The U.S.-China game has expanded from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean

The Nikkei Asia website published an article by James Crabtree, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, saying that the new Biden administration will have to focus on developing a new Indian Ocean policy in the coming months as it grapples with many conflicting Asian priorities. Biden, who made many mistakes on the South China Sea during his tenure as vice president in the Obama administration, should be well aware of the risks of not developing a maritime policy. Back in 2012, the Obama administration faced a tense standoff between Chinese and Philippine ships around the disputed reef of Huangyan Island, not far from the Philippine coast.

“Asian Czar Campbell’s Return Emboldens Communist China

U.S. officials, including Biden’s recently appointed Indo-Pacific coordinator for the National Security Council, Kurt Campbell, known as the “czar of Asia,” have argued that good offices are the answer. But in the end, good offices did not stop China from moving forward with the construction of artificial islands, which would have changed the geopolitical balance in the region and left the United States powerless to deal with Beijing‘s determination.

The risks in the Indian Ocean are more subtle. Beijing is unlikely to duplicate the construction of artificial islands there. But the Chinese Communist Party‘s islands of influence are expanding throughout the region, from Malaysia to Mozambique. Beijing now has a military base in Djibouti and port projects for potential military use in many other countries, from Burma to Pakistan. Beijing’s priority continues to be expanding its influence, trying to make friends with Asian island states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives and small island states off the east coast of Africa like the Comoros.

Those seeking to balance Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean should be in a favorable position, at least in theory. India, for example, is the dominant player in the region by virtue of geography alone. The United States has long been the dominant player in the Indian Ocean, even if its attention has often been dragged northward in connection with Afghanistan and Pakistani affairs. Japan, Australia and France are all key players in the Indian Ocean, and all are wary of the growth of Chinese Communist Influence. Yet there is still the risk of poor coordination, inadequate resources and distraction. Beijing provides everything from military equipment to infrastructure to vaccines. When smaller Indian Ocean states seek partners, the Chinese communist state looks like a good choice given the balance of traditional ties with India.

Biden’s new Asia team acknowledges this. Campbell’s appointment will reassure many in the Indian Ocean region. He knows the South Asian region and everyone knows his weight. However, the focus of U.S. policy is still likely to be on China and its neighbors, and the Indian Ocean portion of the Indo-Pacific region is likely to be relegated to a secondary matter. This becomes problematic because in the new era of great power competition, the Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming an important focus. Four-fifths of global maritime trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and its economic importance is unquestionable. Strategically, the Indian Ocean is not yet dominated, and there is ample room for rival regional states to seek to increase their influence.

In November 2020, the Trump administration proposed rebuilding the First Fleet, which was withdrawn in the 1970s, with a possible stationing in Singapore. But the plan does not appear to have been properly coordinated with U.S. partners in the region and remains up in the air. Campbell argues that the United States should encourage new military and intelligence partnerships among regional nations while continuing to deepen those relationships in which the United States plays a leading role. Rather than acting bilaterally, Biden should function through a system of close regional allies with the United States at the center.

U.S. economic influence in Asia is declining, so it must work more closely with other Asian countries such as Japan and India, especially in the Indian Ocean region. The U.S. military remains strong, but in order to keep pace with the Communist Party’s military expansion, it will have to increase its efforts both in terms of its own military strength and in helping to build the military strength of its partners.