In both “Zhou Enlai in Later Years” by Gao Wenqian and in “Zhou Enlai’s Later Years” by Liu Wusheng, two books are written about the expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in late 1973 to criticize Zhou Enlai. Gao writes: “Incidentally, the original records about this meeting have all been destroyed.” Liu wrote: “Since the central archives department did not keep the records of this expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, this historical public case, which has been dusty for more than thirty years, can only be glimpsed in the recollections of certain parties.”
After reading this, I was puzzled: How could the original records of such an important meeting be “not preserved”? How could such precious central archives be “all destroyed”? In the high book, Deng Yingchao’s conversation with Zhou Enlai’s biographical team on April 5, 1989, is quoted as revealing some of the process of destruction. According to Deng Yingchao, before Zhou Enlai died, he talked to Deng Yingchao about the two things he was most uneasy about after his death, one being the Wu Hao Kai incident, and the other being the enlarged Politburo meeting in 1973, which criticized him and told her to keep an eye on him. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Yingchao and Ye Jianying jointly wrote a letter to the Central Committee, requesting that this matter be vindicated, approved by Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang stepped in to find the original records and then destroyed them all.
Reading these words did not solve the mystery in my mind, I always wanted to confirm and explore this important event of burning archives, and I felt that I could not “mention it in passing” and let it go gently. Because in any country, in any dynasty, burning important files, especially the core confidential files of the central government, is not allowed.
It is confirmed that all the archives of the Zhou Conference have been burned
On the morning of October 16, 2006, Zhao Wei, the former secretary of Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao, accompanied by Geng Biao’s daughter Geng Hong, came to my Home on Tianping Road in Shanghai to visit me and my old companion Ge Yunfang. We had not seen each other for more than 30 years, so we had a lot to talk about when we met. Zhao Wei was already in her seventies, but she was hale and hearty, and she was still telling stories about the lives of Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao in various places.
During the conversation, I asked Zhao Wei to confirm the burning of the archives of the Zhou Criticism Society. Zhao Wei told me that the original records of the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held from November to early December 1973, which was personally decided by Mao Zedong to criticize Zhou Enlai, had indeed been burned by Zhao Wei and others under the direct supervision of Deng Yingchao in the early 1980s.
Zhao Wei said to me: the Politburo criticism of Zhou, the criticism can be fierce, Deng Xiaoping also spoke at the meeting, the Zhou criticism is very strong. After the end of the criticism of the week, Chairman Mao said to burn the material, but has not been burned. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping resumed, Hua Guofeng presided over the work of the Central Committee. The two of them wrote a letter to the Central Committee asking for vindication, saying that Chairman Mao had instructed to burn the materials of the Politburo’s Week Criticism Conference and asking that it be done. After Hua Guofeng’s approval, by Hu Yaobang from the Central Office of the Secretary Bureau to take out the Politburo approval of the Zhou meeting materials, all to Deng Dasha’s office. By me and Wang Shoujiang, secretary of Marshal Ye, in the presence of Deng Dajie, the original records were all burned.
The files of the Politburo meeting to criticize Zhou were finally confirmed to have been burned in their entirety. The situation concerning the Politburo’s extended meeting to criticize Zhou Enlai had been kept strictly confidential in the past, and only a very small number of people within the Central Committee knew about it. As a member of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee at that Time, I had never heard of this meeting during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, among others, also never revealed any information about it to the leaders of Shanghai. It was only after the end of the Cultural Revolution, in the process of criticizing Jiang Qing and others, that the inner workings of the Zhou criticism meeting were gradually uncovered.
