The main strategy of Taiwan‘s military is anti-landing defensive operations. Pictured is a U.S.-made M60 A3 tank in a live-fire drill on the beachhead of the Penghu Islands on May 25, 2017.
When talking about military power, the major military powers should generally be explored, and Taiwan is not among them, but Taiwan’s military is one of the few in the world that focuses on defense and is supposed to be an army that maintains peace. The risk of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is on the minds of most Chinese people and is also under the attention of major countries in the world. Therefore, this article starts with Taiwan and explores the real military strength of each of the world’s armies one by one.
To explore the strength of an army, we need to consider its military strategy, military organization, military equipment, surrounding geographical environment, economic strength and resource logistics capacity. According to the “2020 Military Power Ranking” by the U.S. military website Global Firepower, Taiwan is ranked 26th out of 138 countries and regions in the world and 15th out of 45 Asian countries and regions. Taiwan is ranked 26th out of 138 countries and regions worldwide and 15th out of 45 Asian countries and regions. Since Taiwan is only focused on defense, its actual defense capability ranking should be higher.
Anti-landing obstacles on a beach in Kinmen, Taiwan, April 19, 2018.
Overview
Taiwan’s defense is very clearly targeted at stopping possible attacks by Chinese Communist forces. Taiwan’s defense possesses the geographical advantage of not being connected to the mainland, which precludes the possibility of a direct encounter with a large-scale ground attack, and the Taiwan Strait becomes a natural defense depth, which also facilitates military warning. Taiwan’s defense strategy is mainly to counter-landing operations and to minimize the harmful effects of CCP missile attacks and air and sea strikes before counter-landing, and to preserve as much as possible the defensive capability of counter-landing operations.
The main island of Taiwan was mountainous and there were few locations suitable for large-scale landings, and the sea in the Taiwan Strait was like a complex, easy to defend and difficult to attack. During the Pacific War, when Japan still occupied Taiwan, the U.S. Army countered with island-hopping tactics, bypassing Taiwan and going straight to Okinawa, Japan, with only air strikes against Taiwan.
Taiwan has a population of 23 million, with 188,000 active duty military personnel, but 2.38 million in the reserves, and all men of military age are required to undergo military training. Taiwan’s military is under the command of an elected president, similar to the U.S. professional military system.
Taiwan’s GDP in 2020 is over $625.2 billion, ranking 24th in the world, with a per capita GDP of over $30,000, while mainland China’s per capita GDP is just over $10,000. Taiwan’s military spending is about $13 billion, or about 2% of GDP, and there is still room for improvement. Taiwan can be self-sufficient in agriculture, but needs to import major industrial raw materials, such as oil, steel, and chemicals.
The main weaponry of Taiwan’s military comes from the U.S., or self-developed products based on U.S. weapons. Taiwan is located in the U.S. first island chain, and the U.S. may directly participate in the war if necessary; under the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan may also intervene to some extent.
Taiwan’s Skybow 3 air defense missiles.
The first line of defense
If the Chinese Communist military launches a war, the first wave of attack should be land-based short- or medium-range missiles, while preparing for a large-scale air strike. Therefore, Taiwan’s first line of defense is to intercept the CCP’s missiles, followed by stopping the CCP’s air strikes. The burden of the first line of defense falls on Taiwan’s air force and air defense missile forces.
The difficulty of the first line of defense is that the response Time is short and most testing in terms of combat readiness, regardless of missile attacks and air strikes. Taiwan and the U.S. should share a lot of intelligence. If the Chinese Communist army starts to build up, U.S. satellites and reconnaissance planes will alert Taiwan at any time, and advanced radars provided by the U.S., such as the Leshan radar, can also provide insight for thousands of kilometers. Taiwan’s four MQ-9 Drones purchased from the U.S., when deployed, can ensure all-weather monitoring of movements near the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan should be able to get timely warning before the Chinese Communist Party attacks.
I. Air defense missiles
Taiwan is equipped with U.S. Patriot 2 missiles for terminal missile interception, which are currently being upgraded; the latest purchase is 300 Patriot 3 missiles, which will bring the total number of Patriot missiles deployed to 650.
Taiwan has also developed its own Tianbao series of missiles, the latest Tianbao 3 can be used for missile interception, equipped with an advanced active array radar, capable of mobile deployment, operational range of more than 200 km, interception altitude of 70 km, speed of at least Mach 7, the actual number of deployments is not known, and is still continuously test-fired extended range type.
