Known as the “big killer” transport-9G electronic jammer, the effective jamming distance of only 100 to 120 kilometers, this distance has long entered the attack range of the fighter. Its chances of survival over the war zone are almost nil.
On February 4, Xi Jinping inspected a division of the Communist Air Force in Guizhou and boarded a Yun-9G electronic jamming aircraft. The Yun-9G, also known as the GX-11, is a second-generation electronic jamming and intelligence-gathering aircraft of the Chinese Communist Air Force, and is the latest electronic jamming aircraft in the Communist Party’s equipment sequence.
The Chinese Communist Party really developed the concept of modern electronic warfare back in October 1994. The USS Kitty Hawk, a U.S. aircraft carrier on patrol in the western Pacific, sent several sorties of EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft to monitor and reconnoitre the Chinese military exercise code-named “Sacred 94” in the Zhoushan Islands. The Chinese Air Force and ground radar units attempted to jam the U.S. aircraft, but were met with massive electronic suppression by the EA-6Bs. Nearly 100 unidentified fighters were spotted on the radar of the Air Force based in large areas of Shandong, Jiangsu and Shanghai at the Time, approaching the Communist exercise area, and Air Force fighters based in Qingdao took off urgently to intercept them in the high seas. After arriving at the target area, the intercepting fighters found no trace of any foreign fighters and were continuously subjected to U.S. electronic decoys and strong electromagnetic suppression for several days thereafter. Four U.S. electronic jamming planes left the former Jinan Military Region’s operational capability virtually paralyzed.
This was an enlightening Education in modern electronic warfare concepts by the U.S. military to the CCP. It was only then that the Communist forces figured out that this was a standard action before the U.S. military launched an attack, and that if the U.S. military suddenly launched an attack when the communication system was completely paralyzed, the consequences would be imaginable.
However, it was not easy to develop an electronic warfare capability with the Chinese Communist Party’s modest resources. Where does the complex electronic technology come from? How to solve a series of problems brought about by the huge equipment system due to the backward technology, including carrier aircraft, energy, electromagnetic compatibility, etc.. It was not until the Hainan crash in April 2001 that the Chinese Communist Party finally waited for an opportunity.
On April 1, 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft was on a reconnaissance mission over the South China Sea. The Chinese naval air force sent two J-8II fighters to monitor and intercept it, and one of the wingmen crashed the fighter piloted by Wang Wei as a result of a collision with the suddenly turning U.S. plane as it took a forced approach to drive away. The pilot, Wang Wei, bailed out and was later declared dead by the Chinese Communist Party at the age of 32. The U.S. Army EP-3 made a forced landing at Lingshui Airport on Hainan Island. The incident ended with the U.S. expressing regret and the Chinese releasing the entire U.S. crew and returning the aircraft.
The crew of the EP-3 did their best to destroy classified information and equipment before the crash landing. The EP-3 that landed at Lingshui Airport was in disarray, but it was still a mine of intelligence in the eyes of Chinese military experts. In fact, the U.S. military did a less-than-complete job of implementing “emergency destruction procedures. A comprehensive report by the U.S. Navy and National Security Agency shows that after the collision, although the crew implemented emergency destruction procedures before the EP-3 fell into Chinese hands, the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party gaining access to the aircraft’s classified information remained “highly probable.
The Chinese military formed a joint task force of dozens of people and flew to Lingshui Airport, not realizing that the EP-3 at the end of the runway, with its nose knocked off, contained so many secrets of what was then considered the world’s top electronic surveillance technology.
The collision led to a breakthrough for the Chinese Communist Party. Mastered the operation band and communication frequency of the U.S. Army receiver; understood the change of the U.S. Army tracking frequency hopping radio frequency; deciphered the principle and structure of the antenna set and radio station; sorted out the latest U.S. Army anti-jamming UHF communication system; knew the latest emission source area range and power size, physical characteristics of the target, various radar and signal acquisition equipment antenna hardware and layout, wiring in the airframe and prevention of electromagnetic interference methods.
An expert from the Chinese Communist Air Force said, “Our electronic reconnaissance technology is not a matter of how big the gap is, the gap is even bigger, but still in the right direction. And we are completely in the opposite direction.” One technician, after figuring out the principle, drifted off and said, “After a lifetime of working on it, that’s all that’s missing.”
We note that the Chinese Communist Party’s series of electronic warfare aircraft have all emerged one by one since 2000. Although the Chinese Communist Party has made a breakthrough in the EP-3, it is only a research path back in the right direction, and there is still a huge gap between the technical level and the U.S. military. This gap is manifested as: single function, high energy consumption, large equipment size and weight, poor carrier performance, range and short retention time.
There are as many as 12 models of CCP electronic warfare aircraft, with the Yun-8 as the carrier aircraft alone, including reconnaissance, jamming, anti-submarine, early warning, heart warfare, and battlefield command aircraft.
The Yun-8 is a cottage version of the Soviet An-12 transport aircraft from the 1950s. After a series of modifications, an improved version of the Yun-9 was derived in 2007, whose performance is basically equivalent to that of the original An-12 except for its electronic system. Fuselage length: 36 m, wingspan: 38 m, maximum payload: 20,000 kg, cruise speed: 650 km/h, range: 5,200 km.
The effective range of these electric warplanes is very limited, especially the Yun-9G electronic jammer, which Xi recently boarded and is known as the “big killer,” has an effective jamming range of only 100 to 120 kilometers, a distance that has long fallen into the fighter’s range of attack. This slow moving, target-specific, single-function electronic warfare aircraft, the chances of survival in the air over the war zone is almost zero.
Limited space, we will not say how strong the overall electronic warfare capabilities of the U.S. military, just look at how the F-35 is to gain an advantage in the electronic warfare environment.
As you know, electronic warfare is the use of a variety of technologies to detect and control the invisible radio waves and infrared light at any time. f-35 is not just radar stealth so simple, but also has an advanced electronic warfare system. There are 10 early warning radar antennas distributed around the fuselage, as well as multiple infrared sensors.
At the heart of the F-35’s electronic warfare system is the AN/ASQ-239 electronic countermeasures system, a modular system with defensive and offensive capabilities that can detect, locate and attack any infrared or electromagnetic signal from the enemy. This system provides continuous, accurate monitoring of the full spectrum of threats, fusing and displaying relevant information on the pilot’s helmet display. It will optimize attack options by threat level and automatically respond without any action by the pilot. The system can also be linked to friendly information through the battlefield information system, giving the pilot a full picture of his dynamic position in relation to enemy and friendly forces. In fact, the F-35 is like a sponge collecting so much electromagnetic information about almost everything worth knowing in its area of operations. All of this information passes through a central processor that sifts through it and makes optimal decisions about threats at a trillion operations per second, enabling it to jam and attack enemy aircraft while defending against missile attacks.
The F-35 is difficult to detect with its targeting radar on, and the enemy is almost in visual range before it has a chance to attempt an attack, but few enemies can get that close to it without being shot down. the F-35’s situational awareness is so powerful that in simulated air battles, it always has a win rate greater than 20:1.
Xi claimed that in modern warfare, the “right to information” has become the key to winning the war, calling for accelerating the development of advanced equipment and strengthening targeted, confrontational training. Xi chose to inspect the special aircraft during a period when Chinese military aircraft frequently disturb Taiwan. In addition to targeting Taiwan, he also wanted to show his military development achievements.
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