The lucky Jiang Zemin’s talent is mediocre and he does not have any strategy to govern the country, nor does he have the experience or ability to take the lead, which is very unappealing to Deng Xiaoping. Therefore, he could only hide his cynicism and jealousy in his heart, and he turned the tide with the situation, to meet and patronize the horse, in order to keep his own selfish power as the highest principle.
Jiang Zemin in Deng Xiaoping and then the conservative game to get out of the line, fell through the glasses of many people. Wu Jiaxiang, who served in the Office of the Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the Central Committee, called Jiang Zemin and his forces the “Black Horse Group”. He described the “Black Horse Group” as “the highest political level of patronage and the most correct political attitude of not making any political statements”, and as “utterly utilitarian and downright power-hungry. He is a “utterly utilitarian and power-hungry person. Such a person as party leader is really a wrong party appointing a wrong leader at the wrong Time and in the wrong way, thus embarking on a wrong path.
It is no wonder that Jiang Zemin does not have any good qualities that human beings should have and, moreover, does not have any talents, all acting with extreme selfish calculations when things come to a head and doing whatever it takes to keep his power.
After Jiang Zemin came to power, the political environment in the country took an immediate left turn between 1989 and 1991, bringing reforms to a standstill for a while. the annual growth of GNP in 1989 and 1990 was less than 5%.
Two sides of the same coin
Jiang Zemin was accepted by the conservatives at the Time for a number of reasons, but to say that Jiang did not want to be in tune with Deng Xiaoping, who was the most powerful man in the country, would be an injustice. Compared with Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin did not have any strategy for governing the country, nor did he have any experience or ability to take charge. In his Life, all he has known is that he has been in favor of people before he gained power, and after he gained power, he forced people to be in favor of him to satisfy his own desires, and that’s all. For Deng Xiaoping is thinking of the problem, Jiang Zemin really know nothing from nothing, despite efforts to light cigarettes, tea, shoes for Deng Xiaoping, but ultimately did not get Deng’s heart.
Jiang Zemin wanted to throw Deng’s good not get his door to enter, but he threw Li Peng’s good, support the Three Gorges Dam, so that the Li Peng Department from the Three Gorges project to get great benefit, but received an immediate and rich return. The Jiang-Li system had the support of the conservative elders, so during his first three years as general secretary, Jiang Zemin emphasized “anti-peaceful evolution” and talked about the vain “social” or “capitalist” concept. The first three years of Jiang Zemin’s term as general secretary, he emphasized the “anti-peaceful evolution” and talked about the “two reform concepts” of “surname of society” or “surname of capital”, and said he would “punish the self-employed to the point of losing all their money. The outside world thus considered Jiang Zemin as a conservative, which is also wronged him, as evidenced by the fact that Jiang Zemin later turned into a “reformist” and abandoned Li Peng like a broom. If Jiang Zemin could have voted for Deng Xiaoping at the beginning, he would have been a “reformist”.
The collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the socialist camps in Eastern Europe in 1991 alarmed the Communist Party and Jiang Zemin, who had just ascended to the top.
Deng Xiaoping saw the need to continue to reform and open up the market, and to win back the hearts and minds of the people by starting with the economy. In order to consolidate his position, he abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s line of “economic construction as the center” and vigorously implemented “anti-liberalization and anti-peaceful evolution as the center”. He tightened his ideological control. Jiang Zemin even theoretically claimed that “there is also a struggle over the line in reform and opening up”, directly pointing his criticism at Deng Xiaoping.
In the spring and summer of 1992, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Mao’s “Speech at the Yan’an Symposium on Literature and Art,” Jiang organized a series of high-profile commemorative events nationwide, trying to bring China back to the pre-Cultural Revolution period and to resolve domestic conflicts through political campaigns. According to Tian Jiyun’s later recollection, “some extremely rigid-minded people tried to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the “storm” to deny the great achievements of reform and opening up, and to drag China back to the old ways. …… In those cold windy days, the cadres and masses held their breath and worried about China’s future”.
