The Nationalist government’s policy was to resolutely recover the northeast based on the Sino-Soviet treaty, or destroy the Communist forces if they stood in the way. However, Marshall opposed military conflict and then pulled the government to negotiate an armistice with the CCP, putting the CCP, which had no legal status in the Northeast, on par with the government. Chiang proposed that the Communist forces should withdraw from the areas that the government must occupy in order to restore sovereignty; the Communist forces should not occupy the areas vacated by Soviet troops first. But the Communists refused to accept it, agreeing only to a three-person team to go to the mediation, which was really a rip-off. Such an agreement is useless. It is no wonder that during the negotiations, the communists were informed of the evacuation of Soviet troops, raided Siping, eliminated the advance defenders of the national army, arrested government officials to receive, and appointed the communists’ own provincial and municipal party secretaries. The communists were so rampant because they had figured out the bottom line of the United States, which was to resolve conflicts by negotiation, avoid war by concessions, and seek peace by compromise. So they amassed more than 200,000 troops in Benxi and Siping, blocking the northward path of the national army and attempting to monopolize northern Manchuria.
Fortunately, at this Time (March 1946), Marshall returned to China for duty, and Chiang was able to get rid of the American constraint for the time being. He ordered the National Army to advance northward and eliminate the main force of the communist rebels in Siping in one fell swoop, known as the Battle of Siping Street.
The soldiers were well-trained and equipped with American-style equipment, and had unprecedented firepower for the Communists.
However, at the critical moment when the battle was heating up, the American “mother-in-law” hurried back.
If Chiang was afraid of Marshall’s return to China, the Communists were eagerly awaiting it, because despite Mao’s strict orders to hold Siping at all costs, the Communists were on the verge of a military and psychological collapse under the intense artillery fire of the Nationalists, and they desperately needed the “peacemaker” Marshall to press the government for a truce. 18]
The American ally of the Nationalist government was seen as a savior by the dying Communists, and a great wonder in the northeast battlefield of the Communist Party. The wonder was that Ma did live up to the “Communist” expectation by accusing the government’s righteous division in a stern voice; the wonder was that on the same day Ma returned to China, the Communists again captured Changchun and again blatantly violated the armistice, yet Marshall still insisted that compromise was in the government’s interest; [19] the wonder was that the appeasement emissary was not even as good as the infamous Chamberlain, for Chamberlain knew to change course and declare war on Germany even after Hitler had torn up the agreement. Chiang said in his diary, “I have recently observed Marshall’s psychology and attitude, and I am extremely worried about the breakdown or suspension of the negotiations with the Communists. His mind was almost completely controlled by the Communist Party, and he dared not disobey the Communist Party’s demands, and dared not try to negotiate with the Communist Party on any terms that were in conflict with its mentality. [20]
In this round, Chiang refused to give in to American pressure. The Nationalist soldiers worked their way up and down the army, and the momentum was as strong as ever, first taking Benxi and then breaking Siping. Lin Biao failed to get Mao Zedong’s approval in return, and led the remnants of his army in a full-scale rout to northern Manchuria, and the Northeast Bureau, which had made Changchun its capital, also abandoned the city and fled north. The defeated communist army was in disarray and disarmed, and countless people, including Lin Biao’s beloved chief of operations, surrendered and left the army.
This was one of the rare victories in the history of the war against the Communists, as Jiang Zhongzheng was able to exclude Marshall’s interference, and the national army was finally able to implement the supreme commander’s decision to fight the Communists.
However, Lin Biao was defeated on the battlefield and immediately replaced by Zhou Enlai to launch a diplomatic offensive, accusing Marshall of harboring the government, expanding the conflict and undermining peace. This poked at Ma’s sore point of “fair reconciliation”. He was already opposed to the National Army’s counter-attack on Siping, and was even more irritated by the National Army’s continued pursuit and destruction after the victory, showing his incompetence in mediating the failure. Provoked by the communists, Marshall became furious and demonic, claiming that his honor and credibility had been damaged, forcing Chiang to immediately order the Nationalists to stop the pursuit, and threatening to withdraw from the mediation and cancel the 500 million aid loan to China. Chiang said in his diary on May 27: “The treacherous and cunning schemes of Chou En-lai have been in mind, and Marshall’s mind, as in the past, only wants me to order a truce immediately, so that his personal mission can be achieved quickly, without regard to the survival of our country’s veins and people’s lives, as lamentable too!”
