was already a senior cadre at the provincial and municipal levels of the CPC. Therefore, Mao Zedong had called Yao Wenyuan, who had much shallower seniority than Zhang (at that time, he was only at the deputy division level), a “junior general”, while Zhang was a “lieutenant general”. Mao believed that one of the fundamental tasks of the Cultural Revolution was to “make the lieutenant general no longer suffer and the junior general no longer suffer”.
During the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Chunqiao became the director of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee and the first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and kept the economic situation in Shanghai “grasping the revolution and promoting production” intact, making Shanghai a pillar of the entire national economic output of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, under Zhang Chunqiao’s leadership, Shanghai also provided the whole country with concrete experiences of “fighting and criticizing” such as “barefoot doctors” and “July 21 University”, making Shanghai a very important experiment for Mao’s ideals of the Cultural Revolution. Shanghai became a very important testing ground for Mao’s ideals of the Cultural Revolution, which were deeply rooted in the saint’s heart. For this reason, Mao not only ignored Zhou Enlai when he told him about Zhang Chunqiao’s “traitor problem”, but also scolded Kang Sheng, who reported the matter, as “ultra-leftist”. At the same time, he deliberately praised Zhang Chunqiao’s “talent” in front of Zhou. In addition to agreeing to Zhang’s appointment as second vice premier of the State Council, he also personally proposed him for the post of director of the General Political Department of the PLA. In fact, with the release of Zhang Chunqiao’s archives today, it is not difficult to find a clear-cut historical fact: Zhang was never arrested in history, how to act as a “traitor”? This is a deliberate fabrication made out of the need to seize the highest level of power, which is a dark secret of factional power struggle at the top of the CCP. But because it was repeatedly mentioned in front of Mao by faction leaders such as Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, it gave Mao the impression that Zhang Chunqiao would not be able to balance the pressure of the various factions in the Party if he became his successor, so he gave up on Zhang as his successor when he was on his deathbed. But according to his nephew Mao Yuanxin, who has been at Mao’s side in his later years, recalled: “For the successor, the chairman most important or Zhang Chunqiao. He was considered to be thoughtful and capable”. In 1976, after the “April 5 incident” Mao Zedong determined to once again overthrow Deng Xiaoping, the first thought is also to let Zhang Chunqiao as successor. The first thought was for Zhang Chunqiao to be his successor, but because of Zhang’s “unpopularity”, he finally chose Hua Guofeng. But Mao still let Mao Yuanxin to Zhang Chunqiao message, “I hope Zhang Chunqiao do ‘military division’, feel at ease to do deputy, he asked me to Zhang Chunqiao to pass a message ‘after the Zunyi Conference is not I do a decade of deputy? ” In other words, in Mao’s view, Zhang Chunqiao still has the potential and hope to be the first-in-command in the future.
With a cursory review of the relationship between Mao and Zhang Chunqiao, it is easy to understand why Lin Biao and his military clique were eager to take on Zhang Chunqiao at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee: to force Mao’s hand by privately conspiring, fanning the flames up and down, and lighting fires everywhere in order to publicly uncover and bring down Zhang Chunqiao. In the words of Lin Liguo, son of Lin Biao: “The current struggle revolves around the attitude towards Lin Biao, and the focus of the struggle is on the perception of the successor” and “the issue of defending Lin Biao’s position as deputy commander-in-chief”. In other words, it was a battle to defend the crown prince in princely politics, a court power struggle. Zhang Chunqiao, born in 1917, was only about fifty-three years old during the Ninth Congress and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, and was in very good health, deeply appreciated by Mao, and has been proposed as a candidate to succeed Lin after. The choice of Zhang as his successor was in line with Mao’s strategy of returning to the civilian system of governance after the 9th Congress. Lin Biao was born in 1907 and will be sixty-three years old by then. The most important thing is: Lin’s health is already very bad, and this alone may not be able to take over Mao’s class. In this way, Zhang Chunqiao poses a real threat to Lin Biao’s successor position. In the “Project 571” document written by Lin Biao’s son Lin Liguo and his “small fleet”, Zhang Chunqiao was one of the first targets of their armed coup: “We must capture Zhang and immediately use all the tools of public opinion to announce his rebellion. public opinion tools, publicize his traitorous crimes”. Mao Zedong was always well aware of the purpose of the Lushan meeting when Lin Biao and his military clique took Zhang Chunqiao to task – to oppose his designation of Zhang as Lin’s successor in the next generation, and he once pointed out, “They are called opposing Zhang Chunqiao, but in reality they are opposing me.” For this reason, he fought back categorically and firmly against it.
