After the outbreak of the Korean War, U Nu was quick to link Myanmar’s national security to the situation facing South Korea. In his view, Burma, like South Korea, was a small country that was not capable of defending itself. Burma had to prevent itself from being caught in a war as a result of South Korea’s entry into the capitalist camp. Since then, U Nu had repeatedly stressed neutrality on various occasions: Yangon would support the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union as long as they acted legitimately; Myanmar was willing to abandon political ideology and cooperate with any country that had common interests; Yangon would never join one big power bloc against another; and the Union Government would promote an independent, democratic and democratic government in order to maintain peace in Myanmar and the world. Foreign Policy. Since then, Myanmar has gradually abandoned its pro-British and pro-American diplomatic tendencies and adopted neutrality as the main guideline for its foreign relations, one of the main manifestations of which was the softening of its attitude towards socialist countries, especially China.56
Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. President Harry S. Truman approved the CIA’s Operation Paper plan to covertly support Lee Mya’s troops in attacking Yunnan in order to diffuse the military pressure on U.S. forces in the Korean War. Under the plan, the United States sent a steady flow of weapons and equipment to the remnants of the Nationalist Party through Thailand.57 The Burmese government concluded from various indications and evidence that Washington was secretly supporting Lee Mya’s forces, but the United States denied this and repeatedly prevented Burma from resolving the issue through the United Nations.58 In March 1953, an impatient Burmese finally brought the issue of the remnants of the Nationalist Party to the United Nations, demanding that Taiwan be condemned as a “terrorist organization”. “aggressor”, and took immediate steps to cease hostilities against Burma by Lee Mya’s forces. As a result, the United States privately supported Mexico’s revision of the Burma proposal, criticizing Taiwan as the “aggressor” without naming it and implicitly calling the remnants of the Kuomintang “foreign troops”. The U Nu government was very disappointed and its confidence in the United States was sharply reduced. Because of this, Burma formally notified the Eisenhower administration that it would terminate the U.S. economic aid program on June 30. For his part, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles stated, “It is imperative that (U.S.) aid not be allowed to be like a faucet that can be turned on and off at will.” In response, the U.S. cut the $31 million in aid already allocated to Burma to about $21 million. As a result, U.S.-Burma relations were strained, and Burma lost its largest source of economic aid.59 The deterioration of U.S.-Burma relations soon became a driving force behind Burma’s quest to develop relations with China.60 In April and May, a Burmese government labor mission visited China. During this period, Burma requested assistance from Zhou Enlai, and China expressed its desire to develop trade between the two countries.60
Against the backdrop of China’s involvement in the Korean War, in December 1950 the United States announced a comprehensive licensing system for China, placing both strategic and non-strategic goods such as oil, scrap rubber and textiles under embargo.61 Thereafter, the United States tried to prevent countries such as Malaya, Thailand and Indonesia from exporting rubber to China. As a result, China looked to Ceylon as a major source of rubber, importing tens of thousands of tons of rubber per year from Ceylon through barter from 1951 to 1952.62 But it became clear that the war and the need to build the domestic economy forced China to seek imports from more countries.In late 1952 and early 1953, China asked Burma if it could trade in rubber. Burma responded positively to China while explaining to the United States that Burma, with its neutralist foreign policy, could not refuse China’s request for rubber trade.63 Soon, China and Burma reached an agreement on rubber trade. According to the U.S. Embassy in Burma, Burma exported rubber to China twice, in March and June 1953, accounting for more than one-third of the total rubber exports that year.64 According to the U.S. Embassy in Burma, Burma exported rubber to China in March and June 1953.
For a long time after independence, Burma’s economy remained as heavily dependent on rice exports as it had been in colonial times. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the demand for rice rose in the international market, and Myanmar’s rice exports reached 1,184,000 tons that year. However, the end of the Korean War in 1953 resulted in Myanmar’s rice exports falling below 1 million tons again. To make matters worse, Burma’s rice export revenue dropped significantly due to the falling price of rice on the international market.65 So Burma, which had just refused U.S. aid, once again urged Washington to buy Burmese rice for food aid given to Southeast Asian countries. But at that time, the United States was trying to resolve the agricultural surplus it faced through Public Law 480, and for a time did not respond to Burma’s request. In April 1954, a barter agreement was reached between China and Burma, whereby Burma traded rice in exchange for Chinese goods and technical assistance. Under the agreement, China imported 150,000 tons of Burmese rice, equivalent to about 10 percent of Burma’s rice exports. The Burmese are very grateful for this.66
It was against the above background that, at the invitation of U Nu, Zhou Enlai visited Burma at the end of June 1954.67 The visit largely eased Burma’s suspicions about China, strengthened Yangon’s resolve to resist the SEATO, and prompted U Nu’s government to actively support the initiative to convene an Asian-African conference. Eventually, the two prime ministers affirmed in a joint communiqué the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as the guiding principles for the development of China-Myanmar relations. At the end of the year, U Nu visited China, and the two leaders held in-depth discussions on the remnants of the Kuomintang, border issues, and dual citizenship of overseas Chinese, which resulted in a number of agreements68 and led to a rapid improvement in China-Burma relations in the mid-1950s.
