On March 9, Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the Chinese Communist Party is accelerating its attempts to take over U.S. leadership and that (the seizure of) Taiwan is clearly one of Beijing‘s ambitions before it can achieve that goal, and that “such a threat will become apparent in the next 10 years, in fact probably the next six years. Indeed, we must do everything we can to prevent conflict. Our first priority is to keep the peace, but if competition turns into conflict, we absolutely must be prepared to fight and win.
Sen. Rick Scott (R-SC) questioned whether he agreed that Communist China must be prevented from taking control of Taiwan. Davidson said that as an operational commander in the Indo-Pacific region, he has an obligation to support the Taiwan Relations Act; that from a geostrategic perspective, Taiwan is critical to the global standing of the United States; that the policy of “strategic ambiguity” that has helped Taiwan maintain the status quo for more than four decades should be reviewed periodically; and that a steady stream of arms sales to Taiwan should be sustained to assist Taiwan’s ability to continue to The policy of “strategic ambiguity” has helped Taiwan maintain the status quo for the past four decades, but it should be reviewed periodically.
Davidson noted, however, that “the greatest danger to the United States and our allies in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrence against the People’s Republic of China.” As a result, Davidson told the senators, “Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate the capability, strength and willingness to thoroughly convince Beijing that achieving its objectives through military force is too costly.”
The proposal comes just days after Indo-Pacific Command submitted to Congress the core of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which considers $27.4 billion for the Indo-Pacific theater over the next six years; the deployment of an integrated first island chain west of the International Date Change Line Joint Force Precision Strike Network (JFPSN) in the western part of the International Date Line, an integrated air and missile defense capability in the second island chain, and a decentralized force capable of sustaining prolonged combat operations.
Davidson’s testimony above is not just his personal opinion, not that a change of commander is a change of policy (it is customary in the U.S. military for the commander of a theater command to serve a three-year term; Davidson is also scheduled to retire later this year), but represents the long-standing Perception of the former Pacific Command/Indo-Pacific Command about the CCP and its military; and the perception of Indo-Pacific Command is first-hand and most genuine because, if the U.S. and China go to war in the future Indo-Pacific will be the main theater of war, and Indo-Pacific U.S. forces will be the main fighting force.
Former Pacific Command/Indo-Pacific Command’s Long-Term Perceptions of the Chinese Communist Party and its Military
First, a little background: In May 2018, the U.S. Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command (IPCC). The Indo-Pacific Command inherited the structure, functions and forces of the former Pacific Command, and is one of the six global theater commands of the U.S. military, as well as the largest one, with a defense area stretching from the western waters of India in the west to the west coast of the United States in the east, the Arctic Ocean in the north and the Antarctic continent in the south. “The command includes the Navy’s third-largest and most importantly, the Navy’s third-ranking military command. The command includes the Navy’s Third and Seventh Fleets, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Air Force Pacific and Army Pacific, U.S. forces in Korea and Japan; with 375,000 troops, six aircraft carriers, about 200 ships and 1,100 aircraft, it is considered to “command almost the most powerful military force in the world. “.
The last commander of Pacific Command was Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr. who in Congress called the Chinese Communist Party a “provocateur and expansionist” and accused it of “building a great wall of sea sand” and of “conspicuously” “militarizing” the disputed waters of the Western Pacific. “He famously said, “We are ready for war tonight” (against the Chinese Communist Party). Harris was appointed by the Trump administration as ambassador to South Korea after he stepped down as Pacific commander.
After Harris, Davidson became the first Indo-Pacific commander, and the Chinese Communist Party has had a hard Time with him. According to media reports, Davidson said in a report to Congress that the Chinese Communist Party is now strong enough to extend its influence thousands of kilometers away once it has full control of the South China Sea, that it is capable of overwhelming regional countries with its incredible power and rivaling the U.S. in the Western Pacific, and that if the U.S. military cannot resolve to engage in a large-scale conflict, then the Chinese Communist Party will win.