At that time, the front line of the National Army had already crossed the Songhua River, and was approaching Harbin, where the Northeast Bureau of the Communists was located, and it was only a matter of time before they would be wiped out. On June 2, Lin Biao lamented in a telegram to Mao Zedong that he could not stop the National Army from occupying Qiha, and that he would be lucky if he could get a truce by withdrawing from Qiha; he would prepare for a guerrilla attack and abandon Qiha. [21]
However, under Marshall’s hysterical coercion, Chiang weighed his options and, with the assurance that the National Army had the right to attack at any time and in order to maintain relations with the United States, decided to resume peace talks with a seven-day armistice beginning June 6, 1946. This was the much-criticized Second Armistice Order.
Why did Marshall fear the Communists so much? The main reason was that he feared that a war between the Nationalists and the Communists would anger the Soviet Union and involve the United States. In fact, both Stalin and Mao regarded conflict with the US as a fearful option. The Soviet ambassador had warned the Communists not to be too aggressive in the northeast, lest the danger of American troops entering Manchuria become too great. But in contrast to the rigid U.S. policy, the Soviet Union spared no effort to protect the CCP. [22] When Marshall interfered in China’s internal affairs and pushed for peaceful reunification, the Soviets let the Communists attack and pillage in the northeast on the grounds of non-interference in China’s internal affairs; when Marshall led the government to negotiate a truce with the Communists, the Soviets encouraged the Communists to let go of the fight in areas where the Soviets had withdrawn (such as Siping and Changchun); when American officers quarreled with the Communists at the Military Adjustment Department, Soviet military advisers directly joined the Communists’ illiterate army to operate artillery, tanks, and other modern weapons. The Soviet Union ostensibly supported the Nationalist government, but in fact secretly helped the CCP; the U.S. nominally recognized the Nationalist government, but in fact favored the CCP. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union was the protector of the CCP, but it is saddening that the United States also acted as the protector of the CCP.
Without Marshall, there would not have been the first armistice, let alone the second. Without the second armistice, the Communists would not have been able to escape their fate of destruction in the Northeast. Although the communists were defeated in Siping, they were able to use Marshall’s strength to preserve North Manchur and successfully achieve their strategic goal of dividing the Northeast equally with the government. They took advantage of the truce to establish a base, collect hundreds of thousands of armed pseudo-Manchurians and tens of thousands of skilled Japanese soldiers, plus seize fine Japanese weapons and arsenals, and receive countless Soviet-supplied arms through the North Manchurian Railway. Six months later, the National Army was unable to counter the reorganized Communists with its current strength. Due to Marshall’s intervention, the Nationalist Army lost the fleeting opportunity to fight, and its brief strategic advantage in the Northeast was wasted. As Chiang himself summarized, “From then on, the morale of the national army in the northeast was getting lower and lower, and all military operations were in a passive position. …… Therefore, the final defeat of the National Army in the Northeast in the winter of 37 years was all due to the consequences incurred by this second armistice order.” [23]
It is reasonable to say that the government should have had the absolute upper hand in the subsequent negotiations when the Communists begged for an armistice when they were defeated. But Marshall’s intervention made the Communists extra tough, rejecting all five of the government’s proposals and sticking to them. For example, the government demanded that the communists hand over the “liberated areas” in northern Jiangsu, while the communists wanted the government to withdraw from Nanking; the government wanted the communists to withdraw from Zhetsa, while the communists wanted the government to withdraw from Pingjin. When the armistice expired, the government was caught in a dilemma. If it wanted to fight, the United States could not pass; if it wanted to make peace, the communists would not give in. The national government, as the justified and powerful party, had nothing to gain after the armistice.
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