Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping has been flying a high-profile anti-corruption flag since he came to power in 2012. Almost a decade later, the anti-corruption banner is still one of the main banners of the Xi administration, and the so-called “high-handed anti-corruption campaign” has become the so-called new normal for the CCP under Xi Jinping’s rule.
Anti-corruption campaign discussions are off-limits
According to recent reports in the official CCP media, Xi Jinping himself said, “Despite the historic achievements of the Party’s clean government construction and anti-corruption struggle, the situation is still serious and complicated. It must be seen soberly that corruption, the biggest risk to the party’s rule, still exists, the stock has not been cleared and incremental increases still occur.”
To some observers, such statements by Xi Jinping are confusing to them and to much of the Chinese public, as they are unsure whether Xi or the authors of Xi’s speech are praising him or mocking his incompetence and the nearly decade-long anti-corruption campaign that he has personally led and commanded, the so-called “Fight Flies and Tigers Together” campaign. The campaign he has personally led and directed for nearly a decade is a lackluster or obvious failure.
What is wrong with the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping’s rule is a sensitive topic in the CCP today. Most serious scholars in the world today believe that too many topics and subjects cannot be seriously discussed or studied in depth in the CCP due to the tight control of freedom of expression and academic freedom by the CCP authorities. Such topics and subjects cover a wide range of subjects, including politics, economics, history, diplomacy, philosophy, education, ethnic relations, and almost everything else.
Free discussion and research on the so-called anti-corruption campaign that Xi Jinping has vigorously pursued since he came to power also falls into such taboo and forbidden areas in China today. Therefore, in-depth discussion and research on related topics are as taboo and forbidden in today’s Chinese Communist Party as the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, which caused tens of millions of people to starve to death, or the Anti-Rightist Movement, which wiped out the outspoken intellectuals. It is basically a no-go area for speech and academics.
Under such a situation, the in-depth and free study of the current anti-corruption movement of the CCP has basically become a wide field for foreign scholars to exercise and demonstrate their wisdom and academic skills. Christopher Carothers, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, is one of the young American scholars who is free to roam or wander in this wide open space.
Having visited and worked in China several times before, Carothers specializes in political science, with a focus on anti-corruption in authoritarian governments. He recently spoke with Voice of America about his research on Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign.
U.S. political science scholar Richard Kerr, Chris Carothers (Courtesy of the author)
Xi Jinping’s push for “strict governance” of officials
Many observers and commentators in China and abroad have argued that Xi’s so-called anti-corruption campaign is nothing more than using the name of anti-corruption to remove his political enemies. But while this may have been the initial or primary purpose of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, according to Ke Rui Kai, there is now multiple evidence from the CCP that clearly shows that the situation or purpose of the anti-corruption campaign has changed qualitatively, and that people should now realize that the primary purpose of the Xi-led anti-corruption campaign is no longer to remove political enemies, and that the ongoing anti-corruption campaign has become a tool of Xi Jinping’s governance.
Xi Jinping himself grew up during the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, Xi’s predecessor as Communist Party dictator, Mao Zedong, vigorously praised ancient Chinese legalism and its philosophy of governance. Legalism more than 2,000 years ago advocated the use of severe criminal and penal codes to rule the country, and a major component of the Legalist philosophy of governance was the so-called rule of officials, which meant taking control of society and politics by completely taming and controlling officials to ensure that imperial rule would be passed down to thousands of generations. Since Xi Jinping came to power, he has repeatedly and publicly expressed his appreciation and aspiration for the concept of legalistic governance, and “governing officials” or “ruling officials strictly” has become a key word in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.
The Qin Dynasty, China’s first imperial dynasty, is considered to have been the most thorough in implementing the concept of legalism, but the Qin Dynasty, established by Qin Shi Huang to unify the six kingdoms, failed to last for thousands of generations and died in the second century, making it the shortest-lived of all Chinese dynasties. Now, Xi Jinping is also ruling the country by “ruling officials”. Some analysts are gauging whether he will have better luck than the rulers of the Qin dynasty. Will he become what his critics call a “master accelerator,” i.e., a man who can take on the historical responsibility of hastening the Communist regime’s demise?