As the theater commander, Davidson’s key word is “surge” to further enrich frontline forces. He argues that the distance of the Indo-Pacific region means that U.S. forces cannot rely solely on rapid reinforcements from the U.S. mainland, which would not be sufficient to stop a CCP attack or create a fait accompli; that all major U.S. military services need to increase their forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region; and that U.S. fifth-generation fighters deployed in the Pacific must be numerically overwhelming (for the CCP’s J-20s), along with their complementary refueling and transport aircraft. The U.S. military also needs a precision strike weapon (missile) in the Pacific that combines long-range, high-speed, and lethal capabilities, which can be equipped on warships, submarines, patrol aircraft, and land-based takeoffs; and further strengthen its capabilities in intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.
When the plague of 2020 emerged and the Chinese Communist Party used the Epidemic for hegemony to increase its military activities in the Western Pacific to provoke the U.S. military, the Indo-Pacific U.S. military immediately responded strongly, such as Rear Admiral Blake Converse of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Submarine Force, who said, “The submarine force has proven time and time again that it can operate anywhere, anytime. ” He revealed, “The Pacific Fleet’s submarine force retains the lethality, the agility, and the ability to fight tonight.”
Key to U.S. response to war in the Taiwan Strait
The aforementioned testimony of Davidson, as a front-line commander, and the long-standing knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party and its military by the former Pacific Command/Indo-Pacific Command that he represents, shows two things: first, the U.S. military has a clear understanding of and is highly alert to the expansionist ambitions and actions of the Chinese Communist Party; second, the U.S. military has sufficient confidence, capability and resources to thwart the Communist forces, but the U.S. military must be given the appropriate support from the U.S. policy-making level.
We can also see that the United States does not want a war in the Taiwan Strait. However, the initiative of whether a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait is not in the hands of the United States; the Chinese Communist Party is the instigator of the war.
For U.S. policy makers, the following two judgments are crucial. First, will the United States be able to deter the Chinese Communist Party from unifying Taiwan by force? Second, if deterrence fails and the CCP starts a war in the Taiwan Strait, should the United States intervene to defend Taiwan to the extent of fighting a large-scale conventional war with the CCP?
In 2016, the prestigious RAND Corporation released a report, “Going to War with China: The Incredible Controversy,” which showed, first, that during the period 2015-2025, as the CCP’s military power increases, the United States can no longer ensure a quick and decisive victory in a U.S.-China war; second, that the United States and China both countries have advanced strike capabilities and the military gap between them is narrowing, and once war begins, the scenes will be extraordinarily intense, devastating, and protracted; third, by 2025, the strengthening of the CCP’s anti-access/area denial strength may close the gap in military losses between the United States and China: the Chinese losses will remain very severe; the U.S. losses, while lower than the Chinese, will be much higher than the the 2015 scenario. At that point, it would be difficult for China to win, even if the U.S. military had a lower probability of winning.
The RAND report is quite objective, and its accuracy is not in doubt. It is of high reference value to both U.S. and Chinese decision makers.
If the RAND report is used as the basis for discussion, the severity of a possible war in the Taiwan Strait will be self-evident to the U.S. policy makers.
From a historical perspective, whether it is World War I, World War II, the Cold War to the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the strength and will of the United States to defend national interests is not in doubt.
But the problem now is that the Chinese Communist Party, which could provoke a war in the Taiwan Strait, is an unprecedented enemy of the United States. Not only has it fully infiltrated the U.S. (and even intervened in the 2020 U.S. election), but its power is approaching the U.S.; it is ambitious, has a strong will to war, and behaves unpredictably, exploding from time to time with irrational major decisions.
More seriously, it is more evil than normal people can imagine: in broad daylight, it has bloodied Tiananmen Square with tanks and machine guns, operated large-scale live organ harvesting as a national industry, violently destroyed Hong Kong‘s “one country, two systems”, which it promised to keep “unchanged for 50 years”. It has violently destroyed “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong, which it promised to keep “for 50 years”, put millions of people in Xinjiang into concentration camps, etc., etc.
Therefore, for the U.S. policymakers, it is of the first importance to recognize the nature of the CCP regime (see the author’s article “The U.S. Misjudged the CCP for 80 Years”).
If the U.S. cannot recognize the Chinese Communist Party, then it is inconceivable that the U.S. will respond correctly to the war in the Taiwan Strait; if the U.S. cannot respond correctly to the war in the Taiwan Strait, then the domino game of U.S. decline will begin, and the whole world, including Taiwan, China, and the U.S., will be deeply affected.
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