The matter had come to this point, and Chiang C.C. thought that a political solution had to be abandoned. That’s what led to the speech at the KMT Central Committee’s Memorial Week in June 1946 mentioned above. To avoid Marshall’s pestering, Chiang went as far as Lushan to command the Nationalist forces in Guanzhou to fight the Communists. Knowing full well that this move would bring him into direct conflict with Marshall, Chiang showed the moral commitment and tenacious Anti-Communist will of a great power leader by defying possible U.S. sanctions for the sake of saving the country from abject disaster.
Some people criticized the government for not wanting peace in this way. But the problem is that the armistice order is like an unequal treaty imposed by the United States, depriving the government of a sovereign nation of the right to use legitimate force to quell chaos. What’s more, the communists launched retaliatory operations against the national army in Shandong and other places the day after the armistice came into effect, and the government still did not repent even after two lenient delays. Therefore, it was only natural and unquestionable that the National Army broke free from the unreasonable shackles of the United States and took military action.
Marshall, however, after six months and two ineffective peace talks with the Communists, still refused to admit the failure of the U.S. mediation policy, and within two months, eight to Mount Lu, forcing Chiang to armistice and set up various names of negotiation groups with the Chinese Communist Party. Chiang insisted, on the other hand, that negotiations were possible, but the communists must accept the government program unconditionally, otherwise no light talk of an armistice. Chiang told Ma that the Communists could only be subdued by superior force and hoped that his American allies would understand and assist. But what he got turned out to be a warning letter from Truman: If there was no progress in a peaceful settlement, the United States would reexamine its support for the ROC government. Ma also argued forcefully that peace talks would not guarantee that the Communists would not rebel again, but there was more hope for peace because war would lead to economic chaos, and economic chaos was a breeding ground for communism. But the problem was that the Communists were already flooding China and were in the process of armed subversion of the government, not a breeding ground for anything. During that Time, the communists were concentrating their forces to form a field army and were in full rebellion against the government. Chiang not only had to command the front, but also had to concentrate on dealing with the interference of the United States behind him.
On July 29, 1946, Marshall made a killer move and ordered an arms embargo against the ROC for nearly a year. This year was the best time for the national army to be at an absolute advantage in terms of strength, combat power, morale, and equipment, and to put down the communist rebellion. Marshall himself was afraid of the Communists, but also obstructed the National Army’s fight against the Communists; the United States itself was just to pull the bottom out of the fire, but even asked the allies such as Britain to follow suit, to block the National Army’s access to weapons and ammunition. At the same time, the Soviet Union was supplying the Communists with more than 4 billion dollars of American heavy armaments obtained through Lend-Lease during World War II (the US military aid received by the Nationalist Army during the war was only 800 million dollars) via the land route in North Manchuria and the water route in Liaodong Peninsula. As a result, the National Army was cut off from supplies and its equipment became less and less; the Communists had “as much American-made arms as they wanted”. The appeasement envoy Marshall and the Soviet Union “joined hands” to help the Communists, so that the national army was gradually in a desperate situation. Jiang Zhongzheng wrote in his diary on August 19: “The Communists are becoming more rampant, and the pressure from the United States is increasing, so the difficulties can be extreme!
On August 6, Mao Zedong to the American journalist Strang issued “all reactionary factions are paper tigers” rant. That day Marshall also in Lushan to Jiang Zhongzheng to pressure the truce. The United States of America, sweeping Western Europe, defeated Japan, military power and prestige, proud of the world, but was begging for peace to The Japanese communists called “paper tiger”, is no less than a big joke, more than a big humiliation. However, just from the second armistice order after a few things to observe, the horse for the United States to win this “honor” may not be wrong.
On July 11, Marshall appointed Stanton as ambassador to China to join the mediation that had proved to be a complete failure, an appointment that was itself the result of a compromise with the Communists. He originally nominated the hardliner Weidemann, who was only changed to the Communist recommendation of Stanton because of Communist opposition, setting a bad precedent for American foreign affairs to be decided by the Communist Party. Upon taking office, Stout, like Marshall, opposed unconditional support for the National Government, insisted that Chiang open the door to peace with the CCP, and acted as a lobbyist for the Communists. [24]
On July 29, the Communists ambushed a U.S. Marine transport in the town of Anping in Hebei, killing three American troops and wounding twelve, and biting back afterwards. Instead of being vocal as he had been with the National Government earlier, Marshall chose to hold his tongue and settle the matter.
