Xinhua News Agency and CCTV reported in the evening of March 26 that Xi Jinping visited the Second Mobile Force of the Armed Police during his inspection in Fujian on March 24, stressing that the Mobile Force is an important force in the mobile operations of the Armed Police Force and should “comprehensively strengthen the training and preparation for war” and “adhere to the focus on the preparation for war ” “to ensure that in the event of any situation can be quickly and effectively respond to the task assigned to complete” and so on.
At the same Time, Xi Jinping also asked the armed forces “absolute loyalty, absolute purity, absolute reliability”, to do a good job of “ideological work”.
This is seen as a sign that Xi is both insecure and coveting the other side of the border.
Xi Jinping initiated the restructuring of the Armed Police several years ago. The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Adjusting the Leadership and Command System of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, issued by the CPC Central Committee in December 2017, announced that the Armed Police Force is directly under the leadership of the CPC Central Military Commission, and since then not only have local governments, the State Council, and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission lost the right to mobilize the Armed Police, but since the Armed Police is not included in the military sequence, the force is effectively under Xi Jinping’s direct command, making it a direct Xi’s power is directly guaranteed.
Against this backdrop, Xi’s emphasis on “loyalty” and “reliability” for the 2nd Mobile Unit of the Armed Police is seen as his preparation for the internal struggles of the CCP during the sensitive period of the 20th National Congress.
Observers have also noted that during the restructuring of the Armed Police Force, Xi ordered that the marine police force be subordinated to the Armed Police, which was finally established in 2019 as a direct subordinate unit of the Armed Police Marine Police General Force. There are indications that the force has been involved in the Communist Party’s territorial disputes with Taiwan and Japan.
Xi’s emphasis on “war preparedness” in Fujian may have been intended to signal a threat to Taiwan at a time of increasingly close ties between Taiwan and the United States.
On March 26, just after Xi’s visit, as many as 20 Chinese military aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s southwestern airspace, a record high since Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense began routinely announcing information about communist aircraft disturbing Taiwan in September last year.
According to Shu Hsiao-huang, a scholar and associate researcher at the National Defense College of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party‘s move is mainly in response to the signing of the Taiwan-US memorandum of understanding on maritime patrol, intended to create a gray zone conflict pattern, while the communist planes chose Taiwan’s southwest airspace instead of the central line of the Taiwan Strait because the latter is too sensitive, and if the communist forces cross the central line, Taiwan will deploy its main fighter aircraft to intercept, and the Chinese Communist Party may also be worried about its Boom 6K and other technical reconnaissance aircraft being observed by the Taiwanese side at close range, so The Chinese Communist Party may also be worried about its Boom 6K and other technical reconnaissance aircraft being observed by Taiwan at close range, so it chose the southwest airspace, which is relatively far away from Taiwan, to send political signals and avoid over-stimulating Taiwan.
It is believed that the CCP’s official media concealed Xi Jinping’s inspection of the Armed Police Force for two days, probably with similar considerations in mind, in order to release political signals without triggering heated discussions and speculation.