(3) Nixon’s Treachery and Betrayal of Anti-Communist Allies
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. misjudged the CCP’s motives to a certain extent, underestimating both the CCP’s extreme concern for its own security and ignoring the CCP’s deep desire for contact with the U.S., especially the U.S. top brass. As a result, what could have been a reciprocal and mutually beneficial thaw turned into a costly deal in which the U.S. responded to the CCP’s demands, or even gave it what it did not ask for. It is said that pie does not fall from the sky, but the CCP not only got it on the Taiwan issue, but it was also surprisingly big.
When Nixon developed relations with the CCP, Taiwan should not have been a problem because from the U.S. perspective, confronting the CCP’s existence did not require denying the reality of Taiwan. If it was in the national interest of the United States to normalize relations with the CCP, how much more so to maintain national relations with the ROC? The Nixon Doctrine should not and need not be implemented at the expense of the ROC. It was the Chinese Communist Party that forced the United States to choose between the two, and Nixon actually accepted and complied, which is the essence of what made Taiwan a problem.
For their part, the CCP did not have a feel for the U.S. position and bottom line on the Taiwan issue, despite having prior intelligence on the U.S. intention to unfreeze the rapprochement through the communist spy Kim Woo-woo, who had been undercover in the CIA for years. The CCP certainly wanted to withdraw troops, abrogate treaties, and establish diplomatic relations in one step, but it also knew that was unrealistic. Mao made it clear to Snow: “If Nixon is willing to come, I am willing to talk with him, either to make it or not to make it, to quarrel or not to quarrel, to talk as a traveler or to talk as a president. In short, anything. I don’t see that I will quarrel with him.” The reason for Mao’s rather softened attitude was that the CCP was begging the United States at the Time.
Since the CCP welcomed Nixon’s visit unconditionally, it did not expect the two sides to agree on any major issues. Kissinger himself had received reports that Zhou Enlai, in a meeting with a French delegation, said that China would never accept two Chinas, but could “live with this de facto situation. In fact, the Chinese Communists were prepared for the Taiwan issue to be a non-starter, because they did not intend to let it get in the way of their grand strategy of uniting the United States with the Soviet Union.
Perhaps because the CCP did not expect the United States to give up its ROC ally so easily, Zhou Enlai, in several oral and written replies to the United States, only proposed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and did not ask the United States to recognize Taiwan as belonging to the CCP, as he had done in the past. For example, in a personal letter to Nixon dated May 29, 1971, Zhou Enlai wrote: “Chairman Mao Zedong expresses his welcome to President Nixon’s visit and looks forward to the day when he can have a direct conversation with His Excellency and freely raise the main issues of their respective concerns. It goes without saying that the key issue between China and the United States, namely, the question of the concrete means of withdrawing all armed forces of the United States from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area, must first be resolved.” Given the importance of the matter at stake, it is believed that this letter was sent only after Mao Zedong himself had read it and approved it. It is evident that Mao and Zhou were restrained on the Taiwan issue and did not have high expectations, as the initiative was entirely in the hands of the United States.
The Republic of China opposed U.S. recognition of the CCP, but would not oppose U.S. double recognition based on facts. Chiang showed pragmatism in admitting the Chinese Communist Party to the United Nations, rather than the absolute “Chinese and traitors don’t get along” attitude. Initially, Chiang agreed to co-exist with the Chinese Communist Party in the UN while retaining a seat on the Security Council. Later, after the seats in the Security Council were inevitably taken by the Chinese Communist Party, he acquiesced to the Republic of China’s presence in the UN only as a general member. Later, he could even tolerate the new Saudi proposal of “one China, one Taiwan” (i.e., retaining the ROC’s seat in the UN until the people of Taiwan decide, under the auspices of the UN, whether to become independent or to form a federation with the PRC).
In short, if Nixon had really said, as he did when announcing his visit to Beijing, that the United States would not seek relations with Communist China at the expense of old friends, especially if the Republic of China showed pragmatism, it would have been possible to refer to the two-German and two-Korean models for relations with Communist China. Secretary of State Rogers then advised Nixon that the United States should regard the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China as the legitimate governments (dejure government) of their respective jurisdictions and maintain national relations and concordant defense treaties with the latter while seeking greater engagement with the former. If the United States sticks to its principles, the CCP, however reluctantly, will have to face the reality of two Chinas living side by side. After all, from the CCP’s perspective, a visit by the U.S. president and a commitment to improving relations between the two countries would have been two pieces of swan meat that a toad could never have dreamed of eating.