On October 5, the Chinese Communist Party seized on Marshall’s soft underbelly of fear of a breakdown in negotiations and threatened to withdraw from them. The Chinese government’s fear of a breakdown in the negotiations was threatened by Marshall’s withdrawal from the negotiations. In spite of the honor of the five-star general and the dignity of the American nation, Marshall followed Zhou Enlai to Shanghai and begged him to return to Nanking, assuming a dinner party. Chiang said in his diary, “This time Matt flew to Shanghai to visit Zhou, but met with such a wall, which he thought had never encountered the insult, from then on may be aware of the communist bandits can not be compatible with it?”
The weaker the United States was, the tougher the Communists were; the more arrogant and unscrupulous the Communists were, the more the United States pressed the government to compromise. As a result, the Nationalist government was confronted on both sides and could hardly do its job. Instead of being able to put down the chaos in a righteous and justifiable manner, the national army had to cover up as if it had done something wrong. For example, at the beginning of the Soviet-Chinese campaign, the National Army’s battle plan was detected by the bandit spies in advance and put on Marshall’s desk. The National Army was forced to call off the attacking troops, and as a result, they were beaten passively and lost troops. [25] Throughout 1946, the National Army was never able to go all out and attack with a bang, but instead fought and stopped, talking while fighting. Under Marshall’s pressure, the government made a third and fourth unilateral truce, and morale was greatly affected, not to mention that the plan to eliminate the bandits, which had been planned to be completed within a year, was completely scrapped and the war dragged on.
In November 1946 the Communists refused to attend the National Constitutional Convention, relations between the Communist Party and China broke down, and the Chinese delegates returned to Yan’an. In the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, Marshall had lost his value and was even in the way. However, without any self-awareness, Ma asked Zhou Enlai to bring a message to the Chinese Communist Party, asking it to decide whether it wanted him to continue to mediate. What he got was the headbutt of the editorial of the Liberation Daily: “The united front against the aggressive policy of American imperialism will grow rapidly in the 36th year of the Republic…American imperialism and its lackeys in China have replaced German, Italian and Japanese fascism as the world’s aggressor and the public enemy of all mankind. “. It was only at this point that Marshall finally gave up mediation.
Before he returned to China, the saddened and aggrieved Marshall issued a statement saying: “I wish I could state to the American people that in deliberately misrepresenting and slandering the actions, policies and purposes of our government, the propaganda (of the Chinese Communist Party) has no regard for the truth, no regard for facts, whatever they may be, and clearly proves that its resolute purpose is to deceive the Chinese people and world public opinion and to incite resentment and hatred against the American people. It is to incite resentment and hatred against the American people. It is difficult to remain silent in the face of such blatant slander and total disregard for the facts”. It is incredible that Marshall was so upset that before he left China he asked the government to send representatives to Yan’an to discuss with the Chinese Communist Party “a comprehensive plan for the cessation of the conflict and the reorganization of the government”.
Marshall’s greatest tragedy was that he did not realize who the real enemy and friend was until he was abandoned by the Chinese Communist Party, and insisted that the disagreement between China and the Communist Party was a lack of mutual trust, and that he was still beating each other to death. Jiang Zhongzheng said he was stubborn and insane, and he was right.
Marshall failed to mediate and returned in defeat, but was promoted to Secretary of State and continued his anti-Chiang policy. The Nationalist government was restrained by the U.S. and reserved seats for the Communists when the government was reorganized in April ’47. It was not until the United States lifted the arms embargo that it liberalized its efforts to fight the Communists in the summer of the same year, wanted the Communist leaders, banned the Communist Party, and launched a nationwide mobilization to save the country from extinction. At this time, nearly two years had passed since Chiang C.C.C. issued his secret order to suppress the bandits in ’45. The best time to put down the Communists had long since passed. The national army, which had been fighting repeatedly, was demoralized and no longer superior. Without continued strong foreign aid, there was little hope for counter-insurgency against the communists.
In November 1948, the Nationalist government sent Soong Mei-ling to the United States to ask for the support and assistance of its American allies, but Truman refused. in April 1949, the Nationalist government rejected the terms of the communists’ forced surrender, and in December of the same year, the government of the Republic of China moved its capital to Taipei, and mainland China has fallen since.
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