As a researcher in political science, Richard Ko believes that predicting when the CCP regime will die is difficult, and that many previous predictions have not come true, a lesson that should be learned by those who prefer to make such predictions; but one should indeed recognize today that Xi Jinping clearly intends to prolong the CCP’s rule in China, thinking that his anti-corruption rule will strengthen the party’s discipline, protect the economy, and deal with the people’s discontent with corruption. Xi thinks that his anti-corruption rule will strengthen the party’s discipline, protect the economy, and counter the people’s discontent with corruption.
Richard Ko also traveled to Xinjiang in 2012 to work as an English teacher. He said that when he observed the relationship between Han Chinese and Uighurs and other ethnic minorities there, he could sense a clear lack of harmony, and he “saw many Uighurs desperately trying to learn English because they felt that learning good English would be a way out.”
Interview with American scholar Richard Cole
The following transcript of the interview has been edited slightly for clarity.
Kim Cheol Q: Before we begin the formal interview, I’d like to ask a few light-hearted questions that might be of particular interest to our listeners or readers. For example, where were you born and raised? Why did you choose to study East Asia, to study China, and to study authoritarianism and the control of corruption?
Richard Ko A: I was born and raised in Washington, DC, the capital of the United States. I have been more interested in politics since I was a child, because Washington is a political center. I had the opportunity to visit many countries as a child. I went to China for the first time at the age of 18, and I was very impressed with China. China is not only a country, it is also a very interesting country. I felt I had to deepen my understanding of it.
So, I started learning Chinese when I was in college. I’ve always been very interested in China even now. When it comes to why I’m interested in authoritarian government, it’s probably because it’s very different from democratic government. Moreover, authoritarian government is also very different from my personal experience, and I am most interested in things that are different from my personal experience.
By comparing authoritarian government to democracy also deepens our understanding of democratic government and can deepen our understanding of authoritarian government. Also, we have to consider that most people in this world still live under authoritarian governments, and truly democratic governments are still a minority.
Q: Why are you interested in the issue of corruption control?
A: It should be because Xi Jinping is interested in this issue.
Q: You’re really up to date with the times. You said you used to teach English in Xinjiang. When was that?
A: After I graduated from university, I worked as a journalist in Hong Kong and then decided to go to Xinjiang to teach English. That was also a very chic experience. It was in 2012. Because at that time I thought Xinjiang should be very unique and not a place where many Americans could go, and I felt I had to take that opportunity. I went to a branch of Shihezi University in Xinjiang, in a place called Wujiaqu. Not a lot of people know about that little city of Wujiaqu. When I was there, I was the only foreigner there.
Q: How did Xinjiang feel to you at that time?
A: My feeling was that the relationship between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities was not particularly good anymore. I especially liked Xinjiang. I liked the food in Xinjiang, I liked the culture in Xinjiang. The Han Chinese and Uyghurs there in Xinjiang were very warm to me. But at that time I already felt that there might be a potential crisis, and today we see the consequences of the crisis developing.
Q: What signs of bad relations between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities did you see at that time?
A: Well, when I was living in Xinjiang with a beard, many Han Chinese thought I was a Uyghur. So, they had a wary attitude toward me. And when I discuss ethnic issues with cab drivers and with Han Chinese, their views are not very civilized.
Very often, they would just say: the ethnic minorities used to be a big problem, but we Han Chinese came and took care of the problem; we developed Xinjiang, so the ethnic minorities must thank us. This kind of perception makes me feel sorry for them.
I also see many Uyghurs desperately trying to learn English because they think learning good English will be a way out.
Q: How long have you been in Xinjiang?
A: One year.