The Skybow 2 missile is a medium-range air defense missile, primarily against enemy aircraft incursions, with a range of 200 km, speed of more than Mach 4, and active radar guidance. Earlier, there was also the Tianbao 1 short-range air defense missile with a range of 100 km, similar to the U.S. Standard 2 missile. Taiwan may have as many as 6,000 various air defense missiles. Among them, the Tian Gong 2 may have a surface-to-surface missile version with a possible range of 500 kilometers, which could counter the Chinese Communist army’s airfields, missile launching positions, landing staging areas, etc.
Taiwan’s F-16 fighter jets.
II. Air Combat Force
Taiwan’s current main fighter aircraft are F-16A/B totaling about 141 aircraft, which are being upgraded to F-16V, and another 66 new F-16Vs have been procured.
Taiwan’s F-CK-1 Jingguo, a copy of the F-16, has a total of 129 aircraft with American engines and an independently developed radar system with a detection range of 150 km. The fighters are equipped with the Tianjian-2 medium-range air-to-air missile, which mimics the U.S. AIM-120 advanced medium-range missile with a range of 100 kilometers, and the Tianjian-1 short-range air-to-air missile, which mimics the U.S. AIM-9 Rattlesnake missile.
Taiwan also has 55 Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Taiwan’s fighters are mainly air defense aircraft, and can also carry harpoon anti-ship missiles for sea attacks. Ground strike capability should not be a training priority, and the Taiwan Air Force has no bombers.
Taiwan also has six U.S. E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircraft and 12 P3-C anti-submarine aircraft. Taiwan’s Air Force basically trains according to the U.S. model, close to the actual battle.
Taiwan’s F-16s, if all upgraded to F-16Vs, should outperform the CCP’s Su-27s, J-11s and J-10s in air superiority, including Su-30s and J-16s, and be comparable to the CCP’s imported Su-35s. It is difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to deploy all fourth-generation fighters to the Taiwan Strait, and if an air battle occurs, the actual victory or defeat is difficult to predict. The Taiwan Air Force has the advantage of training level and management; however, the Chinese Communist Party has the advantage of ground-to-ground missiles, and if Taiwan’s major airports are destroyed, the Taiwan Air Force’s combat capability may be reduced.
If the CCP were to throw in the towel and commit most of its air power, the Taiwan Air Force might not be able to handle a war of attrition, but Taiwan’s dense air defense missiles would make it difficult for the CCP to gain air control, and the CCP’s landing operation might not be able to get effective air support.
Taiwan’s Gideon-class destroyer test fires a Standard 2 missile.
Second Line of Defense
If Taiwan is unable to gain air control, it must rely on a second line of defense to prevent the CCP fleet from approaching Taiwan’s main island and the larger islands nearby, with naval and land-based anti-ship missiles required to perform interdiction tasks. Taiwan’s Navy has limited large tonnage warships and relies primarily on small tonnage warships for offshore defense.
Taiwan purchased from the U.S. Navy four retired U.S. Kidd class destroyers with a displacement of 10,500 tons, the most powerful U.S. anti-aircraft firepower before the Burke class destroyers, equipped with 68 Standard II missiles, also equipped with the then advanced combat command system and radar, upgraded to detect, identify, and track 256 targets within 500 km. It was also equipped with Aslok ASW missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 2 torpedo tubes, as well as electronic warfare systems and decoy launches, ASW sonar and ASW helicopters. The Kidd ship is mainly used for important sea reconnaissance patrol missions to increase early warning response time and also to control important sea areas to deter enemy advances, and can also serve as a backup air defense and sea control operations command center.
Taiwan also has 22 offshore patrol ships, including 10 prototypes and replicas of the 4,100-ton American Perry class, carrying 40 Harpoon anti-ship missiles or Standard 1 air defense missiles, mainly for anti-ship operations and air defense capabilities; six Lafayette-class patrol ships procured from France, equipped with U.S. air defense missiles and self-developed Xiongfeng II anti-ship missiles, also mainly for anti-ship operations; another six U.S. The other six U.S.-decommissioned Knox-class cruisers, modified for anti-submarine warfare.
Taiwan has a total of 43 small missile boats for offshore anti-ship raids; 11 of the 500-ton Jinjiang class; one of the Tuojiang class has just been commissioned; and 31 of the smaller 186.5-ton Guanghua VI, all of which carry Xiongfeng II or III anti-ship missiles.
