The federal government has revealed that nearly 90 per cent of the staff at the Canadian Visa Application Centre in Beijing are directly employed by companies affiliated with the Beijing Public Security Bureau. (Canada News Service)
On March 10, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM) held a video conference in which Canadian Immigration Minister Marco Mendicino and a number of opposition MPs discussed special immigration and refugee measures for Hong Kong residents and how to deal with the possible existence of Canadian visa centers in mainland China. Marco Mendicino and opposition MPs discussed special immigration and refugee measures for Hong Kong residents and how to deal with possible espionage at Canada’s visa centers in mainland China.
NDP MP: Hong Kong people should be granted exemptions
NDP MP Michelle Kwan raised concerns at the meeting about the operability of the federal government’s current “lifeboat program,” which is limited to young people in Hong Kong who graduate from university within five years, while those in urgent need of a “lifeboat” are also This includes secondary school students and adults who have graduated from university more than five years ago.
Kwan pointed out that these Hong Kong people are unable to come to Canada as refugees and are subject to a non-essential international travel ban that makes it difficult for them to enter Canada to apply for refugee status. She urged the federal government that with many Hong Kong people facing arrest, or possible denial of entry, “most urgently, we need the Canadian government to grant entry (waivers).
Conservative MP: Information security risks at Beijing visa center
The federal government has revealed that nearly 90 per cent of the staff at the Canadian Visa Application Centre in Beijing are directly employed by companies affiliated with the Beijing Public Security Bureau. Conservative MP Jasrag Singh Hallan asked at a March 10 videoconference, “If Chinese pro-democracy activists have not fled to Canada, how can we be sure that Chinese spies are not submitting this information to the Chinese Communist government? How can we know if employees of foreign consulates are not being used for espionage activities?
There are risks in hiring foreign companies, which is why we have introduced strict protocols,” said Marco Mendicino, Canada’s immigration minister. Screening and vetting is done not only for our contractors, but also for each employee (hired) by our subcontractors. That’s why we worked closely with these security agencies and national security agencies before installing the immigration process information equipment; we closely monitor all of these protocols and will take all necessary steps to manage these risks to protect the integrity of our immigration system.”
DiCino said, “I believe we have protocols in place to manage the risks that exist in foreign environments, including China. The screening and vetting that our contractors do ensures that there is a uniform standard that is applied to the reliability state across the government. We don’t just stop there. As part of our visa application process, we also ensure that the Visa Application Center itself has stringent security measures in place to closely monitor and review the work done by our contract employees, including uploading sensitive information. So I hope you will understand that we have our eyes wide open on this issue and we will continue to manage these risks carefully and take any steps necessary to protect the integrity of our immigration system.”
Speaking about the current calls from former Canadian diplomats and security experts in China to (terminate) this service contract with security risks, DiCino did not give a definitive response, saying, “We will continue the government’s interdepartmental cooperation to protect and preserve the integrity of our immigration system.”
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