Q: Do you still have contact with friends and acquaintances from anywhere?
A: No, because I’m afraid that contacting them will cause them trouble.
Q: What did you study for your doctoral dissertation at Harvard University?
A: I studied the corruption and anti-corruption policies of authoritarian governments. I compared the successes and failures of anti-corruption policies of different authoritarian governments.
Q: In the early years of Xi Jinping’s presidency, the anti-corruption campaign was so vigorous that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was always releasing so-called news about “tiger hunting” on weekends or late at night. But it seems that this kind of fervor has now passed, or at least is not as strong. In your opinion, what is the main point of the Xi Jinping administration’s anti-corruption campaign or strategy now?
A: Indeed, compared to the early days of the anti-corruption campaign, there are not as many “big tigers” being arrested now. But the campaign is not over. After the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), more senior officials, including cadres under central control and provincial control, have fallen from power than before, and the number of officials disciplined each year is still huge. It is only in 2019 that it started to decline.
I note that since the 19th National Congress, the fight against corruption has become increasingly institutionalized. For example, the National Supervisory and Investigation Commission, established in 2018, has consolidated the work of various government departments. Moreover, you can see that the regulations adopted in the early days of anti-corruption and the rules about the bureaucracy have not been abandoned, but are still being revised. So I think that the first anti-corruption campaign is not over. The second point is that we have noticed that while previously the punishment of corrupt elements was the most important, now the function of the anti-corruption campaign is more diversified, and now the campaign has become a tool to improve the ability to strengthen governance.
For example, in order to ensure that the government will reach its goal of poverty eradication by 2020, in 2019 the Communist Party launched a special inspection to support poverty alleviation efforts. The special national inspection is to send central inspection teams to various regions to find and correct various problems in the implementation of policies, including corruption. Another example is the “Belt and Road” project. The Belt and Road project has often faced allegations of corruption and challenges from state-owned enterprises. In response to such challenges, the Commission on Discipline Inspection has strengthened its supervision of SOEs participating in the Belt and Road, investigated and punished their corruption, and launched the Beijing Initiative for a Clean Silk Road. In many ways, the Communist authorities have tried to use the fight against corruption to improve policy implementation in various areas.
Q: The use of anti-corruption as a ruling technique has a long history in China. For example, the Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang personally took charge of the anti-corruption campaign and punished corrupt officials brutally, including by “peeling the skin of corrupt officials and stuffing them with grass for public display to deter potential corrupt officials. What is the difference between Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and Zhu Yuanzhang’s? How is it the same or similar?
A: I think experts in anti-corruption almost universally agree that integrity building is the best way to fight corruption. It is important to rely on the strength of democratic institutions, on the rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, allowing NGOs and free media to monitor the government, etc. Because these institutions can limit the exercise of public power.
Of course Xi Jinping did not choose this path. He also took the anti-corruption campaign personally. This campaign is a centralized, top-down campaign. Even the official CCP media uses the word “iron fist” to describe how Xi Jinping is leading the anti-corruption campaign. As far as I know, Xi has not skinned anyone, but he does employ some harsh tactics. Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have long reported on forced confessions, torture, and the suicides of some accused officials. Also, if the government feels you are guilty, you can’t defend yourself in this campaign, and the conviction rate is ridiculously high. These should have some deterrent effect.
Q: In China today, the direct responsibility for anti-corruption matters lies with the State Supervision Commission/Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which is beyond legal oversight and is directly responsible to Xi Jinping. Some people then liken the NISC/CNDC to the East Factory/West Factory of the Ming Dynasty, which was directly responsible to the emperor. Do you think this analogy is helpful or misleading to our understanding of Chinese politics today?
A: I think you are an expert in Ming Dynasty, or you are very interested in Ming Dynasty, right?
Q: A lot of Chinese people are interested in the Ming Dynasty because they feel that it is too much like modern China.
