On March 23, the Lithuanian government proposed to the National Assembly to amend the law to send business representatives to Taiwan, moving toward the goal of establishing a representative office in Taiwan this year. China established the “17+1 Cooperation” mechanism in 2012 to bring together 17 Central European, Balkan and Baltic countries in an attempt to increase trade and commerce with each other and expand its influence in the CEE region, but experts question whether the 17+1 mechanism can continue to operate as more and more countries become suspicious of China.
Political analyst Konstantin Eggert published an article in Deutsche Welle on May 5 entitled “Lithuania’s challenge to China is risky, but clever” (Lithuania’s challenge to China is risky, but clever). Lithuania’s challenge to China is risky, but clever” in an op-ed published by Deutsche Welle on 5 May, pointing out that the “17+1” is more widely known as a tool for China to promote large-scale infrastructure development in its “One Belt, One Road” initiative. In a very bold move, Lithuania rejected China and sought to establish trade relations with Taiwan after the EU reached a comprehensive investment agreement with China.
Egert noted that Lithuania prides itself on its cross-party foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and principled anti-authoritarianism. Lithuanians like to call their country a “front-line state” against Russia under President Putin and Belarus under Lukashenko.
Despite having a population of less than 3 million, Lithuania provides training and medical services to Ugandan military personnel, is a staunch supporter of Ukraine against Russia, and is one of the main destinations for Russian opposition emigrants. This stance often raises side-eye, especially in the EU. Many would ask, “Why is a small, middle-income EU country so eager to challenge big powers like Russia and China?”
According to Eggert, Lithuanians have learned from history, especially in the 20th century, when Lithuania and its neighbors, Latvia and Estonia, both lost their independence under the iron heel of former Soviet dictator Stalin. Lithuanians have thus learned that respect is the main political leverage when dealing with authoritarian regimes. If you want to be respected, you have to stand your ground and be prepared to make sacrifices.
Egert noted that Lithuania’s “abandonment of China and protection of Taiwan” was well thought out and aimed at provoking Beijing to retaliate. If the Chinese government decides to “punish” Lithuania in the trade sphere, Lithuanian exporters may benefit from the previous experience of switching to new markets. Previously, Putin imposed an import ban on EU-produced food products in retaliation for the EU’s decision to impose sanctions on the Kremlin following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine.
On the other hand, Lithuania also hopes that the United States, as the Baltic states’ most important ally in NATO, will take note of its firm stance toward China. The Biden administration is developing its China strategy, which does not seem to be very different from former President Trump’s. Sooner or later, other NATO allies will have to develop their own positions in the face of challenges from China. In the face of China’s aggressive global intimidation strategy, Lithuania has set a rare European example of firmness and willingness to give up material interests. By doing so, Lithuania has become far more influential than its political weight and has won the attention of Washington.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Rinkevicius has revealed that China is trying to prevent Lithuania from getting close to Taiwan by pressuring Lithuanian companies. In an interview with German media, he also criticized that the benefits of the “17+1” mechanism do not meet expectations and even bring counterproductive effects, making the EU vulnerable to fragmentation, and that the best way to deal with China is to unite the 27 EU member states.
Justyna Szczudlik, a China expert at The Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Ivana Karáskov, an expert at the Mercator Center for China Studies, a Berlin-based think tank, have also criticized the “17+1” mechanism as not having the desired benefits and even as having the potential to polarize the EU. Ivana Karásková, a China expert at the Mercator Center for China Studies, a Berlin-based think tank, agreed that despite China’s much-publicized benefits of the “17+1” mechanism for both sides, CEE countries are in fact not very dependent on China and have recently found that China’s investment and export commitments have not been fulfilled. 19) epidemic, cyber security, and the crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, more and more countries are becoming more suspicious of China and are questioning the need for the 17+1. If China is unwilling to change its ways, it will be difficult to sustain the 17+1 cooperation mechanism.
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