Beijing’s Central Asian Diplomacy Tilts Toward Uzbekistan, Local Goodwill Toward Communist China Declines

The CCP’s activities in Central Asia have begun to turn and target Uzbekistan more. But as trade with Uzbekistan expands and CCP investment in the region increases, Beijing’s image has not become more positive, and concerns about the CCP have increased in Uzbek society.

No Anti-China Protests China Activities Have Comfortable Environment

The CCP’s activities in Central Asia have been particularly focused on Kazakhstan. However, due to anti-Communist sentiment in Kazakh society, the CCP has begun to adjust its strategy and in recent years has increasingly focused on Uzbekistan, another key Central Asian country.

Increased cooperation with Uzbekistan could allow China to balance its relations with Kazakhstan. Some Central Asian analysts say China may value more the fact that Uzbek society has so far not experienced anti-Chinese sentiment, which makes China comfortable with its activities in Uzbekistan. In addition, while there are some Uighurs settled there, there has been little coverage of Xinjiang affairs in the Uzbek media, which has been largely silent officially.

After the death of longtime Uzbek ruler Karimov a few years ago, the current president, Mirziyoyev, took power and began pushing a series of reforms to open the country’s doors, which has provided new opportunities for the Communist Party of China to strengthen its trade and investment activities in Uzbekistan.

Chinese economic and trade investment in Kazakhstan decreases and investment in Uzbekistan increases

Kazakh scholar on China Kavukonov said that the key reason for the contrast between the decline in trade and investment between China and Kazakhstan in recent years and the continued growth with Uzbekistan is the absence of anti-Communist protests in the country.

Kavukonov said that China’s trade with Kazakhstan has been decreasing since 2010. in 2010, trade between the two countries had reached $20 billion. in the two years from 2019 to 2020, trade between the two countries hovered at more than $14 billion to $15 billion. And in the years from 2014 to 2016, the annual bilateral trade volume did not even reach $10 billion. He believes that such a small trade volume is very disproportionate to the huge size of China’s economy and Kazakhstan’s border with the Communist Party of China.

Kavukonov said that the Chinese Communist Party’s investment in Kazakhstan has also been declining. From 2013 to 2020, the Communist Party’s share of foreign investment in Kazakhstan has fallen from 9.3 percent to 4.7 percent.

Kazakh media said that Russia and China are now Kazakhstan’s largest trading partners. Communist China has the third largest share of foreign debt owed by Kazakhstan. The CCP also ranks only fifth in terms of foreign investment in Kazakhstan.

And since 2015, the CCP has been the largest trading partner of Uzbekistan for many years in a row, surpassing Russia. Uzbekistan’s trade with the CCP reached more than $7.6 billion in 2019, up 16.8% from 2018, said information released by the Uzbek National Statistical Service. However, trade between the two countries fell last year to $6.4 billion due to the epidemic.

Uzbekistan opened a consulate in Guangzhou last October, becoming the second after Shanghai, with the main aim of further developing economic and trade ties with China.

Chinese investment is the largest in many fields, including military industry

Although the scale of Chinese investment in Uzbekistan is not as large as in Kazakhstan, the growth of Chinese investment in the country is very fast and involves telecommunications, heavy truck manufacturing, energy, military industry and many other fields.

China has overtaken Russia as the top foreign investor in Uzbekistan, said Abdulrasulov, a spokesman for the Uzbek National Statistical Office last year. 2019, the Chinese Communist Party’s share of Uzbek foreign investment has exceeded a quarter at 26.2%. As of the beginning of last year, the number of companies with a Chinese background operating in Uzbekistan had reached 1,650, compared to 1,820 companies with a Russian capital background.

Close cooperation in Afghanistan, security

Uzbekistan and the Chinese Communist Party are discussing the construction of a railroad project from Xinjiang to Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan. This could be an alternative to the transportation route from Xinjiang’s Khorgos port to Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan is also promoting cooperation programs in Central and South Asia. Some of these projects include the construction of a high-voltage transmission line from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and a railroad from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and then to Pakistan or India. Uzbekistan expects China to join these projects.

Cooperation between the two sides in the security field is also increasing. The Uzbek army, which has traditionally used Russian-made equipment, began purchasing air defense missile systems and other military equipment from China in 2017. Interaction and cooperation between the two sides’ security and intelligence agencies on Afghan affairs is also increasing. Uzbek media say that there is a possibility that the CCP could form a new cooperation platform with Uzbekistan on Afghan affairs. Or add Uzbekistan to the existing China-Tajikistan-Pakistan-Afghanistan quadripartite mechanism.

In addition, the CCP and Uzbekistan are jointly developing and producing vaccines. The first batch of one million doses of Chinese vaccine arrived in the capital Tashkent at the end of March.

Uzbekistan is indispensable for Central Asian affairs

Grozin, a Russian scholar on Central Asia, said that Uzbekistan can account for half of Central Asia’s population and has a very young demographic structure. This country has a great potential in many areas such as economy, market and politics, which makes it attractive to many countries. Geographically, Uzbekistan shares borders with all Central Asian countries and is bordered by Afghanistan to the south.

Grozin said that not only the Communist Party of China, but also all major countries that want to operate in Central Asia, can not do without Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan has the most powerful army in Central Asia,” Grozin said. Moreover, many issues in Central Asia cannot be resolved without Uzbekistan’s participation, especially in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan, especially in northern Afghanistan, depends to a large extent on Tashkent.”

China’s influence has expanded and the attitude of the local population has changed

Five or six years ago, Uzbekistan was considered the least dependent on the CCP in Central Asia, but today the CCP accounts for about one-fifth of Uzbekistan’s foreign debt. This deepening dependence on the CCP has also led to a quiet change in Uzbek society’s attitude toward the CCP.

A poll by the Bishkek-based social agency Central Asia Barometer in Uzbekistan shows that in 2019, as many as 65 percent of Uzbeks still strongly support Chinese investment and cooperation projects in the energy and infrastructure sectors there. But just one year later, by 2020, that percentage has dropped to 48 percent.

At the same time, more Uzbeks are becoming worried about the Chinese Communist Party. The number of people who fear that Uzbekistan will fall into China’s debt trap has climbed from 7% in 2019 to 25% in 2020.

How long China’s image will last if it does not want to rely on China raises concerns

Some Central Asian analysts say the Chinese Communist Party used to think it could buy hearts and minds by spreading money and investment, but that strategy didn’t work in Kazakhstan. Now the Communist Party has turned to Uzbekistan, making it the two most important countries in Central Asia, parallel to Kazakhstan. The CCP’s influence will thus expand, but there is concern about how long the CCP’s image will hold up in Uzbekistan without turning sour.

A report published in February by the Central Asia Analysis Network said that while Uzbekistan is trying hard to strike a balance between the CCP, Russia and the West, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so in practice and is tilting more toward the Chinese side. It is foreseeable that Uzbekistan will strengthen its ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Turkish-led Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States in the future as a way to reduce its dependence on the CCP.