A: I’m not an expert in that period of history, so I don’t dare to talk nonsense. But the State Supervisory Commission and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are two separate groups of people. The Discipline Inspection Commission is a Party organization, and the State Supervision Commission is not a Party organization. Of course, both organizations are under the leadership of the Party, and both are controlled by the Party.
I think it is not only these two organs that enforce anti-corruption, and let’s not forget that there is also the Central Inspection Group. Xi Jinping has also taken a lot of measures to strengthen the inspection system since he came to power. As I understand it, the East and West Factories are somewhat like the secret police, so I think they are most like the Discipline Inspection Unit of the Discipline Inspection Commission or the Central Inspection Unit. But I also have to repeat again that I’m not an expert on that period of Ming dynasty history.
Q: But what everyone finds most problematic is that the Supervisory Commission and the Discipline Inspection Commission are not constrained by law, they are beyond the law, they are directly under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the current emperor, and this situation is very disturbing to everyone.
A: I certainly agree that this anti-corruption campaign is beyond the limits of the law, that China under the Xi Jinping administration is not a country governed by the rule of law, and that China has regressed in the rule of law today. But China is also not whatever Xi Jinping orders it to be. In fact, this anti-corruption campaign is very complicated, with many detailed rules, regulations and ordinances. China is so big that it cannot be controlled by any one person on his own.
Q: At the beginning of his rule in China, in the early 1950s, Xi’s predecessor, Mao Zedong, also raised the banner of anti-corruption with great fanfare and was personally involved in the so-called Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan corruption cases, in which Liu and Zhang were subsequently executed by firing squad. However, according to those in the know, the sensational charges of corruption against Liu and Zhang were basically false, and Mao was actually trying to kill people in the name of anti-corruption to establish his authority. What are the similarities and differences between Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts and those of Mao Zedong?
A: Xi Jinping is, to some extent, borrowing the tools of governance from the Mao era. This is certainly a great concern to many Chinese, including foreigners. Although Xi would deny that this is a movement, there is a very strong atmosphere of movement today. But at the same time, every era is different. One major difference between the strategy adopted by today’s government and the past is that Xi’s anti-corruption effort is not using the power of the masses.
Mao was obsessed with the power of the masses, and he felt that the members of today’s inspection teams were not ordinary people, but people who had experience working in the inspection department. I don’t think all Chinese leaders since the Cultural Revolution have easily mobilized the masses. Xi Jinping can make people sing red songs, but the CCP is no longer a revolutionary party, but a ruling party. So, there are similarities and differences between the CCP now and the Mao era.
You cite this example as if to say that because anti-corruption is a tool to help dictators consolidate their personal power, anti-corruption may be ineffective. I don’t necessarily agree with that. It may be that at the highest levels the anti-corruption campaign may be just to remove political enemies, but that is only a small part of the anti-corruption campaign.
For example, the two examples you just mentioned, Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, occurred during the “Three Anti-Corruption” campaign, but I personally think that the “Three Anti-Corruption” campaign (note: the so-called anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucracy campaign launched by the Chinese Communist authorities in 1952) was It was a very successful anti-corruption campaign. It is true that the CCP was not as corrupt as the KMT after it came to power. Even the CIA of the United States came to this conclusion.
This is not to say that that campaign was not political. Of course it was political, and campaigns are always associated with politics. But that’s not the same thing as the success of the anti-corruption campaign. The Three Anti-Corruption Campaigns helped the Communists avoid falling to the level of the Kuomintang. Together, the Three Anti-Corruption Campaigns and the Five Anti-Corruption Campaigns (the “Five Anti-Corruption Campaigns” of 1953, i.e., the “Anti-Bribery, Anti-Tax Evasion, Anti-Theft of State Property, Anti-Skimming, and Anti-Theft of State Economic Information” campaigns) helped the Communist Party infiltrate and control China’s cities.
