An F-35 stealth fighter jet is seen flying over the Nevada Test and Training Range on March 18, 2021.
The Biden administration intends to sell $23 billion ($645 billion) in arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, including the F-35 and MQ-9B armed drones.
Defense News 24 pointed out that the Biden administration’s decision is likely due to Beijing’s increased efforts to take advantage of Washington’s reluctance to sell drones to key partners in the Gulf. If the trend of China’s increased sales of drones and other armaments in the Middle East continues, it will undermine Washington’s influence and could even jeopardize core U.S. interests.
A report released in March by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted that while global arms sales remained flat between 2016-2020 and 2011-2015, they grew by 25 percent in the smoky Middle East during the same period. The sales include advanced tanks and warplanes, warships and satellites. The report shows that the arms sales market in the Middle East is becoming increasingly crowded, robust, and competitive.
What the report doesn’t mention is that China, traditionally not a major arms supplier to the Middle East, saw a 169 percent increase in arms sales to the United Arab Emirates between 2016-2020 and 2011-2015, and a 386 percent increase in arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Undeniably, Beijing’s big increase in arms sales to two key U.S. Middle East security partners reflects not a huge total sales volume, but a low starting point.
To date, the United States remains the top arms supplier to the Shah and the United Arab Emirates, with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute showing that from 2000-2019, U.S. arms sales to the Shah accounted for about 61 percent and to the United Arab Emirates for 56 percent.
Although Chinese arms sales to these two countries did not exceed 1 percent during the same period, it would be a mistake not to take them into account. This is because Beijing’s increased arms sales, their nature, and their possible implications for core U.S. interests cannot be taken lightly. For example, Shaudi initially bought only a handful of land-based Rainbow-4 drones in 2014, then procured at least 15 more of the more lethal Pterodactyl II drones, and has expressed interest in buying 285 more.
Similarly, the AL procured at least five Pterodactyl I drones from the Chinese in 2011 and couldn’t wait to sign on as the first export customer for the Pterodactyl II drones, taking delivery of the first batch in 2017, which are now on the battlefield across the Middle East. The UAE also bought 500 Blue Arrow 7 air-to-surface missiles to arm the Pterodactyl II, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
The Rainbow-4 and Pterodactyl I are both armed drones, roughly resembling the phased-out MQ-1 Predator. The Pterodactyl II is more advanced, capable of carrying up to 12 missiles and incorporating newer avionics and sensors, in addition to a more powerful upgraded engine.
In fact, in addition to the Shah and the League, China has also sold armed drones to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan. Of course, these drones are not for display; they have been used in combat in conflicts in Libya, Yemen and other Middle East hotspots.
The analysis points out that as China’s military technology advances and countries like Russia actively engage in the Middle East military arms market, the U.S. has more options for regional security partners and has become more attractive, but China, Russia and the U.S. do not share a core concern, even with the intention of undermining U.S. interests.
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