To this day, there is finally an introduction of the meeting in authoritative publications in the sea. For example, in the Chronology of Zhou Enlai, compiled by the Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, it is written: “On the advice of Mao Zedong, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee met continuously on November 21 and early December (1973) to criticize the so-called ‘mistakes’ of Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. At the meetings, Jiang Qing and others laid siege to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, denouncing the Sino-American talks as a ‘loss of power and insult to the country’ and ‘surrenderism’. Zhou Enlai made an inspection against his will. Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan also suggested that this was the ‘eleventh line struggle’, slandering Zhou Enlai as the ‘head of the wrong line’ and as ‘impatient’ to replace Mao Zedong. Afterwards, Jiang Qing reported to Mao Zedong her request to add herself and Yao Wenyuan to the Politburo Standing Committee. On December 9, Mao Zedong talked with Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen and proposed that the meeting had gone well, but someone had made two mistakes: one was to talk about the ‘eleventh line of struggle’, which should not be so, and in fact was not; the other was to talk about the Premier’s ‘impatience’. ‘. The Premier is not ‘impatient’, Jiang Qing is ‘impatient’. On Jiang Qing’s proposal to add to the Standing Committee, Mao said: ‘Add to the Standing Committee, don’t.'”
From the above text, the meeting of the Politburo to criticize Zhou was a “siege” and “slander” of Zhou Enlai by Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and others, and Jiang Qing and others had other ambitions to become the “Standing Committee”. Although Mao Zedong proposed to convene the meeting, he found out in time that Jiang Qing and others had made wrong statements such as “eleven line struggles” and “impatience”, “protected” Zhou Enlai, and stopped the The conspiracy to “add to the Standing Committee” was stopped. In that case, the original records of the Politburo’s meeting to criticize Zhou were the perfect material to expose the “Gang of Four”‘s opposition to Premier Zhou and their conspiracy to seize power. Deng Yingchao and Ye Jianying asked for the vindication of the criticism of Zhou, which was reasonable, and the central government made a decision to vindicate them accordingly, but why did they burn all the important files of the central government? Why did they burn all the important files of the Central Committee? What is the unspeakable truth in this?
With such questions, I checked a large amount of information, and looked for the relevant personnel to understand, and finally have a preliminary conclusion on this suspicious case.
The meeting was held in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions
The reason for the meeting was Mao Zedong.
After the Lin Biao incident, Zhou Enlai started to correct Lin Biao’s ultra-leftist influence in various fields, including diplomacy, from 1972. On December 17, 1972, Mao Zedong approached Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and others and proposed that the extreme leftist trend should be criticized a little less. The essence of Lin Biao’s line was the “extreme right”. Zhou Enlai’s criticism of the extreme left could no longer continue.
In June 1973, Zhou Enlai asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study the U.S.-Soviet summit, and the ministry immediately published an issue of New Situation, arguing that after the U.S. and Soviet Union had signed the agreement on preventing nuclear war, they were “more deceptive” to the world, and “the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination of the world has intensified”. While Zhou Enlai praised this issue of New Situation, Mao Zedong thought it did not conform to his usual analysis of the international situation. On July 4, instead of Zhou Enlai, Mao talked to Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, who were preparing for the “Tenth Congress” of the Communist Party of China, and criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Zhou Enlai’s supervision: “I always blow the big upheaval, big division and big reorganization, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suddenly comes to a big deception and big domination. ” The name criticizes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but actually names Zhou Enlai: “I routinely do not read any such bullshit documents. The Premier’s speech is also included, because it is not better to read.” Mao Zedong “advised” Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen: “You are not too young, so you’d better learn some foreign languages, lest you fall for those old masters and be cheated by them, so much so that you get into their boat.” “The conclusion is in four words: big things are not discussed, and small things are sent every day. This tone is not corrected, is bound to come out of the revision. In the future to engage in revisionism, do not say that I did not speak in advance.”
Mao Zedong said enough here: what “fart documents”, “fall for those old masters”, “be deceived by them”, “get on their The boat of thieves”, “engage in revisionism” and so on, completely the nature of the problem on the line to the height of the “line of struggle”. That night, Zhang Chunqiao conveyed Mao’s criticism to the Politburo and Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai, of course, felt the weight of this criticism, while withdrawing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “new situation”, while writing a review to Mao Zedong. On July 5, Mao Zedong criticized Zhou Enlai’s letter, saying, “Such persistent problems are found everywhere and are not unique to any one person; it is advisable to study ways to correct them.”
