Taiwan’s Land Commission explains dialogue goodwill, Taiwan’s Taiwan Affairs Office responds with rigid “1992 Consensus”

Taiwan‘s offer of dialogue goodwill met with another rigid response from China. Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Ma Xiaoguang on Wednesday (Feb. 24) at a regular press conference, brought up the old tune of “1992 Consensus” again in response to the expectation of dialogue that “the future of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can blossom in spring” raised by Taiwan’s new Land Commission Chairman Qiu Taizan.

Ma Xiaoguang said that the “1992 Consensus” is the “east wind and rain” of the spring blossoms across the Taiwan Strait, and that “the gentlemen of Taiwan” should return to the “1992 Consensus” if they have the will to do so. The “gentlemen of Taiwan” should return to the “1992 Consensus” if they have the will to do so.

Taiwan’s newly-appointed Land Commission Chairman Qiu Taisan said bluntly on Tuesday (Feb. 23) when he assumed his duties that China has made a new addition to the “1992 Consensus”, that is, “one country, two systems”, saying that the premise of such a dialogue is unacceptable to the Taiwanese people, and hoping that The two sides can be pragmatic in judging future exchanges.

In response, Ma slammed Qiu Taisan for deliberately distorting and grafting, and downgraded him to “this gentleman”. He said, “This gentleman (Qiu Taisan) deliberately mixes the ‘1992 Consensus’ and ‘one country, two systems’. It’s not that he doesn’t know, but he deliberately distorts, deliberately confuses, and deliberately grafted.”

The 1992 Consensus is not equal to one country, two systems?

Ma said, “One country, two systems is the ‘scientific concept for solving the Taiwan issue’ put forward by the Chinese mainland side”; the “1992 Consensus” is the prerequisite foundation for the current peaceful development of cross-strait relations. Mixing the two together is a new trick of the DPP authorities to deny the “1992 Consensus” and the common political foundation of cross-strait relations.

However, after Chinese President Xi Jinping issued his “Letter to Taiwan Compatriots” in early 2019, analysts generally believe that the general public Perception of the “1992 Consensus” in Taiwan has been transformed into “one country, two systems and the Taiwan proposal. This is an indisputable fact, not a perception unilaterally guided by the DPP government.

Xi Jinping made it clear at the Time that the “1992 Consensus” is based on the one-China principle that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same China and work together to seek national reunification …… The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification, and will explore the “one country, two systems” solution for Taiwan.

The first encounter between Qiu Taizan and Ma Xiaoguang, two cross-strait officials with different ideologies, was full of hostility and each said his own thing. It is difficult for scholars to be optimistic about how to open a dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future.

Land scholars call for pragmatic dialogue

In an interview with the Voice of America, Zhu Feng, director of the Institute of International Relations at Nanjing University, said it is true that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot reach a political consensus at present, but since “the knot cannot be tied, don’t untie it”.

He called on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to put aside these differences, and not to take the differences between the two sides as a preset prerequisite for dialogue. Instead, he argued, the two sides should start a dialogue as soon as possible to defuse tensions and stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

One of the major signs of tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is the inability to reach a political consensus on the future of cross-strait relations, which has led to each side saying its own thing,” he said. The Tsai (English) government’s view is that the future of Taiwan is up to the people of Taiwan to decide. Mainland China would consider the rejection of reunification as Taiwan independence. So, exactly how different the definitions of the two sides are shouldn’t be a condition for dialogue because, in the current internal affairs pattern of each side, it’s actually impossible in itself for you to get these definitions of cross-strait relations and definitions of Taiwan (independence) to be fully aligned. Therefore, I think, do not presuppose the premise, do not make the respective expressions into obstacles to dialogue.”

Professor Chu’s “no presuppositions and dialogue” is actually in line with the DPP’s position and is quite pragmatic. But compared to Ma and the mainstream thinking in Chinese academia, which is that “cross-strait dialogue is based on the premise of the 1992 Consensus or that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same country,” there is a divergence.

China insists on rigid premise of dialogue

According to Wind Media, Liu Guoshen, a professor at Xiamen University’s Taiwan Research Institute, agrees with the latest national security and cross-strait personnel layout completed by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. He said, including the new head of the Land Commission Qiu Taizan, the new national security director Chen Mingtong (former head of the Land Commission) and the vice chairman of the SEF Zhan Zhihong, who took office last August, are all “mainlanders” and “momentary choices,” but he said, whether these three can play to their strengths. “also need to make systematic adjustments, especially the “cross-strait belongs to one country” jurisprudential positioning, need to do accurate and effective elaboration, otherwise the three of them may be idle. “

Beijing United University, Taiwan Institute of Cross-Straits Relations Director Zhu Songling also said that in the current situation, if the Taiwan authorities do not agree with the “1992 Consensus”, no matter how to adjust the cross-strait personnel layout, it is difficult to form a new situation for the peaceful development of cross-straits relations.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen recently completed the “task and team redeployment” of the national security team, and said that the personnel formed three iron triangle of diplomacy, national security and cross-strait, in order to “guard national security and maintain regional peace and stability”. The new personnel changes, in addition to the two latest appointments of cross-strait personnel, in the defense of the military, the former Secretary of National Security Qiu Guozheng was promoted to Minister of National Defense, while the former Minister of National Defense Yan Defa was transferred to the National Security Council Advisory Committee, both have completed the handover.

