After the 1950 National Day, the Chinese embassy in Burma reported that the Burmese government had been perfunctory in obstructing Chinese National Day activities, mainly because it feared that China would use the occasion to expand its political influence, suggesting that the Burmese government was largely opposed to China while appearing to be worried.25 Further developments clearly reinforced the Chinese government’s judgment. On October 11, the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar protested to the Burmese Foreign Ministry and asked the Burmese government to address the issue. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Sao Hkun Hkio invited Yao Zhongming to speak with him, pointing out that his anti-U.S. remarks on October 1 were inappropriate and should be heeded thereafter. Yao Zhongming countered that U.S. imperialist aggression existed in fact, so why not talk about it. To avoid complications, however, it was suggested that in the future the U.S. should be criticized in general terms or on the basis of a specific case, rather than opposing U.S. imperialism. On November 1, the permanent secretary of the foreign ministry informed the U.S. ambassador to Burma that he had told Yao Chung Ming that his October 1 speech was inappropriate and warned him not to make such remarks again in Burma, which maintains friendly relations with the United States, in order to give the United States a “satisfactory response. Yao Chung Myint promised not to do so again.26
Despite the fact that the two countries had little contact with each other from 1950 to 1952, they did communicate on matters related to the border, the remnants of the Kuomintang, and cultural exchanges. It was these very limited but not meaningless exchanges that, to some extent, enhanced mutual understanding between China and Burma and even more or less reduced suspicion towards each other.
At the time of the founding of New China, there were a number of unresolved border disputes, including the undefined border north of Jiangaoshan Mountain in the northern sector, the “perpetual lease” of the Mengmao Triangle in the central sector,27 and the “1941 Line” in the southern sector.28 At that time, due to concerns about the status of the border, China and Burma were not able to resolve these issues. With little understanding of the situation, and preoccupied with the Korean War, Beijing’s overall approach to the border issue was to “maintain the status quo for the time being”.29 Conversely, as early as December 1949, when the U Nu government offered to resolve the border issue for national security reasons, China replied that it was premature. In December, China published a map that included the area north of Bhamo, but marked it as an unsurveyed border, and in March 1951, Beijing reissued a similar map. As a result, the Burmese Embassy in Beijing protested. The Chinese side explained that these maps were copied from the old maps of the Kuomintang government and the new maps had not yet been drawn up due to time. China has no territorial ambitions for Burma and is willing to negotiate on the border issue at an appropriate time. On 8 May, U Nu assured Congress that the Sino-Burmese border issue could be solved through joint demarcation.318 In May, Saung Khun Choo informed the U.S. that China had a large military presence on one side of the Sino-Burmese border, but acted appropriately and did not enter Burmese territory.319 In 1952, Kuomintang troops launched an attack on Yunnan from Burma, but were repulsed by the PLA. In order to prevent another attack by the KMT troops, the PLA was stationed west of the “1941 Line”, which was a serious concern for the Burmese government.31 In February 1950, the PLA was attacked by the Burmese army on the Chinese side of the border.
In February 1950, under the PLA offensive, the KMT 8th Army and part of the 26th Army, led by 8th Army commander Lee Mya, were defeated in groups and retreated to northern Burma. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the Taiwanese authorities ordered the remnants of the Kuomintang in Burma to enter Yunnan to engage in guerrilla activities.32 This posed a threat to China’s security in the south. On November 29, 1949, Zhou Enlai issued a statement saying, “It is the unshakable policy of my government to eliminate all the reactionary armed forces of the Kuomintang. Wherever the defeated Kuomintang reactionary forces have fled to, the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China retains the right to inquire into this fact, and the government of any country that hosts the Kuomintang reactionary forces must be held responsible for this fact and bear all the consequences arising therefrom.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry then gave the text of the statement to the Burmese side. When the issue of KMT remnants arose, the U Nu government was naturally very worried that China would mistakenly think that Burma was hosting Li Mya’s forces, and thus send troops into Burma to clear the country, or even “infiltrate” Burma disguised as KMT troops. To add to Yangon’s worries, the documents seized by the Burmese government troops from the remnants of the Kuomintang also indicated an intention to cause problems in Sino-Burmese relations.33
In June, the Burmese ambassador to China also discussed the issue head-on with the Chinese government. The Chinese expressed assurances that they respected Burma’s territorial sovereignty and were aware that the Burmese army was clearing out the remnants of the Nationalists, but it was puzzling that the Burmese government was at the same time providing them with supplies. The Burmese ambassador explained that Lee Mya’s forces were only making a living by plundering the local population.34 It turned out that the Burmese army, with the covert support of Taiwan and the U.S., was simply unable to complete the purge as the remnants of the Kuomintang in northern Burma grew in strength.35 In early May 1951, Yao Zhongming drew the attention of Saung Kun Choo to reports that the Chinese had received reports of large numbers of Kuomintang troops entering Kengtung from Thailand and asked what the Burmese side wished to do about it. Paokun Choo assured that the Burmese government would take military action accordingly. After this meeting, Rangoon’s fears about China’s entry into Burma in pursuit of Lee Mya’s forces reached a peak, so much so that the United States was explicitly told that Washington had only three days to resolve the issue of the Nationalist remnants or it would go to the United Nations.35 In desperation, the Truman administration set out to consider a response. Ultimately, the U.S. proposed two options: to allow the remnants of the KMT to lay down their arms and become local farmers; and to repatriate the remnants of the KMT to Taiwan via Burma. The Myanmar side indicated that the Chinese side might not agree to these options and therefore would not consider them.