However, the matter did not end there, it was really “one wave before it subsides, another wave after another”. In November 1973, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger visited China and had four formal talks with Zhou Enlai and three separate talks. During the talks, Zhou Enlai talked strictly according to the caliber determined by Mao Zedong. On November 12, Kissinger met with Mao accompanied by Zhou Enlai and said that the Soviet Union wanted to destroy China’s nuclear capabilities and that the United States “had decided not to allow China’s security to be undermined. Kissinger wanted the United States to provide a nuclear umbrella for China, which offended Mao, who had always emphasized national independence and dignity, and he expressed his disagreement to Kissinger on the spot: the Soviet Union “contradicted its ambitions and its capabilities.” Mao was not willing to accept “protection” from anyone.
In the early morning of November 14, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying had a final formal meeting with Kissinger and agreed on the wording of the “communiqué. The full text of the “communiqué” was sent to Mao Zedong for approval. The talks were supposed to be over and Kissinger was to leave China on the morning of the 15th. However, just a few hours before he left for China, Kissinger suddenly proposed to call on Zhou Enlai alone to exchange further views on the issue of U.S.-China military cooperation. Zhou Enlai immediately asked Mao Zedong by telephone, and the reply was that the President had already taken sleeping pills and gone to sleep. Knowing Mao’s poor health, Zhou Enlai could not bear to wake him up, but feeling bad about not seeing Kissinger, he had a separate meeting with Kissinger accompanied by interpreter Tang Wensheng.
During the meeting, Zhou Enlai did not make any commitment to the issues raised by Kissinger because he did not have time to consult Mao Zedong, but only replied that the matter needed further consideration and would be discussed later; on the issue of Sino-US military cooperation, each side could designate a person to continue to exchange views in the future. In Kissinger’s later book, Kissinger’s Secret Book, Zhou Enlai’s answer to this question is also recorded in the “Memorandum of Talks”.
“Premier Zhou: And because this is a very specific and very complex issue, we need to study it further before consulting with your side.”
As a premier of a country, such a reply did not lose its principle, but if there was a shortcoming, it was that it did not go back on the spot in the spirit of Mao, and at the same time did not report back to Mao afterwards on the last round of individual talks.
Who knows, the situation reached Mao Zedong, it became a major crime of Zhou Enlai. With Mao’s boldness and sensitivity on the issue of national independence, he believed that Zhou Enlai had made a mess during the talks, was frightened by the Soviet atomic bomb, and had undertaken the task of engaging in military cooperation with the United States without asking him for instructions, accepting the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Mao criticized this, saying, “Be careful with the United States; it is easy to be ‘left’ when engaging in struggle and right when engaging in coalition.” He proposed that the Central Political Bureau meet to discuss his views. On November 17, Mao Zedong personally summoned Zhou Enlai and the relevant personnel of the Foreign Ministry to criticize the communiqué of the Sino-American talks as not good, and added: Someone wants to lend us an umbrella, we just don’t want this umbrella, it is a nuclear umbrella. Mao Zedong said sternly: “Speaking in front of you, the Politburo meeting, you can come, set up a row of chairs at the back, who wants to engage in revisionism, that will have to criticize it! You have to have the courage, nothing more than the abolition of your positions.” In this way, it was decided that Zhou Enlai himself presided over the meeting of the Central Political Bureau to criticize Zhou.
After two days of small meetings, Jiang Qing criticized Zhou Enlai for “right-leaning surrenderism” and for accepting “nuclear protection” from the United States. Zhou Enlai made a preliminary examination of Mao’s criticism and also made some explanations. Jiang Qing rebuked him on the spot: “You are a nagging person! To talk about substantive issues!” Zhou Enlai’s attitude provoked Mao’s greater dissatisfaction. Mao Zedong suspected that the Politburo’s small-scale criticism of Zhou was not enough, to further expand the scope and purge the influence, decided to convene an expanded meeting of the Politburo.
According to Mao Zedong’s instructions, in addition to the elderly and sick, 20 or so members of the Politburo in Beijing to participate in the criticism of Zhou, even Deng Xiaoping, who was not yet a member of the Politburo, was also designated to attend the meeting. The venue was changed from Diaoyutai to the Great Hall of the People, and the expanded list was drawn up by Mao Zedong himself, including: Ji Pengfei, Qiao Guanhua, Huang Zhen, Zhong Xidong, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Biao, the Minister of the Liaison Department, plus the four “junior members” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang Hailong, Tang Wensheng, Luo Xu and Zhang Hanzhi. The meeting was chaired by Wang Hongwen and approved by Mao Zedong, who set up a six-member “help group” consisting of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng. Mao also appointed Wang Hailong and Tang Wensheng as his liaison officers to convey his instructions at all times.
