The U.S.-China ministerial talks just took place, and as I predicted earlier in the Apple Daily, the only outcome was the restoration of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China in exchange for the Communist Party’s cooperation on climate issues.
Before that, Biden hosted the “four-nation security talks,” which were quite effective, and Blinken and Austin’s trip to Japan and South Korea was a big step forward in planning the Indo-Pacific strategy. In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party is looking forward to resuming diplomatic contacts with the U.S., and is exercising considerable restraint ahead of the talks.
Blinken stated clearly that U.S.-China relations would not improve if the Chinese Communist Party did not meet the U.S. government’s demands on all fronts, and the U.S. side has no follow-up contact arrangements. It is rare for diplomatic exchanges between the two countries to set any conditions publicly before the talks to force the other side to comply, but the U.S. did just that.
Before the talks, White House National Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Campbell even said publicly that the Chinese Communist Party must give up its “economic coercion” of Australia, and that the U.S. would see the normalization of Sino-Australian relations as a precondition for the U.S. to take steps to improve U.S.-China relations.
Are China-Australia relations that important to U.S.-China relations? No, but if Biden wants to convince the allies to work together against the enemy, the U.S. cannot just think about itself, but must make a clear statement and stand up for the allies in exchange for them joining the anti-China alliance. Whether such a clear statement is effective or not, the attitude itself is already important.
The US is forcing the CCP to back down to Australia, which is forcing the CCP to do what it wants. If the CCP complies, it will simply be showing weakness and will not be able to explain to the Chinese or gain a foothold in the international arena, but if it does not listen to the U.S., it is unlikely that Sino-U.S. relations will be restored to their old view. By putting pressure on the CCP, the U.S. is showing goodwill to Australia, and doing so to other allies and to the U.S. dynasty. The U.S. demand was not made privately in the talks, but publicly, which made the Chinese Communist Party even more uncomfortable.
The U.S. supported Australia, and Australia wanted to follow the U.S. in return; the U.S. clearly stated that the Japan-U.S. Security treaty covers the Diaoyu Islands, and Japan dared to denounce the Chinese Communist Party’s war threat by name. After the U.S.-South Korea ministerial meeting, South Korea also had to choose to side with the United States.
The U.S. has always adopted a vague strategy in its relations with China, saying as little as possible about the CCP’s domestic issues, and not provoking the CCP in its international relations, letting the CCP go up and down in various international organizations. The U.S. has been waiting for the CCP to change, but it has waited for 20 to 30 years before realizing that it has been fooled. If the U.S. government still does not wake up, the U.S. will be the world’s top power in vain.
If the U.S. continues to implement strategic ambiguity towards the CCP, it will be easier for the CCP to muddle through and become more unscrupulous, “invading the door and stepping on the door”, and dividing and disintegrating the Western democracies, then won’t the U.S. have a problem with itself?
The United States is now all things are clear, how the United States intends to do, what goals, what plans, who is an ally, against whom, what things have what prerequisites, what things to exchange for what. The United States has always had the experience and confidence to manipulate the world situation. The United States has less to ask from the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese Communist Party has more to ask from the United States, and when comparing the two, the United States is more daring to argue the hand melon.
Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, the economic coercion against Australia, and the defense of South Korea, the U.S. position has been clear or is becoming clear. The U.S. position on the defense of Taiwan is still unclear, but the basic position is already written on its face. Whether or not the United States will send troops to Taiwan will determine the ambition of the Chinese Communist Party to commit crimes against Taiwan, and also determine Taiwan’s determination to resist the Communist Party. If the U.S. attitude is not clear, the CCP may misjudge the U.S. determination and therefore recklessly think of landing; as long as the U.S. attitude is clear and will definitely assist in Taiwan’s defense, the CCP will not dare to act arbitrarily considering the military consequences.
Ma Ying-jeou’s theory of “the first war is the final war” is based on the ambiguity of the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan. If the U.S. attitude is clear, there is no reason for the KMT to disturb people’s hearts and minds. When conditions are more mature, the U.S. attitude toward the defense of Taiwan will also become clearer.
Between the United States and the CCP, ideological conflict is fundamental, geopolitical rivalry is secondary, and national power competition is fundamental. The U.S.-China confrontation is fundamental and permanent, and one day there will be a winner and a loser. The clear position of the U.S. towards the CCP is conducive to the unity of Western countries and the suppression of the CCP’s expansion.
Recent Comments