Taiwan’s missile speedboats test-fire the Xiongfeng-2 anti-ship missile.
The Xiongfeng II is an anti-ship missile developed and produced by Taiwan based on the Harpoon missile, and has since been derived from air-launched and land-launched versions, with a range of 148 kilometers for the general type and 250 kilometers for the extended range type. The Xiongfeng III is the latest supersonic anti-ship missile with a speed of Mach 2.5 and a range of 150 km, and the latest test of the land-launched version has an extended range of 400 km.
Taiwan’s navy lacks submarines, with only two 2,660-ton Dutch-made submarines and two U.S. submarines for training purposes, and its own submarines are still under development. Taiwan’s anti-ship capability will depend first on what percentage of CCP warships can be paralyzed by the 16 patrol ships’ harpoon missiles and torpedoes, and secondly on whether the 43 small missile boats’ Xiongfeng II or III anti-ship missiles can really work, and the speed of mass production of the latest Tuojiang ships.
If Taiwan’s navy cannot stop most of the CCP fleet, it will have to rely on land-based harpoon anti-ship missiles and the Xiongfeng series of anti-ship missiles. Taiwan has purchased 400 new land-based Harpoon anti-ship missiles, which could total 850 when deployed, and 300 land-based Xiongfeng series anti-ship missiles should be deployed, and Xiongfeng II should also have a medium-range missile model for ground attack that can counter the CCP forces. Taiwan should also lay a large number of water mines around the perimeter in advance.
Taiwan’s tank forces.
Third line of defense
As long as Taiwan’s anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles function, they can stop the threat of large-scale CCP air strikes and massive fleets. The CCP’s landing will not be supported by effective air and sea firepower, and the CCP army’s large landing ships will have difficulty getting close to Taiwan and will barely be able to transport large amounts of heavy equipment ashore, and the amphibious landing may have to rely on man-overboard tactics.
There are only 14 locations in Taiwan suitable for large-scale landings, which should also be the main direction of the CCP’s attack. The CCP has limited large landing ships and can only focus on 1-2 locations, which should not be difficult for Taiwan to judge and deploy in advance.
The CCP may use landing craft, some amphibious fighting vehicles or hovercraft to land at the main landing sites, but it will be difficult to defend against Taiwan’s 300 self-propelled artillery pieces and over 1,300 howitzers and cannons. Chinese soldiers carrying only light weapons would also have difficulty facing Taiwan’s 1,000 tanks and thousands of armored vehicles, and the CCP’s amphibious armored fighting vehicles would also be no match for Apache helicopters and Cobra helicopters.
Taiwan’s Apache attack helicopters.
It is likely that the CCP will also use small boats or civilian vessels to land troops in multiple scattered locations simultaneously, but will only be able to carry light weapons, will have difficulty obtaining sustained supplies, and will likewise be unable to withstand modern heavy firepower. The CCP may also mimic the U.S. military’s use of helicopters for deep drops, but in limited numbers and easily shot down by Taiwan’s one-man stinger missiles. The CCP may be banking on mass parachute drops, but the limited number of CCP transport aircraft will also make it difficult to evade Taiwan’s anti-aircraft missiles, and the small number of parachutists, even if they land, will have difficulty surviving without heavy weapons and air support. In World War II, the Allies implemented a massive parachute drop for Operation Garden Market in conjunction with the Normandy landings, which was quickly wiped out due to the lack of heavy weapons.
As long as Taiwan’s land forces are properly deployed, they can completely hold the third line of defense. If the Chinese Communist Party is unable to gain air and sea superiority, the landing operation will hardly succeed and will probably be forced to stop the landing operation on its own.
If the Chinese Communist army were to throw in the towel, Taiwan would face a critical situation and U.S. forces would likely intervene. Especially at the end of the Chinese Communist Party’s power, the air and sea forces may have lost most of their strength, the U.S. military intervention will soon become a counterattack operation, the risk of the collapse of the Communist regime is extremely high, which is the key reason why the Chinese Communist Party has not dared to use force in the Taiwan Strait.
Although Taiwan is ranked 26th in the world in terms of military strength, its actual defense capability should be ranked in the top 15 in the world due to favorable geographical conditions, and its air defense capability may be ranked in the top 10 in the world, so it is fully capable of realizing a defense-oriented military strategy.
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