Mao Zedong set the tone for the Zhou criticism meeting
At the beginning of the meeting, in order to let the participants understand Mao’s intention, Tang Wensheng first conveyed Mao’s criticism of Zhou Enlai and the diplomatic work in its original form, which lasted for eight hours. Mao accused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of being Zhou Enlai’s “independent kingdom”, unable to insert a needle or splash water, and not implementing the diplomatic policy he had formulated. Mao also sensationally pointed out that Zhou Enlai was so afraid of the Soviet Union that if they came in, he would be the Soviet emperor’s son! This set the tone for the charge that Zhou Enlai had “surrendered and betrayed his country”.
In the transmission, Wang Hailong, Tang Wensheng and Mao Zedong in July on the phrase “on their boat of thieves” made a clarification: Mao’s original words were as follows, “Do not get on the boat of thieves of Master Qiao (Qiao Guanhua), Master Ji (Ji Pengfei). When the record of the conversation was sent for review, Mao deleted the names of Qiao and Ji, referring here to Zhou Enlai, because Qiao and Ji were not even members of the Central Committee at the time, and were not qualified to be the boss of the thief’s boat, and the only person who could be the boss of the thief’s boat was Lin Biao. Mao Zedong’s pen was deleted, so he compared Zhou Enlai with Lin Biao, which set the tone for the title of “head of the line of struggle”.
Those who attended the meeting were shocked to hear Mao’s instructions conveyed. As Qiao Guanhua later said, listening to Chairman Mao’s words from the liaison officer, it was “creepy”.
At Mao’s command, the expanded Politburo meeting was ablaze with gunfire, with participants accusing Zhou Enlai of “serious rightism,” “revisionism,” “knee-jerk surrender,” and “humiliation of power. The participants accused Zhou Enlai of “serious rightism”, “revisionism”, “knee-jerk surrender”, “losing power and humiliating the country”, “ignoring the Central Committee”, and “deceiving the President”. In Beijing, the Politburo members Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Li Xiannian, Li Desheng, etc., all did not speak, and the Foreign Ministry’s attendees were even more fierce, and everyone had to take a stand under the “supreme instructions” to criticize Zhou.
Zhang Hanzhi, who attended the meeting, later wrote a passage in her memoirs “I and Qiao Guanhua”, stating the psychological state of mind at that time: “Although no one involved in that particular historical condition could defy authority and advocate justice, after all, as an analysis of my own conscience, I, for the sake of my own survival and ‘future I said and did things against my heart and hurt good people for the sake of my own survival and ‘future’ with the turbulent waves that came. Especially when Premier Zhou was humiliated, we did not do anything for him to relieve his pressure.” Although the words are evasive, they tell a few truths and show that “none” of the participants did not take a stand against Zhou.
As for Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and others, of course, they followed the meeting even more closely, with Jiang Qing yelling about “surrenderism,” “the eleventh line of struggle” and “the head of the line of struggle,” based on
Mao Zedong criticized Zhou as the “son of The Emperor” and the “boss” of the “ship of thieves”. The “boss” of the “ship of thieves”, but on a higher level, almost to Zhou Enlai knocked down. Xiao Mu, who used to work in Wang Hongwen’s office, told me on February 2, 2007: Wang Hongwen was presiding over the meeting to criticize Zhou, and late every night the original minutes of the meeting were brought back to Diaoyutai from the Great Hall of the People, and Xiao Mu and his secretary Shen used pencils to transcribe the original minutes into large characters the size of a lead, and presented them to Mao Zedong, whose eyesight was not good, for perusal.
Xiao Mu said, “The original record is not a word can not be copied out, indicating that Mao paid great attention to the speeches at this meeting, each person’s speech to read, he was directly leading the meeting.” For the sake of secrecy, the records could not be sent to the printer to be typeset and printed, and could only be copied by hand.