In mid-February 1952, during a meeting with the Indian ambassador to China, Zhou Enlai stated that the problem of Nationalist remnants was not serious at the moment, but that China doubted that Burma would continue to pursue and destroy Li Mei’s forces under pressure from the United States. Also, if the international situation changes, the region could become a forward position against China. After learning about the situation from India, the Burmese Embassy in China promised that Burma would spare no effort to eliminate the remnants of the Nationalist Party, and on the 25th, Zhou Enlai pointed out to the Burmese Ambassador in China that China suspected that the U.S., Taiwan, and Thailand were jointly supporting the remnants of the Nationalist Party, and understood the difficulties faced by the U Nu government, but still hoped that Burma would be able to resolve the matter as soon as possible. Subsequently, the Burmese Foreign Ministry instructed the embassy in China to reply that Yangon would do its utmost to drive the KMT remnants out of Kengtung.37 In October, Yao Zhongming asked the Burmese government to effectively curb the harassing actions of Liya’s forces against China.38 On the whole, however, China did not put too much pressure on Burma over the KMT remnants, but was more understanding and pointed out that the U.S. was brewing a “conspiracy of aggression. “39 In a letter to Nehru in late February 1953, U Nu asserted that Burma and China had reached a complete understanding on the issue of the Liya forces40.
In the early years of diplomatic relations, there were few cultural exchanges between China and Burma, except for the exchange of cultural delegations between the two governments in 1951-1952.41 In early January 1951, U Nu, through the Chinese Embassy in Burma, suggested that China send friendly delegations to Burma, India and Indonesia in order to promote understanding and dispel misunderstandings. Even more thought-provoking, the Burmese Foreign Ministry specifically instructed the embassy in China to push Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai to make the announcement as far as possible, and to make it clear that China would not interfere in the internal affairs of any Southeast Asian country, respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other countries, and resolve disputed issues between them peacefully. Subsequently, U Nu communicated with the Indian side on the matter. According to Nehru, given the international community’s bias and suspicion towards China and the ongoing discussions at the United Nations to characterize China as an “aggressor”, the exchange of goodwill missions with China at this time could have some negative impact on the perception that India and Myanmar were engaged in a bloc struggle. Likewise, it would be unwise to push the Chinese leadership to make a statement on its relations with Southeast Asian countries, as this would give the international community the impression that the countries concerned were targets of aggression. So U Nu decided to put the matter on hold.42
In mid-February, the Burmese embassy in Beijing reported that China was considering the Burmese proposal. As to the specific arrangements, China preferred to call the delegation a “cultural delegation” rather than a “friendship delegation”, as relations between the two sides were already friendly. In addition, China was reluctant to make a public statement as suggested by U Nu on the grounds that it had repeatedly stated publicly that it respected the territorial integrity of other countries and that all countries were equal and non-aggressive. Myanmar’s response was that since the matter was first raised by its own side and China responded positively, it could no longer deny the Chinese cultural delegation a visit, but that it should move forward slowly so that the Chinese would not claim that this was the result of repeated Burmese insistence and make it clear that it would be embarrassing for the other side to attack a friendly country with Myanmar in Yangon. In the ensuing discussion of the details, the Chinese were also sensitive to Burma’s concerns, emphasizing in particular that the nature of the Chinese delegation was “cultural” and had nothing to do with politics.43
On 24 December, the Chinese embassy in Burma sent a letter to the Burmese government, sending a copy of two anti-communist and pro-Taiwanese newspapers, the Liberty Daily and China Tribune, attacking China. (c) Copy of the report by the Cultural Mission. After investigation, on 4 February 1952, the Burmese Foreign Ministry informed the Chinese Ambassador that the Director of the Burmese Press Office had warned the editor concerned not to publish similar articles in the future. The matter was successfully resolved.45 As a matter of courtesy, China also invited Burmese cultural delegations to return to China on several occasions beginning in May 1951.46 In late April 1952, a Burmese cultural delegation visited China and conducted extensive exchanges and visits.47 It is also important to note that during this period, there were many cultural exchanges with China.
