The Rutherford Building at the northeast corner of the University of Alberta campus (Wikimedia Commons)
Canadian universities have always had close science and technology research and development collaborations with China, but in the last two years, such collaborations have come under increasing scrutiny and questioning in particular.
Last week, Canada’s nationally distributed Globe and Mail reported exclusively that the University of Western Alberta continues to collaborate with China on a wide range of scientific research, including “strategically important areas such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence.
In some of these projects, Canadian professors and researchers have partnered with the Chinese to set up companies to commercialize the technologies developed in Canada.
Immediately after the news broke, Alberta’s Minister of Higher Education Demetrios Nicolaides issued a statement saying that he wanted to exchange views with the University of Alberta administration on the matter.
In a statement sent to the Voice of America, Nicolaides said he was “concerned about the potential theft of Canadian intellectual property. At the same time, he is even more concerned that the results of the collaboration with China may be used by the Chinese military and intelligence agencies. He also said he would welcome “a comprehensive federal framework policy on these serious and pressing issues.
Currently, a university working group, Research Champions, which includes representatives from Canadian public safety, innovation and technology, health, and security and intelligence, is working intensively to gather input and is expected to issue a federal guideline on the risks of university cooperation with foreign governments by the end of June.
Academia Lacks Vigilance Against Foreign Intellectual Property Theft
Michel Juneau-Katsuya was formerly director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for the Asia-Pacific region. He told the Voice of America that Canada’s academic and political communities lacked due vigilance in the face of years of intellectual property theft by the Chinese Communist Party.
He said, “Canadian academics are often extremely hesitant to accept warnings from the intelligence security services, whether it’s from the CSIS, or from the RCMP, or from government departments.”
He described how, over his many years of career, he has repeatedly witnessed researchers in trouble, such as losing their intellectual property rights and getting into complex disputes, when they realize the danger, but it is too late.
He analyzed that the Chinese Communist Party’s espionage operations against Canadian universities include: stealing information about ongoing university research projects; infiltrating all Chinese student organizations to control them as much as possible; and recruiting “influential people” in the academic field.
However, some experts believe that the Canadian government, which in the past has strongly supported university researchers to cooperate with foreign countries and receive financial support, is now asking to put the brakes on cooperation with China. And so far, the federal government has not given any guidance for cooperation with China.
Mr. Juno Casua also admitted that the Canadian government is responsible for the way things have gone. The government should have given guidance on related projects early on, and should also have handled similar incidents more forcefully.
Extra Caution Needed in Collaborating with Sensitive Chinese Technologies
Last month, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and Parliament’s Intelligence Security Committee (NSICOP) released separate annual reports naming China and Russia as threats to Canada’s national security, while in 2020, Canada faces the worst international espionage since the end of the Cold War.
Canadian security intelligence agencies have also repeatedly warned that the Chinese Communist Party is stealing sensitive Canadian technological information as well as results, and that the results of collaborative research could be used by China for military equipment and surveillance and monitoring of the population.
Margaret McGuaig-Johnston, a member of the advisory board of the Canada-China Forum and a senior researcher at the University of Ottawa’s Institute for Science, Technology and Policy, has many years of experience dealing with China. For several years, she has been warning the federal government about this.
Margaret McGuaig-Johnston, a member of the China Forum Advisory Board (Courtesy of myself)
She has written a detailed risk assessment report on “joint ventures” in China for Canadian technology projects. In this report, she cited the difficulties encountered in such joint ventures, such as the low percentage of Canadian ownership, which can be as low as 10 percent in some cases, and the fact that the Canadian side is often pressured by its Chinese partners to give up more ownership of the company, to transfer technology, and to sell key technologies, all in an effort to gain control of these scientific and technological achievements.
She also emphasized that China is a national system and that any action, from the research results of a scientific institution to the actions of an individual on a Canadian campus, is subordinate to “national needs. In this regard, Chinese institutions and individuals have little choice.
For example, she said, the Chinese government’s policy of integrating military and civilian science and technology stipulates that all civilian scientific and technological achievements are subject to the needs of military research. This also means that even if Canada collaborates with a Chinese university, its results could be converted to military use or used in surveillance equipment on the population in a heartbeat, and we must be doubly careful.
According to reports, the University of Alberta has been collaborating with China on scientific and technological research since 2005. Currently, they have access to at least 50 Chinese national laboratories, and 60 professors have received funding for 90 projects from Chinese national laboratories and other institutions.
And Professor Paul Evans, a China expert at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, revealed at a hearing of the Canada-China Relations Committee that more than 300 professors at UBC have a strong interest in China and that institutions have established partnerships with more than 100 Chinese institutions.
Before the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, there were about more than 140,000 Chinese students in Canada.
“It’s the Chinese Communist Party that should be worried about exerting influence over Canadian universities.”
Mr. Juno Casua, former Asia-Pacific director of Canada’s National Security Intelligence Agency, told Voice of America that he does not believe the government’s introduction of a risk guidance platform will affect the autonomy and academic freedom of Canadian universities.
Instead, he warned that close cooperation with China could allow the Chinese Communist Party to exert economic and political influence over Canadian universities.
Ms. McCaig-Johnston said she understands that Canadian universities value their academic independence and freedom. However, it would be inappropriate to find a balance between receiving monetary support and national security, which is paramount in all cases.
Both of them described how, over the years, the Chinese Communist Party has invested in Canadian universities through various channels, such as some companies and even tycoons, inviting Canadian university researchers to lecture in China and develop joint projects, but this can place limits on the independence of Canadian universities.
One famous example is the awarding of an honorary doctorate to the Dalai Lama by the University of Calgary in 2009. This practice greatly upset the Chinese government. And for several years afterwards, the Chinese education authorities did not recognize the degrees awarded by the University of Calgary.
Ms. McCaig-Johnston believes it is clear that such retaliation will have a chilling effect on other universities that receive Chinese funding, and will likely influence universities on whether they support democracy initiatives on campus in Hong Kong and whether they take a stand on “genocide” against the Uighurs.
She also said Canadian universities should be more transparent about how much Chinese funding they receive.
Federal Government Risk Guidance Coming Soon
In March, Canada’s federal Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development issued a statement saying that “Canada has world-class research institutions and its climate of open and collaborative research is increasingly subject to interference from spies and foreign governments.
The statement calls on Canadian academic institutions, research units, and private companies to take extra care in protecting their intellectual property and academic development.
The federal government said the risk guidelines being developed will include “specific risk guidelines that incorporate national security into the assessment and consideration of research partners. At the same time, it will help researchers better assess the potential risks of their projects.
Mr. Junuh-Kasuya said the guidance is a good first step and a good start.
The most effective protection in intelligence agency operations is people’s awareness,” he said. Here, it’s about the university being aware of the potential risks of working with China, not installing a few more cameras, surveillance systems, or alarm systems.
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