At the end of 1991, Deng Xiaoping was completely enraged by Jiang Zemin’s actions and had not only lost confidence in the so-called “third generation leadership core” of Jiang Zemin, but also reached an intolerable level. Deng Xiaoping, although nominally without any position, was still firmly in control of the army: it was managed by Yang Shangkun, Deng’s closest and oldest friend, and Yang Baibing, a very trusted subordinate. Yang Shangkun and Deng Xiaoping had met in 1932 and had been friends for 60 years. Yang Baibing, whose rank of general was personally conferred by Deng Xiaoping in September 1988, has been faithfully carrying out Deng’s political line in the military. Another vice chairman of the military commission, Liu Huaqing, is a longtime subordinate of Deng’s and has also been loyal to him. Jiang Zemin, who had no military credentials, was appointed chairman of the Military Commission in November 1989, but how could the old military chiefs be willing to listen to him, a man who had never touched a gun, when he was in command? Jiang Zemin did not dare to appoint a few admirals like Deng Xiaoping, and he did not have his own team and people in the army, so in addition to allocating huge sums of money to the military to buy obsolete weapons from the Soviet Union, Jiang Zemin remembered the propaganda skills taught to him by his traitor father. He instructed to make several films glorifying the PLA to please the military on the one hand and to brainwash the people who hated the PLA after the June 4 Incident on the other. Jiang Zemin personally wrote the titles for some of the films, including the three mega-budget war films “Armageddon”.
Deng Xiaoping saw that Jiang Zemin, the core of the “third generation leadership”, was trying to obstruct reform and opening up, so he was determined to use his military power to make a last-ditch effort to replace Jiang Zemin and others who opposed reform at the 14th Communist Party Congress, so that those who were determined to implement reform and opening up could take power. Deng Xiaoping planned to replace Jiang Zemin with Qiao Shi as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Deng had consulted Yang Shangkun and Wan Li on this proposal. At the same time, to show his support for Qiao Shi, Deng Xiaoping gave high recognition to Qiao Shi’s speeches in various places. This in turn made Jiang Zemin cynical and saw Qiao Shi as an ingrate rival.
Deng Xiaoping was also prepared to once again promote Zhao Ziyang, who had been placed under house arrest, to the chairmanship of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Deng did not doubt Zhao Ziyang’s insistence on reform, the key is the “June 4” is Deng’s biggest heartache in his later years. Deng Xiaoping then sent a message to Zhao Ziyang, asking him to admit his mistakes in the June Fourth Incident before he came out to work, to prevent Zhao from reversing the June Fourth Incident later. The contact person came back and reported that Zhao Ziyang insisted that he was not at fault and would not write a review. Zhao Ziyang said: “Why did I step down and not make a review? Because this is my own choice. …… I think I’m not wrong, why do I need to review? A review will not tell the truth.” After listening to the report, Deng Xiaoping heart mixed, long silence.
After Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang stepped down, Deng Xiaoping lost the most powerful assistant to promote reform and opening up. Jiang Zemin, the core of the “third generation of leadership”, not only did not promote reform and opening up, but also criticized it from the theoretical point of view. On January 17, 1992, a special train left Beijing and sped to the south. Deng Xiaoping in the car, at the age of 88, went south again, accompanied by his wife, daughter and old friend, President Yang Shangkun, from January 18 to February 21, starting his trip to Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai, known as “Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour”.
The positive and negative defiance angered Deng Xiaoping
On January 18, Deng Xiaoping arrived in Wuchang, Deng Xiaoping directly named Jiang Zemin and asked the local chief to bring a message to Jiang’s “Central Committee”: “Whoever opposes the line of the 13th Congress will step down.” Jiang Zemin harbored a grudge against this, and after that, he was slow to express his support for Deng’s southern tour speech.
On the 19th, the train arrived at Shenzhen SAR. Deng Xiaoping, who had always been relatively quiet, delivered a long speech, clearly issuing an ultimatum to Jiang Zemin: “Reform and opening up is the general trend, supported by the whole Party and the whole country, who does not reform who steps down.” At the same time, Deng Xiaoping put Yang Shangkun and Wan Li in charge of preparing the “personnel team” for the 14th Communist Party Congress at the end of 1992, drawing up a list of the new personnel team, including the general secretary. In addition to his close friend, Yang Shangkun, then president and first vice chairman of the military commission, who accompanied Deng Xiaoping on his southern tour, Deng Xiaoping met separately with Qiao Shi, Liu Huaqing, Ye Xuanping, Zhu Rongji, Yang Baibing and others during this tour, which on the one hand shows that Deng Xiaoping was vigorously building momentum for reform and opening up, and on the other hand reflects Deng Xiaoping’s intention to promote Qiao Shi and remove Jiang Zemin.