Now there may be some high-ranking officials who have been accused of corruption and purged because they were potential political enemies of Xi Jinping. But Xi doesn’t have a million political enemies, he doesn’t have that many, and it doesn’t take him ten years to remove them. This campaign is massive, I’m talking about Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. This campaign has been going on for a long time, longer than any previous Communist Party anti-corruption campaign. It also has a lot of detailed rules and procedures.
You can disagree with his very authoritarian tactics. I also strongly disagree with it. But I think it’s still a fight with substance, and you can’t say it’s all superficial and all fake. When I compare Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign with those of other authoritarian governments, I find that the anti-corruption campaign is mostly superficial – arresting some high-ranking officials and then declaring that I did it for the good of the country. But that’s not always the case with anti-corruption campaigns. Don’t underestimate Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign too much.
Q: Xi Jinping has been outspoken several times since he came to power about his admiration for the ancient Chinese concept of legalism and French governance. The imperial techniques of Han Feizi, the great master of legalism, especially Han Feizi’s idea that the emperor should “rule the officials but not the people” and “not to take care of small matters” also remind people of Xi Jinping’s personal command and deployment of the anti-corruption campaign against officials, as well as Xi’s emphasis on grasping big matters and talking about the big picture. He also emphasized the need to take care of the big issues, to make big accounts, to talk about the big picture and to look at the big picture.
But some critics, including the late Harvard scholar Benjamin Schwartz, have pointed out that Han Feizi was not so much a political scientist as a political muddlehead, a muddlehead who knew what was going on in the world, who eventually died at the hands of Qin Shi Huang after offering his advice and advice, and who died in the second century after the Qin dynasty had seriously pursued its legalistic course of governance instead of lasting a thousand generations. From this criticism, there are many who believe that Xi Jinping is now seeking his own death by following the legalist rule.
Xi Jinping has now earned the nickname “Chief Accelerator,” which means that he will hasten the demise of the CCP and the CCP regime in China. As a scholar of Chinese politics, what do you think about Xi Jinping’s appreciation of legalism and his so-called title of “chief accelerator”?
A: Xi Jinping does appreciate the rule of law. When it comes to how this will end, I think it’s still hard to predict; historical analogies are useful, but they hardly lead us to a definitive conclusion. Many political science studies show that a personal dictatorship is less stable overall, it is actually more unstable than other forms of authoritarian government.
If someone says Xi Jinping is the chief accelerator, I think it may be because of that. Concentrating personal power is a dangerous thing, it makes a regime look like it’s more stable, but in the long run, it creates a lot of problems for that regime. I remember before Xi Jinping came to power, some observers felt that the stability of the regime in China came from collective leadership. But Xi Jinping has changed that tradition. So if you think that collective leadership is the source of stability, then Xi Jinping is the chief accelerator of the demise of the Communist system.
Q: Many well-educated Chinese criticize Western scholars for their studies of Communist leaders, such as their studies of Mao Zedong and their studies of Xi Jinping, arguing that Western scholars often like to complicate things by envisioning the uneducated Mao or Xi Jinping as being so eloquent or far-sighted, when in fact what Mao and Xi did can be understood with common sense; Mao and Xi just happened to seize and occupy the position of dictator by coincidence, so they can have the power to do as they please. Mao and Xi have only seized and occupied the position of dictators by chance, and thus have the power to be selfish and self-serving, whether they decided to participate in the Korean War, or to launch the disastrous “Anti-Rightist”, Great Leap Forward or Cultural Revolution campaigns. The same is true of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. What do you think of this criticism?
A: It is true that some Westerners have a stereotype of Asians, such as saying that Asians always take a long-term view, and that we Westerners only think about today’s gains and losses, but Asian leaders measure their successes and failures in terms of centuries. These statements are certainly not true.
I don’t think Mao knew much about economic issues, and he made mistakes in many ways. But the idea that he came to power by chance by luck is a view I cannot fully agree with. I think some of his ideas helped the Communist Party win public opinion and helped the Communist Party defeat the Kuomintang. I think if you were to ask Chiang Kai-shek whether Mao’s success was by chance, by accident, Chiang Kai-shek would not agree.