In response to this latest personnel deployment, Ma Xiaoguang also said at a press conference on Wednesday: “The key is to look at the policies and actions …… If only the Soup is changed, I’m afraid this disease is still not cured. Ultimately the DPP authorities come up with what kind of cross-strait policy, whether it can return to the political basis of the 1992 Consensus, this is the key.”

Compared with Ma’s non-committal, Professor Zhu Feng of Nanjing University’s comments are “quite good”. He said that the members of Tsai’s national security team are relatively less independent and more pragmatic.

According to Zhu Feng, Tsai’s administration has indeed released good intentions for dialogue, but he believes that this is an adjustment in response to a possible revision of U.S. China Policy after President Biden takes office.

Taiwan’s personnel layout in response to the new U.S. policy

The Biden Administration should not play the same Taiwan card as its predecessor, the Trump administration, to stir up the one-China bottom line that the U.S. has held for years, said Zhu Feng. In this premise, he believes that Tsai Ing-wen’s administration “acts ahead” and intends to pave the way for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue through the latest personnel layout to further reduce the confrontational dynamics with the mainland.

Zhu Feng reiterated that there is an urgency for cross-strait dialogue. For example, he said, China’s frequent military flights around Taiwan are meant to reflect the international situation and show that China will not be deterred by Taiwan’s dependence on the United States. Therefore, if Taiwan wants China to make concessions and stop its military planes from circling Taiwan, what kind of actions Taiwan has to propose and what kind of goodwill it has to release, he said, adding that this will be one of the topics for future cross-strait dialogues to sit down.

In an interview with the Voice of America, Fan Shiping, a professor at the Institute of Political Studies at Taipei’s National Taiwan Normal University, agreed that the latest personnel deployment by Tsai’s administration is mainly a response to the United States, indicating “Taiwan’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. attitude,” as Secretary of State Antony Blinken has previously called for cross-strait The call for meaningful dialogue further echoed Tsai’s New Year’s Day announcement this year, when she reiterated her willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue with the mainland under the principle of reciprocity and dignity.

However, Fan said Ma’s ironclad response of “returning to the 1992 Consensus” met his expectations. He said this means that even if Tsai’s government shows goodwill through the appointment of the new head of the Mainland Affairs Council, Qiu Taisan, who has a softer style, the other side of the Taiwan Strait is still unlikely to see it as goodwill and start a dialogue on this issue, in other words, it is still difficult for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to restart dialogue during Tsai’s term, especially since China’s political definition of Taiwan independence is too broad, forming a great obstacle to work with Taiwan.

Fan said, “If you follow the Chinese Communist Party‘s definition, that is, if you refuse to reunify, then about 90 percent of the people in Taiwan are independent, how are you going to promote it?”

Fan Shiping said that a more precise definition of Taiwan independence should be legal Taiwan independence, that is, overthrowing the Republic of China and establishing the Republic of Taiwan. But in the Democratic Progressive Party, such as Vice President Lai Ching-de and other “pragmatic Taiwan independence workers” have long been through the “resolution on the future of Taiwan” that Taiwan is already a sovereign and independent country, the national name of the Republic of China, will not, and do not need to pursue the legal independence of Taiwan. He said that the outside world may regard this as “Chinese independence” or “independent Taiwan”, but it does represent the mainstream thinking of the Taiwanese people, so if China insists that it can only talk to those who accept reunification, then the basis for cross-strait dialogue will be very weak.

Tsai’s government’s soft and hard approach to China

In addition, the latest personnel layout of the Tsai Ing-wen administration has been interpreted as “a goodwill gesture by the Tsai government to China,” but Fan Shih-ping sees it differently, saying that the Tsai administration is in no way showing softness to China.

He said, “I think it is one hand soft and one hand hard. On the soft side, if you think Qiu Taizan is soft, then I think, Chen Mingtong is hard.”

According to Fan Shih-ping, Tsai is actually showing a tough side to China by appointing Chen Ming-tong, who is familiar with Chinese affairs, as the director of the NSA to overhaul the national security intelligence system, which will strengthen Taiwan’s intelligence combat capability.

He said that the NSA is an important intelligence unit in Taiwan, but it has not played a role in the past during the terms of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, or even during Tsai Ing-wen’s past four years in office, that is, for a total of 20 years.

The most important time for the NSA to play its role was during the term of former President Lee Teng-hui, when the then director of NSA, Yin Zongwen, played a key role in assisting Lee Teng-hui through the shaping of the cross-strait consensus in 1992, facilitating the cross-strait talks between Koo (Zhenfu) and Wang (Daohan) in 1993, Lee’s visit to the United States in 1995, the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1996 and the direct presidential election.

He said that Tsai, who was then a member of the National Security Council Advisory Committee in the Lee administration, fully understood the role and importance of the NSA. Therefore, he believes that in the future, Tsai will follow Lee’s strategy and play the function of the NSA in order to strengthen Taiwan’s intelligence warfare capability against China.