Deng Xiaoping also repeatedly mentioned during his southern tour, saying that Zhao Ziyang was in charge of economic work for five years “to accelerate the development of not small credit”. After returning from the southern tour, Deng Xiaoping was still undeterred and sent people to contact Zhao Ziyang again. Zhao Ziyang still did not admit his mistake.
Since Jiang Zemin became general secretary for more than two years, the implementation of the ultra-left line, “anti-peaceful evolution” has been faint head. Deng Xiaoping’s words, “Whoever does not reform will step down,” poked Jiang Zemin in the gut, and he has been holding a grudge.
In the morning of February 20, Jiang Zemin convened an expanded meeting of the Politburo to convey Deng Xiaoping’s speech. In a series of Deng Xiaoping’s talks as the CPC Central Committee documents officially conveyed to the party, Jiang Zemin to “easily cause the party cadres ideological instability” as an excuse to delete a large number of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour speech, especially the deletion of “reform and opening up is the general trend, the whole party and the people of the country have The majority of people in the country did not know about the details of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour.
On January 18, 2012, when the Chinese Communist Party commemorated Deng’s Southern Tour speech, Xinhua.com reprinted a report from the Southern Daily, “Two Unreported Quotes from Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Talk”, one of which was “Don’t engage in political campaigns, don’t engage in formalism, leaders should be clear-headed, and don’t influence work. The other sentence is “When you are old, you have to be conscious of yourself, otherwise you will easily make mistakes. Like me, I am old, poor memory, and stuttering, so we old people should come down and wholeheartedly support the young people to go up”. I don’t know why Jiang was particularly sensitive to these two sentences, but in the following 10 years, Jiang did launch another nationwide political campaign to persecute Falun Gong, which lasted longer than the Cultural Revolution, and Jiang stayed in his position, restraining Hu Jintao, Deng’s handpicked successor, at every turn.
One day in late February 1992, Li Ruihuan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of ideology, asked Gao Di, president of the People’s Daily, “Why didn’t the People’s Daily publish [Deng’s southern tour speech], and why was there no reaction?” Gao Di justifiably asked in return, “Comrade Xiaoping is just an ordinary Party member now, and we don’t know what caliber to report.” Gao Di dared to contradict Li Ruihuan because he was confident that he had Jiang Zemin as his backstage.
But he did not know that Jiang’s position as general secretary was given by Deng Xiaoping, and that Deng had the backing of the military and could withdraw the appointment at any time.
From March 20 to April 3, 1992, the Fifth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress was held in Beijing, and the focus of the Congress was whether to carry out reforms or not. In the face of Jiang Zemin’s suppression of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour speech, the military, the Trump card in the CCP’s political struggle, spoke up. At the NPC meeting, Yang Baibing, Secretary General of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Secretary General of the Central Military Commission and Director of the General Political Department, took the lead in shouting, “Escort for reform and opening up.” At the same time, Yang Baibing directly instructed the PLA Daily to publish an editorial entitled “Escorting for Reform and Opening-up”, openly expressing “resolutely responding to Comrade Xiaoping’s call to escort for reform and opening-up”, and clearly supporting Deng Xiaoping. The first one to respond in the General Staff system was He Qizong, the deputy chief of the General Staff. Yang Baibing’s “escort for reform and opening up” was aimed directly at Jiang Zemin, who has since hated both Yang Baibing and He Qizong to the bone, and they were both later purged by Jiang.
At about the same time, on March 26, during the NPC session, Shenzhen Special Zone Daily published a long newsletter on the front page, “The East is full of spring – Comrade Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen”, disclosing the facts of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour and his important speech. On the afternoon of the same day, the Yangcheng Evening News published this report in full with rare specifications; on March 28, the Shanghai Wen Wei Po and the China Business Times both reprinted the article in full; on March 30, the Xinhua News Agency, controlled by Jiang’s men, broadcast the article in full, four days later than the Shenzhen Special Zone News, reflecting Jiang Zemin’s strong resistance.
