On April 21, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a 30-page report titled After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era. Jinping Era). The report analyzes a variety of possibilities for Xi Jinping after 2022, including surrendering power, staying in office, being challenged by political opponents or a coup, dying suddenly or becoming incapacitated.
The real trouble Xi faces, the report argues, is consolidating his authority at the expense of the peaceful transfer of power that has been a regular practice in the CCP for the past 40 years, pushing the Chinese (Communist) state into a potentially unstable succession crisis.
Scenario 1: Xi Retires in 2022
In this scenario, Xi would hand over power to someone in the current Politburo Standing Committee at next fall’s 20th Communist Party Congress. What makes Xi choose to hand over power?
Xi has strengthened the CCP’s leadership by centralizing power during his two terms, and many of the transformational changes have now been completed. Xi Jinping may feel that he can relinquish power without fear.
Another is that Xi may feel that he must hand over power for his personal security, as a full centralization of power could provoke a joint revolt within the CCP.
However, even if Xi Jinping feels comfortable retiring, he needs successors who can preserve him. Because of the hundreds of powerful enemies left behind by Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign, whoever Xi chooses as his successor will have to be unwaveringly and openly loyal.
Such a candidate is really hard to find at the moment. One is that no one in the Politburo Standing Committee has broad enough governing skills and sufficient depth of influence and experience in the party, government and military to succeed Xi. A further problem is that no one with unwavering public allegiance appears to have emerged either.
With Xi’s current leadership style, there is no indication that he will quietly retire. Even if Xi names a successor and surrenders all three leadership positions, it is almost certain that he will continue to rule unofficially and drape himself in power.
Scenario 2, Xi continues in office in 2022
Xi may also believe that it is too early to hand over power in 2022, and that all of the current Politburo Standing Committee members (except Xi) will be around retirement age by 2022, and it would not be ideal to name a successor from among them.
In the event that Xi remains in power, he could push for a more thorough anti-corruption campaign between 2022 and 2027 (or 2032), fully and eventually removing any actual or possible political opponents and installing an entire generation of officials loyal to Xi.
Another is that if Xi Jinping does not retire, the cult of Xi could reach new heights after the 20th Congress, on par with Mao Zedong. For in an authoritarian system, the appearance of a dictator’s invincibility is as important as his actual power.
Xi Jinping
Scenario 3: Xi meets a challenge or coup d’état
The plot to overthrow Xi Jinping is not a fantasy out of thin air; fear of political intrigue and coups is the norm for most authoritarian leaders. Even Xi Jinping, the most powerful leader, relies on the support of various groups. While the deals struck between Xi Jinping and the Communist Party elite are unclear, a sharp economic slowdown or repeated mishandling of international crises could leave Xi’s team even more vulnerable.
Nonetheless, successfully organizing a coup against the incumbent leader, especially in a country with a one-party system, is formidable challenge. In the absence of a systemic crisis, a coup against Xi Jinping is very unlikely at this point.
In addition, Xi’s increasing control over the domestic security services has left senior members of the Communist Party and the Communist military, who wield enormous power, lacking the basic operational capacity to act and communicate effectively in the face of Xi’s omniscient security apparatus.
Challenging Xi Jinping in a formal meeting of the Politburo or the entire Central Committee could seemingly happen spontaneously, but it would require the collaboration of numerous officials. Even if someone expresses dissent, it is impossible to know how many people would be willing to join an effort to topple Xi Jinping.
Scenario 4: Xi Jinping’s Unexpected Death or Incapacitation
Xi Jinping, 67, had been smoking, was overweight and under pressure at work. Details about Xi’s health are scarce, and the CCP strictly controls reporting on Xi’s health within its borders. For the sake of simplicity, this report assumes that Xi Jinping died suddenly or unexpectedly.
In the event of Xi’s death, according to the CCP’s constitution, the general secretary can only be elected from among the current members of the Politburo Standing Committee and “elected” at a plenary session of the Central Committee. The members of the party’s Central Military Commission are decided by the Central Committee. The president and vice president “shall be elected by the National People’s Congress.
Assuming the procedure works, in the event of Xi’s death, the CPC Central Committee would be convened to decide, through informal consultation and dealings, who among the Politburo Standing Committee would become general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission, which would then be approved by the Central Committee.
It is unclear whether the National People’s Congress, as provided for in the PRC Constitution, would need to convene to formally determine the state presidency.
In a power vacuum, there is a risk of infighting within the Politburo, and Xi’s allies could split into different factions to support different successors. Those who had been punished or marginalized by Xi could see this as a rare opportunity to return to power, and so they too could vie for control. It is possible that a domestic situation could emerge, with a cluster of rivals.
Signs of a smooth succession process or a split in leadership
The succession of power, whether it is a smooth process or a split in leadership, will be evident from certain signs.
- the Prime Minister or the Vice President of the country, who does not attend regularly scheduled meetings
- A change in the broadcast or publication schedule of national television and radio, as well as the major national and metropolitan newspapers.
- Sudden Internet outages and disruptions to social media; WeChat could experience “technical difficulties” or, conversely, become an important communication channel for the opposition if a power struggle breaks out.
- Inexplicable disruptions to flight and rail schedules at China’s major airports and train stations.
- Competing or contrary discourses appear in various central government agencies, official media or on the Internet, and are not removed.
Another important scenario is that Xi Jinping becomes incapacitated by health problems (e.g., stroke, heart attack), which would send the CCP system into a period of political uncertainty with uncertain timing. During this process, Xi’s supporters and opponents alike would try to maintain a balance between Xi’s recovery and his death.
For example, after Stalin suffered a stroke on March 1, 1953, senior Soviet officials were plotting a post-Stalin era. When Stalin’s condition deteriorated, Beria, the head of the secret police, could swear at Stalin; once Stalin showed signs of recovery, “Beria got down on his knees, grabbed Stalin’s hand and started kissing it.”
Recent Comments