IV. Remaining Arguments
In general, the factors that influenced the basic direction of China-Myanmar relations during the Cold War were ideology, national interests69 and geopolitics.70 In the early years of independence, Myanmar was clearly pro-British and pro-American. Burma’s pro-British and pro-American tendencies were evident at the outset of independence, and it was filled with suspicion and fear of the new China as its “strong neighbour to the north”. Likewise, the new China, which was committed to revolutionary diplomacy, saw the U Nu regime as a “servant” of imperialism and feared that Burma would one day become an anti-China base for the US. As a result, relations between the two countries were limited and marked by mutual jealousy during the early years of diplomatic relations. Soon, however, the outbreak of the Korean War and its protracted aftermath created the possibility of a détente in Sino-Myanmar relations, which was both a major driver of the foreign policy shift between the two countries and a major factor in the deterioration of U.S.-Myanmar relations and the development of mutual economic demand.
Inducing factors. In this way, relations between China and Myanmar improved dramatically in the mid-1950s. Broadly speaking, the historical process of the evolution of China-Myanmar relations from 1949 to 1953 shows that ideological differences and geopolitical factors once hindered the establishment of friendly relations between China and Myanmar against the backdrop of the Cold War between East and West. However, it turns out that for these two newly independent nations, economic and social development was the top priority, and the demands of national interests ultimately led China and Burma to peaceful coexistence.
Commentary
1 It should be said that the empirical study of Sino-Myanmar relations between 1949 and 1953 has only just begun, and the representative results that are of seminal significance include Fan Hongwei: “China-Myanmar Relations in the Early Period of Diplomatic Relations (1949-1953) from the Declassified Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, Yunnan Social Science, No. 2, 2008; Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name. of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011, pp. 40-51; and so on. The need for further discussion on this issue lies in the fact that, with the declassification of the archival documents of the countries concerned, it is now possible to gain a clearer understanding of the many considerations that China, and Myanmar in particular, has taken into account in its relations with the other side, and thus to respond definitively to some of the prevailing narratives or academic debates.
2(1) William C. Johnstone, Burma’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 56-57.
3 (2) Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma, Stanford: Stanford U-niversity Press, 1963, p. 177; Chi-shad Liang, Burma’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 56-57. Relations: Neutralism in Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990, p. 68.
4(3) After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U Nu government did not really consider the attitude of the leftists and voted for “opposing North Korean aggression” at the United Nations. As a result, the left-wing forces withdrew from the ruling party and formed a separate Burma Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (BWP). See Robert H. Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015, p. 142; and Michael W. Charney. For Burma, the recognition of the new China and the United Nations vote on Korea are both important matters, and it is hard to imagine a Burmese government that would ignore the claims of left-wing forces on one issue and In another matter, the opinion of the leftists was the main consideration. Apart from logical deduction, in the relevant Burmese archives, I do not find any trace of left-wing forces influencing the U Nu government’s decision to recognize the new China.
5(4) Selected Works of Mao Zedong, People’s Publishing House, 1966, pp. 1473-1486.
6(5) Shen Zhihua, “Mao Zedong and the Eastern Intelligence Bureau: the Shift of Revolutionary Leadership in Asia”, Journal of East China Normal University, No. 6, 2011.
7(6) Liu Shaoqi’s Texts since the Founding of the People’s Republic, Vol. 1, Central Literature Publishing House, 2005, pp. 50-53.
8(7) The Road Traced by the Republic: A Selected Thematic Collection of Important Documents Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949-1952), Central Literature Publishing House, 1991, pp. 71-75; The Texts of Liu Shaoqi since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1, pp. 160-168.
9(1) Chen cum, “Linking ‘Revolution’ and ‘Decolonization’: The ‘Bandung Discourse’ in China’s Foreign Policy,” in The Central Literature Press, 1991, pp. 71-75; Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic, vol. 1, pp. 160-168. “The Rise of the Cold War and Variations on the Theme of the Global Cold War”, Studies in the International History of the Cold War, Series 9, World Knowledge Press, 2010, pp. 2-3.
10(2) “The Struggle of the Burmese People”, People’s Daily, May 10, 1948; Chi-shad Liang, Burma’s Foreign Relations: Neutralism in Theory and Practice, pp. 68-69.
11(3) Renaud Egreteau and Larry Jagan, Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma: Understanding theForeign Relations of the Burmese Praetorian State, Singapore: NUS Press, 2013, pp. 72-73; Chi-shad Liang, Burma’s Foreign Relations: Neutralism in theory and practice, p.59.
12 (4) Peter Lowe, Contending with Nationalism and Communism: British Policy towards Southeast Asia, 1945-65, New York: Palgrave Mac. Millan, 2009, pp. 98-99.
13 (5) “Telegram from the Department of State to the American Embassy in Rangoon”, August 27, 1949, RG 59, General Records of Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, Box 6132, National Archive II, College Park, MD; Chi-shad Liang, Burma ‘s Foreign Relations: Neutralism in Theory and Practice, p. 59.
14 (6) “To Thakin Nu”, May 10, 1949, in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, vol. 11, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 372; “To Thakin Nu,” December 1, 1949, in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,Second Series,Vol.14,Part I,New Delhi:Oxford University Press,1993,pp.501-503.
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