Of course, the idea that the Mao-Lin dispute was in fact a rehash of the politics of the imperial crown prince in the feudal dynasty, that is, the mutation of supreme power in an irregular succession, is the view of the onlooker in historical research, while the parties involved often would not admit it. Mao and Lin, who were at the center of the dark palace power struggle, on the other hand, often consciously or unconsciously embellished their own true intentions to occupy the moral high ground in the power struggle, deceiving both the people and themselves. Mao certainly called the struggle between him and Lin Biao a “line struggle” after Lin Biao’s escape. It is no coincidence that some members of Lin Biao’s military clique today refer in their memoirs to their outburst against Zhang Chunqiao at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee as “an irreconcilable struggle over principles” and a “crusade against the Central Cultural Revolution…. … Lin took the lead in opposing the Central Cultural Revolution,” and so on. So, let’s analyze what are the “issues of principle”. First, it is Zhang Chunqiao’s “Constitution” disagreed that “(Mao Zedong Thought) genius, comprehensive, creative development of Marxism-Leninism”. In fact, these three adverbs were objected to and circled by Mao himself, and had been deleted from the Central Committee documents and the Party Constitution of the Ninth Congress, which Lin Biao had circled previously. Lin Biao never read these important documents himself, but only listened to his secretary’s daily “lectures on the documents”. Later, even Lin’s secretary lamented, “Zhang Chunqiao angered Wu Fa Xian by belittling the ‘three adverbs’ during the discussion of the Constitution of the Fourth National People’s Congress. Wu Fa Xian reported to Lin Biao and angered him again. If Lin Biao had known that the ‘three adverbs’ on the Party Constitution had been circled by Chairman Mao before this, perhaps he would not have spoken at Lushan?” This shows that it was Lin Biao and others, not Zhang Chunqiao, who violated the “principle issue”. Second, Lin Biao and others repeatedly vowed that “a word from Chairman Mao is worth 10,000 words” and that “those who understand should carry out, and those who do not should also carry out”. On the subject of “no state chairman”, Mao Zedong had as many as six instructions. Not to mention the correctness of Mao’s opinion, but the fact is that Lin Biao and others repeatedly disobeyed Mao’s “supreme instructions”. Finally, Mao did agree with Lin Biao’s boasting of his “genius theory” again at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee. However, Mao also clearly said “don’t name names” and “don’t arrest people”. But Lin Biao and others were in cahoots, pushing up and down, deliberately trying to take Zhang Chunqiao to task. As for the “crusade against the Central Cultural Revolution”, it is even more untrue, because Chen Boda, who participated in the attack on Zhang Chunqiao by Lin Biao’s group, was the head of the Central Cultural Revolution group. During the “Criticism of Lin and Confucius” campaign, Liang Shuming, a famous scholar, confessed during the CPPCC meeting that Lin Biao never had any open political line, unlike Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai, who had a line and openly put forward their ideas for the overall situation of the country. Thus, he did not admit that there was a “tenth line of struggle” between Mao and Lin. This view, it should be said that the whip into the heart, a hit the swan.
The dream of the “super genius” and the deeper reasons for Mao Zedong’s abolition of the reserve
When Lin Biao answered Mao Zedong’s question about his successor on April 25, 1970, he turned a corner and denied Zhang Chunqiao. His excuse was: “It is better to use the red brats who went to Jinggang Mountain with you”. In fact, his military group of cadres Huang, Wu, Li and Qiu, despite being “red kids”, are hardly the second generation of successors. In terms of age, Huang Yongsheng was actually only three years younger than Lin Biao and was already 60 years old during the Ninth Congress and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, the same generation as Lin. The youngest of them is Wu Fa Xian, who is also fifty-six years old, three years older than Zhang Chunqiao. All signs indicate that Lin Biao did not fail to consider the question of his successor, but his intended candidate, whom he began to actively train, was his son Lin Liguo.
