(2) Marshall’s mission to China
(1) Background and fallacies
Although Marshall’s mission to China was only one year apart from Hurley’s previous mission to China, the international situation and the war situation in China had changed fundamentally.
During Hurley’s Time, the cooperation between the Communist Party and China was still in line with the U.S. strategic goal of a quick victory over Japan. But when Japan surrendered, the time had changed and the basis for Communist-Chinese cooperation was gone. As soon as the war was won, the Chinese Communist Party, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, openly rebelled against the government and reignited the war to divide the country. No sooner had the external problems been eliminated than the internal worries arose again. The Red rebels of that year, after eight years of rejuvenation, were revived and reborn. They were no longer satisfied with the communist border areas in the country within a country; they wanted to overthrow the national government and to redress the whole of China. The National Government was facing an enemy more vicious than The Japanese, and the Republic of China was in danger of dying.
But at this time, the pro-communist faction in the United States wanted to use the democratic coalition government as a condition for helping China. The sober man like Hurley was worried. When he returned to China to report on his duties, he complained to Truman that the State Department’s “China Tong” sympathized with the Communists and misled American foreign policy, pointing out that the Communist Party was trying to overthrow the legitimate national government and that the road to a coalition government would not work. But Truman was unmoved, and Ambassador Hurley resigned in anger and was replaced by Marshall. This appointment meant that the Anti-Communist hardliners in the U.S. government’s decision-making circle were basically extinct, and heralded the introduction of a new round of U.S. appeasement policy toward the CCP.
In December 1945, President Truman issued a statement on China Policy, the gist of which was that the Chinese government forces and the Communist forces should cease hostilities through peaceful negotiations. The United States recognized the Nationalist government as the sole legitimate government of China, but strongly desired that the government expand inclusiveness and implement democratic reforms so that all parties would be fairly and effectively represented in the government. The Communist military was incompatible with Chinese political unity and should be effectively subsumed within the national army. This was the benchmark for Marshall’s mission to China.
But what the Truman statement expressed was a policy of compromise with the treasonous terrorist forces of the Communist Party. The prescriptions that the United States thought it was prescribing were also based on a misplaced position of the CCP. Truman and U.S. foreign policy makers have always been accustomed to viewing the relationship between the two parties in terms of the U.S. donkey and donkey debate, when in fact there is no commonality between the two. The Kuomintang is completely opposed in nature and program. The Kuomintang believes in the Three Principles of the People and aims for a democratic and constitutional government, in line with American values, and is a normal political party with a humane spirit.
The CCP, on the other hand, promotes class struggle against humanity and violent revolution, is a terrorist organization against humanity, and does not belong to a regular party. The Kuomintang is essentially the difference between righteousness and evil, civilization and barbarism, freedom and totalitarianism, and gentleman and rogue. Even from the point of view of the Nationalist government’s resolute anti-communist resistance to Russia, the United States should have fully supported the Nationalist government. But the new U.S. policy of treating the Communists as partners, allowing the anti-communist National Government and the rebellious Chinese Communist Party to cease hostilities and establish a coalition government, is a typical case of not distinguishing between the enemy and itself, and not distinguishing between right and wrong.
Truman’s policy toward China, like the Yalta agreement, was not preceded by consultation and consultation with the ROC allies, but by unilaterally and forcibly setting a political red line for the National Government, making a political solution the only option, contradicting Chiang’s two-handed strategy and actually interfering in China’s internal affairs, and its damage to the national interests of the ROC was again far greater than the Yalta agreement in terms of magnitude and duration.
After the failure of the Chongqing negotiations, the overall strategy of the National Government was to eliminate the communists and rebuild the country. However, the U.S. appeasement policy was the opposite, making it difficult for the government to respond. During the War of Resistance, China and the United States had mutual demands. Therefore, Jiang Zhongzheng repeatedly resisted those in the U.S. government who were advocating for the Communists, even going so far as to break away from the U.S. alliance to fight Japan alone, and even Roosevelt had to give him a few points.
After the victory of the war, the United States thought that China was no longer of strategic value. China, on the other hand, had been badly wounded by the long war and was in dire need of assistance from the U.S., in addition to the communist rebellion. Therefore, although Chiang did not agree with the U.S. policy toward China, he had to passively cooperate in order to maintain the relationship between the two countries. However, to obey the U.S., he had to make concessions to the communists, and he was constrained by the U.S. to insist on fighting the communists. After Marshall’s arrival in China, the Nationalist government has been torn between the dilemma and the established strategy of fighting the Communists could not be successfully implemented. It was like a war between good and evil, where the righteous side had to look at the U.S., and was blamed and blamed by the U.S. when they could not easily make a move, or were even simply held back, so how could they win? If the Japanese invasion of China allowed the Chinese Communist Party to take advantage of the opportunity to grow, the post-war appeasement policy of the United States became a stumbling block for the Nationalist government to eliminate the Communist Party and calm the chaos, indirectly helping the Chinese Communist Party to grow against the odds and eventually seize mainland China.
However, Marshall himself was confident at first and thought he could live up to his mission, but in fact his fate of failure in China was already sealed for three reasons.
First, Marshall was weak in anti-communist consciousness, an enlightened faction in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, and easily confused by the Communists. He was stationed in Tianjin for three years in the 1920s, but, like his “China-comers,” he had no good feelings toward Chiang and the Nationalist government, and little understanding of the evils of the Communists. He came to China for more than a year and did not recognize the nature and true face of the Communists until he returned Home after the failed mediation.
Second, Marshall actually had a double identity. Not only was he a mediator between the Communists and the Chinese, but he was also a special envoy of the U.S. president, charged with the important task of defending American values and national interests. These two roles were contradictory in themselves. The United States recognized the Nationalist government as the only legitimate government in China, yet Marshall, as a mediator, considered himself to be impartial and tried to strike a balance between the legitimate government and the rebel groups. Marshall’s so-called “impartial” position enabled the communists to take advantage of the U.S. power, repeatedly resolving difficulties, turning crises into peace, and finally turning defeats into victories.
Thirdly, Marshall was bent on mediation, but his influence and binding power over the two sides was not equal. The Nationalist government had to ask for help from the United States, and was unwilling and unable to turn against the United States. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, was originally a rogue and rogue, and had no scruples in the negotiations, asking for prices, and rejecting all that were unfavorable to it. In order to accomplish his mission, Marshall was bent on accommodating the Chinese Communist Party and forcing the government to compromise. The American envoy became another Chamberlain, leading to the devastating consequences of damage to both the interests of the Republic of China and the United States.
It is generally believed that a key point at which the Nationalist government lost the mainland was when Marshall forced Chiang to issue a second armistice in June 1946, allowing the communists in the northeast to come back from the dead.
However, if we review that whole period of history from a larger perspective, it is easy to see that not only was the war in the Northeast reversed because of Marshall’s obstruction, but Marshall’s mission to China itself, from beginning to end, was ignorantly aiding and abetting the Nationalist government. The actual role he played was to help the Communists step by step to politically, militarily, economically and in terms of public opinion to weaken, combat and eventually subvert the anti-communist allies.
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