Only see the wind and make the rudder
On behalf of the military, Yang Baibing formally and publicly expressed his position on the Southern Tour speech, and the military became Deng Xiaoping’s strongest backing. The strong support of the PLA greatly deterred those who opposed the reform, making the situation take a sharp turn for the worse. Jiang Zemin was stunned and felt that the army’s sharpness was pushing him straight.
In his panic, Jiang resorted to political duplicity and verbally echoed Deng Xiaoping’s speech when he met with The Japanese on April 1. Deng Xiaoping believed that what Jiang Zemin said was totally empty words, not sincere at all, but just coping.
This was only a few months before the official transfer of power at the 14th Communist Party Congress, and Yang Baibing’s revealing of his army’s underhandedness strongly impacted the top echelons of the Communist Party, and the political situation in Beijing was treacherous and unpredictable. On May 22, 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited Shougang in spite of the scorching heat in Beijing and complained in front of all the cadres and workers present: “Some of them are sloppy in their speeches, dealing with me, and some of them are dull, actually opposing and disagreeing with me. is opposed, disagree, only a very small number of people really moved.” Deng Xiaoping then asked Li Ximing and Chen Xitong, the leaders of Beijing who accompanied him there, to “bring a message to the Central Committee”. The “Central Committee” was naturally Jiang Zemin.
During this period, Qiao Shi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, secretary of the Political and Legal Committee and president of the Central Party School, repeatedly pointed out that Deng Xiaoping’s speech should not be limited to “big words and empty words” and criticized Jiang Zemin. Vice Premier Tian Jiyun strongly expressed his support for Deng’s reforms.
At the request of Qiao Shi, Tian Ji Yun delivered a speech at the Central Party School in May 1992, criticizing Jiang Zemin without naming him: “When eliminating the influence of the “left”, we should be especially wary of those wind school figures. Such people turn their hands into clouds and turn their hands into rain, talking to people and talking to ghosts, jumping out to oppose reform and opening up at every opportunity. Once these people get hold of the state power, it will be a disaster for the country and for the people.”
These words made Jiang Zemin gnash his teeth in hatred. Seeing that the situation was not right, he was ready to put on the face of a reformist again, only to be pierced by a few words from Tian Jiyun. The company’s main goal is to provide the best possible solution to the problem. The company’s position is in jeopardy, and the situation is very unfavorable to him. As a last resort, Jiang Zemin had to see the wind to make the rudder, the voice against the “bourgeois reform concept” began to lower.
On June 9, 1992, the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was under heavy guard, as if it were an enemy. Jiang Zemin entered the auditorium of the Party School surrounded by Qiao Shi and a large number of soldiers and police. When the faculty and students of the Party School saw the scene, they laughed and said, “Jiang Zemin must have been escorted here by Qiao Shi using dictatorial forces.” Jiang Zemin was forced by Qiao Shi to express his support for Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour speech at the Party School, but he felt that he had lost a lot of face by being forced by Qiao Shi to come here, and he held a greater grudge against Qiao Shi in his heart. People said under the meeting, “Look at the frame to know that Jiang Zemin has no sincerity.” But on the surface Jiang Zemin has been much more honest.
In the spring and summer of 1992, the political popularity of Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the Communist Party, was in decline, and some people were already discussing whether Jiang Zemin’s position as general secretary could still be retained. Forced by the situation to change his attitude, Jiang Zemin claimed to support Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up line without meaning to, but was still much later than others. Jiang Zemin later on the news that he may step down the more afraid, sleep and Food, more worried about when the old account together with the new account, may also be subject to the Party’s big criticism. So Jiang Zemin secretly went to Deng Xiaoping, made a “profound” review, with tears in his eyes that he vowed to follow Deng Xiaoping, the reform and opening up to the end. Deng’s attitude forced Jiang to support the market economy reform. The history of the next decade or so shows that Jiang’s support is only superficial, but in essence against Deng’s wishes.
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