Lin Liguo (1945-1971) was Lin Biao’s only son, born during the war years. At the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, he was a 21-year-old second-year physics student at Peking University. For his protection and training, he was forbidden by Lin Biao and Ye Qun to participate in the mass student movement and was instead sent to the Shanghai Air Force Four to participate in the Cultural Revolution in a very unique way. On the one hand, he was treated like a “prince” by Jiang Tengjiao, the then commander of the Air Force, who often exchanged secret information with him about the “line struggle” within the army. This not only greatly satisfied Lin Liguo’s political vanity, but also gave him an insight into the inner workings of the power struggle. On the other hand, he observed the Shanghai rebellion movement up close, accompanied by someone from the military, and “admired Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, thinking that they were not simple, had brains and would pull the team …… to become something big in the future.” In addition to this, Lin Biao also made it a point to involve him in a number of important decisions regarding the Army’s Cultural Revolution. For example, he was allowed to participate in dealing with the students of army colleges and universities storming the Ministry of National Defense, participating in the drafting of Lin Biao’s important speech at a meeting of military-level cadres on March 20, 1967, and so on. In the spring of 1967, at his own request, Lin Liguo was arranged by Lin Biao to join the army and work in the Air Force. Only four months later, he was personally introduced to the Party by Air Force Commander Wu Fa Xian.
In the three years from 1967 to 1970, with Lin Biao’s personal arrangement, support and tacit approval, Lin Liguo quickly completed the political triple jump and became the “successor” of course. First, through Wu Fa Xian, Lin Biao selected a group of qualified and talented young and middle-aged cadres in the Air Force Command Office as a “research team” to assist Lin Liguo. These people included Wang Fei, Zhou Yuchi, Liu Peifeng, He Ruzhen, Liu Shiying and others who later became the core members of Lin Liguo’s “small fleet”. Since a shortcut to political fame during the Cultural Revolution was to publish theoretical articles, as Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan had done, to attract the attention of Mao and the Central Committee, Lin Liguo, with the help of these people, had his articles reviewed by Lin Biao’s office and published in the prominent pages of the People’s Liberation Army Daily and the People’s Daily (June 25, 1967) as “Correctly Treating the Two Different Types of Parties in Power” and “Thoroughly Overthrowing the Small Group of Capitalists in the Party from a Political and Ideological Perspective”. (July 22, 1967) and other articles such as “Down with a handful of power elites in the Party who follow the capitalist road”. After the publication of his articles, Lin Liguo gained fame and praise. Even Lin Biao said to him: “Tiger can write articles now, that’s good, you have made a lot of progress. As I said before, the gun and the pen rely on these two poles to seize power. A person, who can play with these two sticks, is comprehensive.” Second, at the behest of Lin Biao and Ye Qun, on October 17, 1969, Lin Liguo was appointed by Wu Faxian as “Deputy Director of the Office of the Air Force Command and Deputy Director of the Operations Department.” This was not only a promotion for Lin Liguo, who had joined the army for just over two years to become a deputy divisional officer. Rather, it gave him an important platform to further recruit and command the entire Air Force. Air Force Commander Wu Fa-hsien then repeatedly declared publicly, “Vice Chairman Lin’s sending Lin Liguo to the Air Force is the greatest care for us”; “Lin Liguo can command everything in the Air Force and mobilize everything in the Air Force.” Soon, the Air Force Command, Political Department, and Logistics Department all issued official documents for the implementation of the “two everything”. As a result, Lin Liguo soon expanded the “research group” around him into a “joint fleet” of which he was the “Comandante” (the English translation of commander), with the exception of A group of young and middle-aged officers in the Air Force Command, as well as many corps-level military air force commanders, deputy chiefs of staff and military political commissars, such as Jiang Tengjiao, Lu Min, Wang Weiguo, Chen Liwei, Hu Ping, Gu Tongzhou, Liang Pu and others. Because of the support of these regiments and air force cadres, Lin Liguo also began to establish similar secret military organizations in various places, such as the “Shanghai Group”, the “Teaching Team” of the Fourth Air Force, and the “Combat Squad” in Guangzhou. The “Shanghai Group”, the “Teaching Team” of the Fourth Air Force, and the “Combat Squad” in Guangzhou, among others.
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