Secret History of Stalin’s Purge (34)

Chapter 7: I. Smirnov and She-Mlachkovsky I Part Ways

In examining the charges against the defendants in the first Moscow trial. We have found in the trial’s shorthand memoirs numerous contradictions, wanton distortions, and blatant fabrications. When the case involves the main defendants, as it does with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Ivan Nikiguchi Smirnov, many of the nonsensical statements are simply absurd to such an astonishing degree that one would think that these abominable fabrications must have been unconvincing in their absurdity. But. Such a strange phenomenon can be understood to some extent if it is noted that all the charges against these people were fabricated down to the smallest detail, and by no other person than Stalin. The “confessions” of these people were examined and modified by Stalin himself.

Lenin stressed in his “will”. One of the greatest of Stalin’s many faults was his brutality. This assertion is not unfounded. Roughness was indeed an intrinsic and essential characteristic of Stalin. Not only was he rude to people, but he carried this vice through all his actions. Even those policies which were politically justified and necessary for the country, when implemented by him, became more harmful than beneficial because of his brutality. It would be enough to point out the collectivization of agriculture as an example.

The whole process of the Moscow trial, from the creation of myths about the conspiracy to the distribution of roles in the farce of the trial, was marked by Stalin’s brutality. It all bore the mark of Stalin’s brutality. When it came to Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov and Trotsky, Stalin’s brutality was made even more insane by his bitter hatred of these men. At this time. He forgot his usual cautious style. The line between reason and madness no longer existed, and the gulf between reality and fantasy was erased.

The heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs often realized the absurdity of Stalin’s instructions, but did not dare to disobey them. In fact, Stalin did not always and everywhere disregard the advice of his strategists. The party insiders knew it well. In the military field, he attached great importance to the opinions of Marshal Tusachevsky, in the industrial construction, he often adopted the suggestions of Pidakov. In foreign policy, he particularly valued the opinion of Livinov. But when it came to intrigue and political rivalry within the party, Stalin considered himself the most remarkable expert and did not accept any different opinions at all, and could not even stand to be advised by others.

As far as I know. At the Kremlin meeting Stalin chose seven defendants, who, in his opinion, should be designated as leading members of the “Trotsky-Tenoviev joint headquarters” in the court. Deputy People’s Commissar Agranov objected to the inclusion of Ivan Nikitich Smirnov in this “joint headquarters” and doubted whether it would work.

“I’m worried that we won’t be able to prosecute Smirnov,” Agranov said. “Because he’s been in prison for years.”

“Then please don’t worry,” said Stalin, giving Agranov a vicious glare, “as long as you don’t worry, everything will be fine.”

In fact, a wiser course would have been to consider Agranov’s opinion. Really, Smirnov had not been out of prison since January 1, 1933, and had remained there until the trial began in August 1936. It is unlikely that he participated in any conspiracy at all.

But Smirnov had been the first to demand the execution of Lenin’s “will” and the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Party Central Committee. At that time, Stalin knew very well the prestige of Smirnov among the party members, and also knew that the old Bolsheviks listened to Smirnov. Now. Stalin consolidated his position, he could not let go of the dream that he had been hoping for years – to take revenge on Smirnov, to make him suffer enough from the trial and court, and then throw him into death row.

Stalin’s stubbornness and his desire to fix Smirnov no matter what put Vyshinsky in a very difficult position in court, because Smirnov had absolutely no “live evidence” of his involvement in the conspiracy. In order to give even the slightest credibility to Stalin’s fabrication, Vyshinsky claimed in his prosecution statement.

“Smirnov could have pushed back and said. I didn’t do anything, I was in prison all the time. Unfortunately, he was naive in this pretense! It is true that Smirnov has been in prison since January 1, 1933. But we know that he established contacts with Trotskyists in prison, and we have found the code, which Smirnov used to communicate with his friends on the outside while in prison.”

Vyshinsky, however, was unable to produce these passwords to the court. The letters that Smirnov supposedly sent from prison to the outside. Not a single one could be produced. Not a single person with whom he had secret correspondence was summoned to court. Vyshinsky could not even say which of the guards in the prison helped Smirnov to send the secret letters outside. And, also, none of the defendants admitted that they received letters from Das Smirnov.

In foreign countries. Nor did anyone necessarily believe that these political prisoners in Stalin’s cell could write to their comrades outside the prison. Soviet citizens knew that this was completely impossible. They also knew that the families of political prisoners could not find out which prison their loved ones were in, or whether they were dead or alive, even many years after they had been locked up.

Besides. What kind of ideas could the isolated Smirnov give to Mlachkovsky or Zinoviev outside the prison? Would he tell them, “Don’t shoot Stalin in the belly, but hit him in the head?” However, no one knows that real conspirators do not discuss terrorist plans by correspondence with people who are behind bars and under the close surveillance of the NKVD.