Since February 1, Burma, located in Southeast Asia, has dominated international news headlines for its military coup, and for two elements of the event that are linked to the U.S.: first, the election date is only six days later than the November 3 U.S. election, almost synchronized; second, the U.S.’s fabled military coup is nowhere in sight, while the Burmese army said it was done and made a fact, which the Chinese media described as ” Myanmar’s version of Trump‘s coup”, suddenly pulling the previously banned topic of U.S. election fraud out of the air.
Why is this so? Simply because after Jan. 20, China extended a barbed olive branch to the U.S., which the U.S. side did not take a position to accept. The analysis of this matter is particularly interesting.
The Subtle Differences in the International Community’s Stance on the Military Coup in Burma
The international community’s stance on the military coup in Burma varies widely: Thailand and the Philippines, our closest neighbors, say it is an “internal matter” and do not intend to condemn it; the UK and EU leaders define the military’s actions as a “military coup”; the Biden administration has issued three condemnations, but none of them have mentioned a “military coup. The Biden Administration issued three condemnations but did not mention “military coup” and avoided using the sensitive term “election fraud. The UN Security Council has stated that it is prepared to meet to discuss the issue, but only mentioned that the cause was a massive “government reshuffle” by the Burmese military.
The Western media then pointed out that the military coup in Burma had affected Chinese investment and wanted China to intervene. But China, the most influential country in Myanmar, has only been approached by Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin, who said, “We have noticed what is happening in Myanmar and are learning more about the situation. …… We hope that all parties in Myanmar will properly handle their differences under the constitutional and legal framework and maintain political and social stability.”
As can be predicted by this Chinese stance: don’t expect China to endorse condemnation of the Burmese military’s actions at the Security Council.
China has close ties with the Burmese military
The U.S. and other Western countries have long pursued a policy of heavy-handed sanctions against Burma and have virtually no formal diplomatic relations with the country. Myanmar’s most prominent diplomatic power is China, and along with Cambodia, is China’s most loyal ally and advocate of its interests in Southeast Asia. In addition to the large number of Chinese companies investing in Burma, China is also building an oil pipeline in Burma to get rid of its dependence on the Straits of Malacca. Myanmar is not only economically important to China, but also politically valuable in immeasurable ways.
During the Trump Administration, the U.S. Department of Defense explored initial cooperation in U.S.-Myanmar military relations, providing humanitarian assistance, military Medicine and training in defense reform for Burmese military personnel, immediately raising high alarm in China. Last December, Globes.com published a report, “U.S. Wants to Control Burma’s Military Through Cooperation to Promote Complete Disengagement,” in which it pointed out that the U.S. has made the disengagement of China and Burma a key objective of its return to the Asia-Pacific region, and that the U.S. has accelerated its military cooperation with Burma, such as inviting Burma to join the U.S.-Thai partnership and having more than 20 countries participate in the Golden Cobra military exercises, with the aim of accelerating Burma’s disengagement from China.
After Ung San Suu Kyi became the paramount ruler of Burma, China continued to bet on both sides of the fence and continued to maintain close contact with the Burmese military. In the most recent year, for example, on July 16, 2020, Chinese media reported in high profile that Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai had exchanged views with Myanmar Defense Force Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw on the development of China-Myanmar relations, with a special emphasis on the Myanmar military’s support for the “Belt and Road” and the Myanmar-China economic corridor, as well as the Myanmar military’s adherence to the one-China Policy and support for In mid-January 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar and met not only with President Win Myint and held talks with Senior Minister and Foreign Minister Ung San Suu Kyi, but also with Myanmar Defence Force Commander Min Aung Hlaing. He also met with Myanmar Defense Force Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing.
Chinese media commentary after the Myanmar army coup
The above is about China’s influence on the Burmese government, not that China in fact manipulated the coup. But the Chinese media’s comments in the aftermath of the coup are unique compared to the world media, especially given that just before January 20, Chinese propaganda authorities, like the U.S. leftist media, banned discussion of the U.S. election fraud, making this mockery all the more meaningful.