Nice, don’t complicate things. Don’t overcomplicate Asians and Chinese too much. But we can’t necessarily use common sense to interpret Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. After the June 4 incident (when the Communist Party deployed troops in Beijing in 1989 to suppress students who wanted democracy and to fight corruption), many Westerners used common sense to think that the Communist Party was going to die, but that common sense is not true.
Not all common sense is necessarily true. It is true that part of this anti-corruption campaign is to help Xi Jinping concentrate his personal power, but Xi Jinping is also very concerned about the future of the party, although not that it is a hundred years from now. But I think this campaign, while not for the benefit of the Chinese, (Xi Jinping apparently believes) it will enhance discipline in this party, it will protect economic development and deal with people’s dissatisfaction with corruption.
I don’t know if that’s considered far-sighted. But Xi Jinping seems to be intent on staying in power, or at least he’s trying to be thoughtful and prepared.
Q: When it comes to having the power to do whatever you want (i.e., having the power to do whatever you want), the Xi Jinping regime or the Communist regime is considered to be outstanding. For example, while pushing for so-called anti-corruption, Xi and his leadership also pushed for anti-bureaucracy and anti-formalism.
But what is meant by bureaucracy or formalism is all determined by those who have the most power. For example, if a local disaster occurs, and officials do not care and prohibit reporting (as they did during the widespread flooding in southern China last year), this can be a sign of bureaucracy and a bad thing, but it can also be a sign of anti-formalism and a good thing. Whether it is a good thing or a bad thing is up to those in power. How do local officials in China respond to this political dilemma in your opinion?
A: This is indeed a political dilemma. I think local officials in China are now facing a big challenge, which is actually a dilemma. Solving this problem requires the Communist Party to clarify what these words mean. What is meant by corruption, what is meant by bureaucracy, what is meant by formalism, is to make the definition of these words clearer. Otherwise local officials have only one recourse: inaction.
The only way for them not to take that risk is to do nothing. I think these phenomena are a side effect of the high-handed anti-corruption efforts. The party leadership is not unaware of the problem, and the official Chinese media often mention the side effects of anti-corruption as inaction and lazy governance. Of course, officials who are unwilling to work will obviously weaken governance and drag down economic development.
So, to avoid these side effects, the definition of corruption must be clarified and the disciplinary regulations for party members must be revised so that everyone can clearly know where the red line really is, or else it will be chaos. In the meantime, I am not an economist, and I see no evidence that inaction is a very serious problem.
The CCP was launching an anti-corruption campaign from thirty years ago, and at that time it was reported that one of the side effects of the anti-corruption campaign was the emergence of inaction that would hurt our economic development or hurt our Party discipline. But we don’t seem to have seen any consequences caused by inaction in recent years. So that does seem to be a problem. I don’t know what local officials can do, but I know what the government should do. The government should provide a clear definition of corruption, of bureaucracy, of formalism, and strengthen awareness of the rule of law to help local officials understand what they have to do. Local officials are really facing a dilemma.
Q: When it comes to corruption, corruption, people in the world today mostly think of corruption associated with power, that is, power corrupts, and in fact, in China today, with Xi Jinping’s increasing emphasis on centralized power, complaints about power corruption are common. Chinese people and Chinese officials generally complain about the kind of corruption that comes from having power to do whatever you want, and that Xi Jinping or Xi’s army, Xi Jinping’s henchmen and cronies, spend their days checking this and that organ and that official, but there is no one to monitor or check Xi Jinping or Xi’s army. Following the controversy over Xi’s brother-in-law’s transfer of assets overseas, Xi’s control of China’s Internet public opinion simply made the term “brother-in-law” a taboo word. What is the response of Xi Jinping and his cronies to the complaint that monitors are not monitored and that power leads to corruption?