However, Nixon was so determined to make amends with the CCP that he agreed with the CCP that the Taiwan issue was the main obstacle to the normalization of relations between the two countries, saw Taiwan as a burden, and submitted his name to the CCP by selling out Taiwan. He knew very well that the mainstream public opinion in the United States at that time was still anti-communist, and there was no market in Congress or among the people for openly betraying anti-communist allies. Therefore, he adopted a black-box approach and discussed all plans and actions for rapprochement with the CCP with Kissinger alone, while even Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Greene were kept in the dark.
The declassified documents show that Nixon did not have a comprehensive strategic plan to deal with the Taiwan issue, and Kissinger lacked a thorough and effective negotiation strategy. Otherwise, the role and value of the Republic of China at the center of the first island chain would have been even more critical, and the U.S. presence in Taiwan should at least not have been weakened, considering that the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam would have led to the expansion of communist power. The United States could also take advantage of the Chinese Communist Party’s wait-and-see attitude on the Taiwan issue to take the initiative in negotiations and force the Communist Party to make concessions to maximize the interests of the United States and the free world. Sadly, Nixon was so impatient and carried away by his own approach to bringing in the Communists that his only concern was to exhort Kissinger to negotiate “without looking like he was selling out Taiwan.”
Specifically, the Nixon administration betrayed the interests of its anti-communist ally, the Republic of China, in two ways.
First, the United States made a half-hearted effort to retain the Republic of China’s seat at the United Nations.
Successive U.S. administrations before Nixon did not recognize the illegal regime of the ROC. In 1971, Albania and others again proposed a bill to “restore the legal authority of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” which the Republic of China called the “Exclusion of Me and the Bandits Case. This is what the Republic of China called “the case of exclusion”. But that year, it was expected that the majority of member states would support the bill. Therefore, the U.S. proposed a new “important issue” bill that would have deemed the denial of membership to be a major issue, requiring more than a two-thirds majority. The United States was also prepared to propose a “dual representation” case.
After receiving an understanding from the Republic of China, Secretary of State Rogers issued a statement on August 2 supporting the People’s Republic of China’s membership in the United Nations and the Security Council, but opposing any action to expel the Republic of China. He stated that in addressing the issue of Chinese representation, the United Nations should recognize that both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China exist, and should reflect this indisputable reality in the manner in which Chinese representation is provided. But Rogers did not yet understand what Nixon really thought at the time.
Nixon had long decided to abandon Taiwan, not wanting to argue with the Chinese Communist Party over the “two Chinas,” but not wanting to be too blatant about it, preferably on Taiwan’s own initiative. He had previously told Ambassador Ma Kangwei, who had asked him for advice, “If I were them, to hell with the United Nations! What’s the point of staying there? It’s just a forum for bickering and bickering. Tell them they don’t have to care about the UN. It was only when Ma reminded him that once Taiwan lost the UN, it would be isolated in the world that Nixon seemed to understand. But Taiwan’s future was no longer relevant in his mind.
In fact, with the great influence of the United States on its allies, the “important issues” case proposed to retain the membership of the Republic of China should be sure to pass. If so, even if the “exclusion case” was passed, the Republic of China would still have a good chance of staying in the United Nations.
But Nixon did not intend to help the Republic of China in order to please the Chinese Communist Party. The United States neither actively communicated with its allies nor was it prepared to discuss the need for two Chinas from a legal perspective. Moreover, before the UN General Assembly vote to decide whether Taiwan should stay or go, Kissinger made a high-profile public visit to Beijing to release the signal that the U.S. was pro-communist and abandoned Taiwan. As a result, many members of the free world voted against or abstained from voting, and the U.S. lost the “important issue” case by four votes. In order to maintain national dignity, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations, which she had helped to create, before the case was put to a vote.
It is a disgrace to the international organization that the United Nations expelled its founding member, the Republic of China, and welcomed an impostor, Communist China, into its membership. It was on that day that the Chinese Communist Party challenged the international order and defanged the international organization. Ironically, Nixon helped Communist China out of isolation, but caused its ally, the Republic of China, to gradually lose its foothold in the international community until today.
Second, the United States accepted the Communist Party’s “One China” claim.
Facilitating the Communist rebel group’s entry into the United Nations and stealing a seat on the Security Council was only the first step in the U.S. selling out Taiwan, and a windfall for the CCP; neither Mao nor Zhou expected to be able to successfully enter the United Nations that year. However, the “exclusion case” did not involve Taiwan’s political status and affiliation. Although the Chinese Communist Party has acquired the title of “sole legitimate representative,” it can hardly deny the existence of the Republic of China, nor can it deprive the Republic of China of its legal status. The ROC is like a mirror that illuminates the true attributes of the illegal regime of Communist China. This is why the CCP insists on international recognition of Taiwan as part of Communist China. The CCP especially needs the endorsement of the United States.