In China, Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the Global Times, who enjoys the privilege of talking about sensitive issues at sensitive times, published “Breaking News! Myanmar’s Military Coup Explodes the Internet, Why Is It Synchronized with the U.S. Political Situation? One of the main points of the article is that the coup by the Burmese military was a legitimate action in accordance with the Burmese Constitution. According to Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw is not bound by the civilian government and is an independent military group outside of the country’s political ecology, as well as a “guardian of the state” and “guardian of the Constitution. Of course, Hu did not forget to emphasize that the constitution, which gives the military a special status, was drawn up under the guidance of Senior General Than Shwe, commander of the Burmese Defense Force. The second key point is set out in the article, “The U.S. and Burma’s ‘Synchronicity’ and Different Endings,” which is a “Burmese version” of the 59th U.S. presidential election, both of which started out similarly: after the election results were in, Trump was able to get the election results in. After the election results came out, both the Trump presidency and the USDP (Unity and Development Party of Burma) disagreed, claiming “vote fraud,” except that the USDP played it much cooler than Trump: they issued a statement on November 11 calling for a rerun, and soon found a “big backer” in the Tatmadaw. “big backer”.
Another magazine, Caixin, which admittedly has a special official background, ran an online article, “Myanmar’s version of the ‘Trump coup’, where does Biden go from here”, focusing on the election fraud: “Most fatally, questions about the fairness of the election are also pervasive, in addition to military-backed opposition parties, Burma and beyond NGOs, and the UN Special Investigator for Human Rights in Burma have also raised questions. International media and human rights organizations are concerned that millions of Rohingya are unable to vote and that many of them are being denied their basic civil rights,” and finally hooked up with the U.S.: “Is this scene déjà vu from the 2020 U.S. elections? It seems that it is not only the U.S. that is experiencing a vote fraud dispute, but Myanmar is also in the same boat!”
It is easy to see that China is saying that the UN and the US have to intervene, and first they have to think of ways to get Myanmar to comply, or ideas to amend the constitution. And of course there is one more thing: a government that came to power on the basis of serious fraud, don’t come back to sing the high tune of exporting democracy and defending democracy in other countries.
Who lost the first hand in China and the United States?
In the final analysis, why is China making the first move on Burma at this point?
China had expected the Biden administration to reciprocate China’s eagerness to help the election after Trump’s ouster. But the Biden administration is facing many difficulties today, with a lot of internal conflicts and high-handed policies. As a result, Biden’s national security adviser Sullivan told a Jan. 29 Web-based video conference at the Institute for Peace, a Washington think tank, that “domestic affairs is diplomacy and diplomacy is domestic affairs” and that “right now, the most far-reaching and urgent national security challenge for the United States is sorting out our own house. ” On Feb. 1, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated in an interview with NBC that China poses the greatest challenge to the United States compared to other countries. The nature of the U.S.-China relationship is complex, encompassing adversarial dimensions, competitive dimensions, and opportunities for cooperation on some issues, and the U.S. must approach the relationship with China from a position of strength rather than weakness.
The Biden administration has been in a state of “confusion” over its approach to the change in Myanmar without a clear statement of policy toward China. According to internal sources quoted by the U.S. media, officials are “very unhappy” with the timing of the Burmese military’s actions, and the U.S. and even the White House have differing views on how to respond to the situation in Burma, debating whether to call the situation a “coup” –The U.S. is debating whether to call the situation a “coup d’état” and cut off aid to Burma, threatening to push Burma into China, while ignoring the situation would be a violation of the U.S. commitment to “advance the democratization process in Burma. But if we ignore it, we would be breaking the U.S. commitment to “promote the democratization process in Burma. However, some experts believe that it is because the U.S. and other Western countries have been too critical and not supportive of Ung San Suu Kyi in the past few years that the military has been given the opportunity to take advantage of the situation. Meanwhile, some experts believe that the coup in Myanmar provided an opportunity for China to increase its influence.
Whatever measures the Biden administration takes afterwards, the change in Myanmar is undoubtedly a case of the US stepping on the toes and China getting a head start. But it may be good news for Taiwan. According to Secretary of State Blinken’s attitude, lifting Taiwan-U.S. relations to a state diplomatic relationship would be suspended, but in terms of geopolitics and the political contest between China and the U.S., protecting the status quo in Taiwan from China would be an option for the Biden administration in the short term.
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