It is necessary to add an episode here: some time later, Qiao Guanhua, who was attending the meeting to criticize Zhou, met Zhou Enlai when receiving foreign guests and said to Zhou face to face that he had apologized to Zhou Enlai for his speech at the meeting and asked for forgiveness. Zhou Enlai said with emotion, “This is not something you can influence.” “Then how can you be blamed? That is the general situation, everyone has spoken, you work beside me for decades, and manage the United States of this stall, how can not speak? Besides, I also have mistakes, and can not say that I can not be criticized.” It is clear that Zhou Enlai is fully aware of who wants to fix him.
Deng Xiaoping both praised Mao Zedong and put Zhou Enlai to death
Deng Xiaoping was only a member of the 10th Central Committee at that time, not yet a member of the Politburo, but Mao Zedong appointed him to attend the meeting to criticize Zhou, to see his attitude and performance at the meeting.
What did Deng Xiaoping say at the meeting? His daughter Mao Mao wrote in her book My Father Deng Xiaoping’s Years of the Cultural Revolution: “Deng Xiaoping had just resumed work and was not even a member of the Politburo, but only an attendee of the meeting. At the meeting, he remained silent and did not speak. After almost all the people had spoken, in the last day or two, he made a speech. At the beginning of his speech, he had to criticize Zhou Enlai as Mao Zedong had asked of each participant. But after a few words, he then turned the tables and began to talk about how to view the international strategic situation.”
According to Mao, Deng Xiaoping only criticized Zhou Enlai “in a few words”, could this satisfy Mao? In fact, Mao Zedong was very concerned about Deng Xiaoping’s attitude at the meeting. In the course of the meeting, he specifically to Wang Hailong, Tang Wensheng to understand Deng Xiaoping’s performance, repeatedly asked him to speak up? Mao Mao himself wrote: Mao Zedong heard Deng Xiaoping spoke after the spur of the moment, wanted to immediately find Deng for a long talk, but because it was already late at night, could not find someone, had to give up.
This gives rise to contradictions. If Deng Xiaoping criticized Zhou Enlai in just a few words, how could he be appreciated by Mao Zedong, and immediately invite him for a “long talk”?
Finally, we know the truth from Ji Dengkui’s conversation: In the spring of 1988, the Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee visited Ji Dengkui, a member of the 10th and 11th Political Bureau, and made a record of the conversation. Ji Dengkui said that Deng Xiaoping made his speech near the end of the meeting, and that Deng Xiaoping “reminded” Zhou Enlai that “your current position is only one step away from the chairmanship, and others can only hope but cannot reach it, but you are ‘hope but can reach it. ‘ I hope you yourself can be very vigilant about this.”
Deng Xiaoping’s “reminder” really carries a lot of weight: your current position is “under one person, above ten thousand people”, “one step away” from the President, only you are qualified “I hope you will be alert to the fact that only you are qualified to replace Chairman Mao. Deng Xiaoping did not say as blatantly as Jiang Qing: “Can’t wait to replace the President.” He said it more cleverly, more subtle, not only praised Mao Zedong, but also “punished” Zhou Enlai, making it more difficult for Zhou Enlai to defend. In fact, the very proper Zhou Enlai never had such a thought since the Zunyi Conference, he has been very careful to avoid “high merit shock”. Therefore, he felt very aggrieved by the statements of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing, and finally had to write in the review that he himself could only be an assistant, and the work of the Politburo should be handed over to someone else to preside over, to show his own heart.
Deng Xiaoping, with decades of friendship with Zhou Enlai, knew that Zhou did not have such a wrong intention, but had to say so, solely to please Mao Zedong. Sure enough, Mao Zedong, after learning that Deng Xiaoping made such a weighty speech, said happily: “I know he will speak, and will speak without having to deliver.” This is what moved the idea of having a long talk with Deng Xiaoping overnight.
Deng Xiaoping passed Mao Zedong’s “examination”, Mao Zedong was determined to reuse Deng Xiaoping. More than ten days later, Mao Zedong personally chaired the Politburo meeting, decided to eight military region commander to transfer. Mao Zedong announced at the meeting: “Now, invited a military division, called Deng Xiaoping. Send a notice, when the Politburo members, members of the Military Commission. The Politburo is in charge of all, the party, government, military and people, east, west, north, south and central. I think the Politburo added a secretary general, you do not want this name, then become the chief of staff.”
