May 16 marks the 55th anniversary of the tragic “Cultural Revolution,” and Chinese officials are keeping a low profile, which is understandable under Xi Jinping’s ultra-leftist regime, but what exactly does Xi think of the Cultural Revolution? Perhaps we can compare Xi’s version of the Party History with Hu’s. Hu’s Party History, published in 2011, explicitly characterizes the Cultural Revolution as a civil unrest, devoting a whole chapter in Chapter 7 to describing the process of the Cultural Revolution and explaining why it was a civil unrest, and a whole chapter in Chapter 8 to describing the various measures taken to set things right, which, of course, originated from a resolution led by Deng Xiaoping after his comeback. Such a characterization is intended to enhance the legitimacy of reform and opening up, and how can the “capitalist” line of reform and opening up be justified without repeatedly reaffirming the “appropriation of chaos”?
In the brief history of Xi published by the Central Party History Publishing House, there are only ten pages on the Cultural Revolution and five pages on the “rectification of the chaos”. Although the Cultural Revolution is not completely denied as a “leftist” error, Mao himself did not do anything wrong in starting the Cultural Revolution, which was aimed at “preventing the restoration of capitalism and finding China’s own way to build socialism” (p. 206). The book also downplays the impact of the Cultural Revolution, arguing that Chinese society had gradually stabilized after 1969. The core thesis of Xi’s version of the brief history is that China must try many things to develop its own socialism, and that the Party has always put the well-being of the people first, even if there are mistakes, they are justifiable.
The primary purpose of Xi’s version of party history is to consolidate the Communist Party’s dictatorship and embrace Xi’s line, with a focus on singing about how China is bound to embark on a moderately prosperous society under the leadership of the Communist Party. This year and next are the most critical period since Xi Jinping’s presidency, and 2021 is the 100th year of the Communist Party. From now until July or even the end of the year, we will see the Communist Party’s domestic and foreign propaganda machines, large and small, at full power to maintain the Party’s “honorable” image and consolidate Xi’s leadership core. The effect of
On April 11, the General Office of the Party Central Committee in Beijing issued a notice to launch a mass propaganda and education campaign for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party with the theme of “Always Follow the Party”, calling for “vigorously singing the main theme of the times that the Communist Party is good, socialism is good, and the great motherland is good”. . Propaganda activities are divided into two stages, the first stage before May, to promote the implementation of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, the National “two sessions” and “National Poverty Alleviation Summary Commendation Conference” spirit, show “the 13th Five-Year Plan period of development The second phase, from May to the end of the year, will “culminate” in June and July with the propagation and implementation of Xi Jinping’s “important speech” at the congress celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party. The second phase, from May to the end of the year, will “culminate” in June and July with the implementation of Xi Jinping’s “important speech” at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party and the official announcement by the Party Central Committee to “build a moderately prosperous society. The whole party and all Chinese people are actually making a personal cult around Xi Jinping, which is also a strategy to further consolidate the leadership core in order to establish Xi Jinping’s formal re-election next year.
President Xi is approaching his tenth year in office, and he has already changed his practice of being in power for ten years since the reform and opening up by implementing a lifelong system. However, according to the observation in the past few years, although the Jiang faction has been vigorously reorganized, Jiang Zemin, his children and grandchildren, and even his inner circle including Zeng Qinghong, have not been reorganized under the balance of terror, but this does not mean that Xi Jinping has not taken action to consolidate his power. The second priority is to make domestic and foreign Chinese media follow the Party’s surname. After nearly a decade of intensive work, Xi Jinping can almost say that he has made the media all take the surname Xi; the third priority is to rectify the large multinational enterprises related to the Jiang faction and the princelings, with Alibaba’s Jack Ma and Tencent’s Ma Huateng already being the targets.
With military power, control over the media and financial resources significantly weakened, it will be increasingly difficult for the Jiang faction to bring down Xi Jinping at the 20th National Congress. In any case, Xi Jinping, who has tightened his grip on the propaganda machine, appears to be a sure winner in the infighting.
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