It is also important to note that during this period, Myanmar often took China’s side, consciously or unconsciously, on many international issues directly or indirectly related to China, such as supporting China’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN, opposing the UN’s labeling of China as an “aggressor”, demanding that the UN lift its trade embargo on China, refusing to sign the “China Agreement”, and refusing to accept the UN’s “China Trade Agreement”. At the same time, in order to avoid any misunderstanding by China, Myanmar also provided timely explanations on issues related to its policy towards the United States, including the San Francisco Peace Treaty. For example, on October 18, 1951, Yunnan Daily published an article entitled “Burmese People Struggle for the Protection of World Peace” written by the Chairman of the Burma Congress for the Defense of World Peace (BCDWP), Tha Khin Lwin, which pointed out that the US was expanding and building airports all over Burma under the pretext of “economic assistance” and carrying out sabotage activities against China. Subsequently, the Burmese Embassy in Beijing explained to the Chinese side that the construction and expansion of the Yangon airport was financed by the Burmese government; the Burmese government would not allow any country to carry out sabotage against the People’s Republic of China or any other country in Burma, and Yangon strictly followed the “policy of neutrality and good neighborliness.
Burma still harbors deep suspicions and even fears of China, as the 1950-1952 Sino-Burmese relationship amply demonstrates. As a result, on many international issues, Burma took great care not to overstep China’s interests and to prevent China from misunderstanding its own. Similarly, until the second half of 1952, the Chinese Communist leaders continued to believe that the Burmese government hid its true attitude towards China and that it was pursuing a pro-British and anti-Chinese policy. But on the other hand, China saw that “in order to win over the Asian countries to oppose war and advocate peace in order to combat the war policy and aggression policy of the American empire and its accomplices,” it should seek and might eventually establish friendly relations with Burma.50 Thus, in the course of its communications with Burma, China tried to try to gradually dispel the other side’s misgivings about itself On many occasions, China has expressed its understanding of the situation in Yangon. Subsequent historical trajectories have shown that improved relations between China and Myanmar are possible when both countries are careful to avoid misjudgments and are willing to engage in friendly relations.
III. The starting point for improved Sino-Myanmar relations (1953)
The marked improvement in China-Myanmar relations in the mid-1950s was both inevitable and contingent. The former was mainly due to foreign policy adjustments and a convergence of attitudes or interests between the two countries on a number of international issues, while the latter was mainly due to Burma’s conflict with the United States over the remnants of the Kuomintang and the mutual demand for trade between China and Burma. Interestingly, both the former and the latter were either directly or indirectly linked to the Korean War.
As early as 1946-1947, Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized the existence of a vast “middle zone” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that is, many capitalist countries and colonial and semi-colonial countries in Asia, Europe, Africa and the three continents, and that the main contradiction in the world today is the “middle zone”. Shortly thereafter, with the formation and intensification of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the concept of the “middle ground” gradually faded from Chinese leaders’ foreign policy discourse, and was replaced by confrontation between the two camps and “one-sided overthrow”. “On 30 April 1952, Zhou Enlai gave a detailed account of China’s foreign policy and tasks in an internal speech. He added “courtesy and reciprocity” to “start another stove,” “take one side of the fence,” and “clean up the house before inviting guests. “The three new basic principles of “mutual understanding” and “solidarity among the peoples of the world”, which emphasize inter-State rather than inter-party relations, demonstrate the will to develop relations with former colonial and semi-colonial countries and certain capitalist countries. Specifically with regard to Southeast Asian countries, Zhou Enlai pointed out: “The Southeast Asian countries are in conflict with imperialism (the key is the question of war and peace), and we should make the most of this conflict. They have just established power and want to maintain their rule, but they are afraid of war. In time of war I can win the neutrality of the Southeast Asian countries, and in peace I keep them at a distance from imperialism.” 53
With the death of Stalin in March 1953, a new generation of Soviet leaders, including Malinkov, turned to easing international tensions, the first step of which was to push China to resume negotiations with the U.S. on a Korean armistice.54 Accordingly, China also began to take the initiative in seeking to ease relations with its neighbors.55 In June, Zhou Enlai summarized in a speech that “the present international The contradictions in society are manifested in four main areas: war and peace, democracy and anti-democracy, imperialism and colonialism, and between imperialist countries” and “the basic point of our policy is to dare peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between countries with different systems”, in the course of which the In the process of adjusting China’s foreign policy, Burma was gradually transformed from a country that placed equal emphasis on both prevention and acquisition to one that sought peaceful coexistence.
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