As mentioned earlier, none of the CCP’s official replies to the United States mentioned the demand for one China, but instead attributed the Taiwan issue to the withdrawal of U.S. troops. It was only during Kissinger’s first visit to Beijing that Zhou Enlai brought up Taiwan as part of the CCP to his face. When Kissinger pointed out that this was an additional requirement, Zhou Enlai said, “That’s because the exchange of views must make the whole point.” It is clear that up to that point, the Communist Party had little confidence that it could get a bargain from the United States. To his surprise, Kissinger replied: “Of course, I don’t mean this in a critical way, but I just want to divide the issue into two parts, first on the withdrawal and then on the political history”. Zhou Enlai was greatly relieved at his words and was visibly tough in the negotiations the next day, putting forward in one breath five conditions for the normalization of relations, which Kissinger readily accepted in their entirety. He had completely forgotten that Nixon had instructed him to “avoid demonstrating a willingness to abandon support for Taiwan unless necessary,” but perhaps he knew that Nixon was just saying that.
Zhou’s five conditions were: recognition of the CCP as the sole legitimate representative of China; Taiwan as a part of the CCP; no support for two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; no support for Taiwan’s independence; and no support for Taiwan’s undetermined status.
Kissinger said he could agree to the latter three on the spot; Nixon would also reiterate them when he met with Mao, and the second one would be automatically settled. Formal recognition of the CCP as the sole legitimate representative of China (i.e., the establishment of diplomatic relations) would need to be achieved after Nixon’s re-election, and thus would only be a matter of time.
As for the issue of U.S. troops in Taiwan, Kissinger explained to Zhou Enlai that two-thirds of the troops in Taiwan were there to support the Vietnam War. They would be withdrawn once the war was over. The remaining one-third would also be withdrawn as relations with the Chinese Communist Party improved. When Nixon met with Zhou, he again promised privately that he would withdraw all U.S. troops in Taiwan during his term, regardless of how negotiations with the Communists proceeded, but begged Zhou to give him leeway in the wording of the Shanghai Communique. Nixon said he would certainly do more than what was publicly stated, but would have to make it clear to Congress and the public upon his return to the United States that there was no secret agreement.
Unfortunately, history has repeatedly shown that when civilization engages evil, concessions in principle are often one-sided. In his first meeting with Zhou Enlai, Kissinger said, “We both adhere to our respective principles, and if we abandon them, we cannot act as a responsible international player or build a lasting peace.” But the Shanghai Communiqué made it clear that it was the Communists who stood firm and it was the United States that made significant concessions.
Secretary of State Rogers, who was with the mission at the time, was excluded from the communiqué drafting team and did not see the final version until the day before it was published. When he discovered that the communiqué deliberately omitted the content about the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty, he had expressed strong dissatisfaction and forced Kissinger to renegotiate with Zhou Enlai. As a result, it was the United States that compromised by removing the original U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan military alliances all together.
In order to conceal the substance of the betrayal of Taiwan and to appease domestic public opinion, Kissinger also put some thought into the One China formulation, the phrase that later appeared in the Shanghai Communique: “The United States recognizes (acknowledge, meaning ‘known, without meaning to agree’) that in All Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. government does not dispute this position.” This statement was also the result of concessions to the Chinese Communist Party.
The version Secretary of State Rogers preferred was: “All Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States notes this position on both sides.”
While both versions deliberately do not identify “China,” Key’s wording is clearly more favorable to the CCP. For example, the CCP deliberately translates “recognizes” as “acknowledges” to mislead mainland readers that the U.S. endorses the CCP’s viewpoint, whereas if Roche’s “notes” is used, the CCP cannot distort the original meaning. If Luo’s “noted” is used, the CCP cannot distort the original meaning. The U.S. “no objection” also allows the CCP to interpret the U.S. as agreeing to one China, the “People’s Republic of China,” and that Taiwan is part of the “People’s Republic of China. In addition, Luo also deleted the word “all” from the phrase “Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait”, leaving room for the Taiwanese.
The Chinese Communist Party did not do anything and lost nothing, but got everything it wanted and became a big winner.
The U.S. gave up everything and gained nothing, except a full meal at the CCP banquet, and lost everything, including principles, justice, credibility, and future national luck.
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