In this meeting, Mao Zedong did not forget to continue to “knock” Zhou Enlai, accusing: “the Politburo does not discuss politics, the military commission does not discuss the military”, “if China out of revisionism, we must pay attention to ah! ” He also used the war to say: “Once the war comes, we can distinguish who is really willing to fight, and who is colluding with foreigners, hoping to become the emperor.” It shows that his residual anger has not yet subsided, and he continues to issue warnings to Zhou Enlai.
What was the reason for burning the records of the Zhou criticism meeting?
At the meeting of the Politburo, which lasted for more than ten days, Zhou Enlai was insulted and aggrieved, and was unable to sleep at night because he had no desire to eat and tea, and he did not even shave, so he quickly lost weight. During the meeting, he endured the pain caused by bladder cancer, while listening to the criticism, while also leaving the meeting to go to the toilet at times to urinate blood. He asked to meet with Mao Zedong for a review, but Mao did not agree and asked him to review the meeting. Jiang Qing did not allow others to help Zhou and forced him to write his own review. Zhou Enlai made a request to the two “junior” who were Mao’s liaison officers: he was too old, his eyes were blurry and his hands were shaky, so he couldn’t remember the content of other people’s criticism, and he wanted their help, but was denounced as trying to get to the bottom of the Chairman through them. In the end, Zhou Enlai could not argue with Mao’s conviction, he had to tolerate for the party, silently swallowed the bitterness and wrote an earnest, on-the-line examination, despite his cancerous body. The first time, the company was criticized. Ye Jianying also wrote a review, the title is “full of absurd words, a handful of bitter tears”. They both made an examination at the meeting, and received another criticism.
The first time I saw the “Zhou Enlai diplomacy”, Mao Zedong saw that the prestige of the people had been swept away, and the anger of Zhou Enlai was almost gone, and after Lin Biao’s accident, someone had to be responsible for the Politburo, and Zhou Enlai should not be knocked down, so he himself came out as a “good guy”. Mao Zedong wrote on Zhou Enlai’s review, “That’s fine.” On December 9, during a meeting with the King and Queen of Nepal, Mao expressed his satisfaction with the meeting in front of Zhou Enlai, saying that it had been held well and had clarified the problems, while criticizing someone for saying two wrong things: “the eleventh line of struggle” and “impatience”. “. He said to Zhou Enlai: “Premier ah, you have been rectified, I heard that they rectified you are not happy ah, said you love to interject my words, so that you are now afraid to speak, made me into a ‘one-word’.” He also pointed to Wang Hailong and Tang Wensheng, who were present, and said, “They screwed me, they screwed the Premier, they shit and pissed on my head, and in the future they will say they screwed the Premier.” He also said, “The Premier is poor, he has been made to suffer so much by these women.” It was clearly Mao himself who wanted to fix Zhou Enlai, but put the blame on the head of the “junior” and “a few pussies”, no wonder Wang Hailong, Tang Wensheng and others were not convinced, and had to whine behind their backs, “He does the face, we do the ass. He also said, “The Premier is poor, he has been made to suffer so much by these women.”
Thus, a high-level criticism meeting officially came to an end; to this day, with the continuous disclosure of inside information, the truth of the meeting is gradually revealed to the world. The reasons for the burning of the original records of the meeting that we have been exploring have finally emerged.
First, to vindicate Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, their reviews were burned.
Second, in order to protect the resurgent Deng Xiaoping, to protect the “wise leader Hua Guofeng” and others, their statements criticizing Zhou were all destroyed.
Third, in order to blame Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four for being anti-Zhou.
Fourth, to conceal the different views of the Communist Party at the top on the issue of Sino-American relations.
Fifth, and last but not least, to protect Mao Zedong, the chief backstage and commander-in-chief of Zhou’s criticism.
The record written in ink can be burned, but history cannot be destroyed. It is engraved on the cliff face of the century, and as time washes away, a stroke, more and more clearly reveals its original true appearance.
(From Xu Jingxian’s “Last Memories”)
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