A: I don’t think Xi Jinping has a good response to this issue. It’s true that no one can monitor his personal corruption.
I guess he might say something like this: democracy is not suitable for China, democracy is a very chaotic and inefficient model; but what China needs is a model that is orderly and maintains unity; I chose to rely on the traditional strength of the Communist Party, an anti-corruption strategy more suited to China’s conditions; I strengthened top-down control; I made my officials, my subordinates, incapable of engaging in corrupt activities; yes, no one can monitor me personally, but in terms of In fact, the Harvard Kennedy School professors did a long-term poll, and their results showed that many Chinese people support my anti-corruption campaign; they don’t think corruption is the biggest problem in China now, as it was ten years ago; so although no one can monitor me, my anti-corruption campaign is successful in general. So although no one can monitor me, on the whole my anti-corruption campaign is successful, so you have to acknowledge my success.
I guess that’s what he (Xi Jinping) would say. I’m not saying this to justify Xi Jinping. But I think he really believes in his approach, and he really thinks that if China becomes too liberal, it’s not good for the Communist Party.
What is Xi Jinping’s biggest fear? It’s that the Chinese Communist Party is repeating the mistakes of the Soviet Union. Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Perhaps from Xi’s point of view, it was because the Soviet Communist Party became too weak, the government became too incompetent, and policies failed, including the spread of corruption, weren’t all these factors present during the Hu Jintao era?
So, to avoid a similar disintegration of the CCP, Xi Jinping has desperately pursued the concentration of power. The fight against corruption is what helps Xi reach his goal. He is trying to strengthen the discipline of the party and make the party stronger, strong enough to curb liberalization for good. I mean this is from Xi Jinping’s perspective.
Q: In your opinion, how far can Xi Jinping’s path of anti-corruption governance, which critics have criticized as “lawlessness,” go? What will be the end of it?
A: Soon after Xi Jinping began his anti-corruption campaign, many scholars and observers thought it would end soon, before the 19th National Congress at the latest; by then Xi would likely have diverted his attention.
But now we see that this is not the case. I think this campaign has turned into what Xi Jinping calls the new normal of high-handed anti-corruption. So as long as Xi Jinping remains in power, he will continue. There is no final end to this anti-corruption campaign, unless Xi Jinping steps down. I can’t predict that.
I think this anti-corruption campaign will not eliminate corruption in China, but will only keep the level of corruption within a range that the Chinese economy can afford. The forms and functions of the anti-corruption campaign will become more and more diverse, but the campaign will not end. You can disagree with the very authoritarian approach of the movement, but the movement is substantial and it does curb corruption to some extent, although its methods and means are very brutal.
Q: I’d like to follow up on one more question, related to the question above. You said earlier that Xi Jinping did not launch this anti-corruption campaign out of whimsy, power, and arbitrary use of his power, but that he was indeed far-sighted, that he wanted to lay the foundation for the long-term existence of the Communist regime, or that he had his “ambition”.
But there are also many people who look at it from another angle, saying that the reason why he wants to run a campaign and continue to clean up his political opponents is that his anti-corruption campaign involves many people and has offended many people, and he cannot stop. In case he stops, there will be a resurgence of his rival forces, the forces he cleaned up, to fight him to the death, like what happened to Mao Zedong and Stalin back then. So he must maintain this high pressure, must maintain this fighting state. What do you think about this political interpretation?
A: I think this may be a factor. Maybe Xi Jinping is thinking that the high-handedness must continue, otherwise everyone will find that the campaign is over and the corruption is still there, and people will decide that he has failed. And his enemies will come and fight back. This could explain the fact that the high-level anti-corruption does have a strong political undertone, but you also have to consider that most of the anti-corruption in recent years has been happening at the grassroots level. I don’t think a village chief can threaten Xi Jinping. So this anti-corruption movement is very complex and not fully explained by any one explanation.
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